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ABSTRACT 
This master's thesis investigates the validity of the breakpoint 
hypothesis as used in modelling conflict termination.  The breakpoint 
hypothesis is based upon the concept that a combat force will terminate 
an engagement after sustaining a sufficiently high percentage of 
personnel casualties.  Despite use of the hypothesis in many combat 
modelling efforts, there has not yet been a satisfactory validation of 
the technique. 
The current investigation incorporates a series of modifications 
to a working hypothesis published by Helmbold (197D and utilizes new 
data for empirioal testing.  This investigation focuses on the 
identification and examination of the validity of a series of break 
curves using an engagement data matrix containing 323 engagements; with 
24 data elements available for each engagement.  The methodology consists 
of the use of principle components analysis to reduce the initial set of 
observed variables to an underlying set of defined factors followed by a 
test procedure to determine the degree to which Helmbold's Theorem holds 
for the subset of engagements associated with each uniquely defined 
factor combination.  The. results are then confirmed using discriminant 
analysis. 
The breakpoint hypothesis testing results indicate a number of 
engagement subsets which obey the breakpoint hypothesis reasonably 
well.  In addition, several engagement subsets have been found which obey 
the breakpoint hypothesis better than the full engagement set.  These 
indicate that a aeries of break curves, rather than a single break curve, 
may better account for the break behavior of military forces for the set 
ix 
^ 
of possible engagement types.  The discriminant analysis confirms the 
significance of 3ome of the observed variables and, for the most part, 
reconciles with the results from the breakpoint hypothesis testing. 
This investigation is a preliminary empirical validation of the 
use of probabalistic break curves to model battle termination. Several 
modifications to the present methodology are suggested to refine the 
results.  In addition, the specification of break curves for particular 
groupings of engagement types should be investigated. 
Chapter 1 
• INTRODUCTION 
The breakpoint hypothesis is based upon the conoept that a 
combat force will terminate an engagement after sustaining a suffi- 
ciently high percentage of personnel casualties.  Despite use of the 
hypothesis in many force-on-force attrition studies, there has not yet 
been a satisfactory validation of the technique•(Taylor, 1980:111). 
This thesis investigates the validity of the breakpoint hypothesis as 
used in modelling conflict, termination.  It incorporates a series of 
modifications to a previously-examined working hypothesis and utilizes 
new data for'empirical testing. 
1.1 Theoretical Framework 
The breakpoint hypothesis concerns the relationship of 
casualties to a force's decision to terminate a battle.  It is the 
assumption that a military force gives up; the battle when its 
personnel casualty fraction reaches a certain level, which may be 
either a fixed quantity or one determined on a probabilistic basis. 
Assumptions, of this type are commonly used in war games, field 
maneuvers and computer simulations. ' 
There are two techniques currently used to apply the 
breakpoint hypothesis: deterministic and/p>obabilistic break 
curves.  These are illustrated below (Helmbold, 1971:2-3). 
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A study of the battle termination process performed by Clark 
(195.4) demonstrates that the use of deterministic breakpoints is 
inconsistent with a set of combat data from World War II.  More 
recently, the validity of probabilistic break curves 'was investigated 
by Helmbold (1971).  His conclusions state that probabilistic break 
curves, although inherently more flexible, are not valid as currently 
employed. 
The use of the breakpoint hypothesis in force-on-force 
attrition modeling can perhaps best be seen by example.  The 
following is an auxilliary model for combat between two homogeneous 
forces following Lanchester's Equations for Modern Warfare that was 
presented by Dr. James Taylor in his book, Force-on-Force Attrition 
Modelling (Taylor, 1980:63-66) 
(1.1) 
r 
dx = 
' dt 
-ay 
0 . 
for x^Xgp and y>ygp 
otherwise 
dy_ =  _ 
db 
-bx 
0 
for x>xgp and y>yj}p 
otherwise 
where: 
y = The force level for force y 
x = The force level for force x 
a.= attrition rate coefficient for y forces 
b = attrition rate coefficient for x forces 
'BP x's breakpoint force level 
ygp = y *-3 breakpoint force level 
From this it is observed that y would "win" an engagement if and only 
if: 
y0 
a . 1 - (/Rp)p 
b  1 - (xBP)^ (1.2) 
As illustrated in Table 1.1 below, the breakpoints selected have a 
very significant effect on simulated engagement outcomes.  This  ... 
sensitivity of engagement outcome to the breakpoint used points out 
the need for rigorous justification of the values used. 
Table 1.1 
Influence of Unit Breakpoints on the Outcome of Battle for 
an Attack by X against Y with Battle Dynamics by 
Lanchester's Equations for Modern Warfare 
(Taylor, 1980:66)  . 
CASE y0 b 
XBP yBP WINNER 
X£ 
1 3.0  5.0  0,8   0.5 
2 3-0  5.0  0.7  * 0.5 
3 3.0  5.0  xBP = yBP 
3.23 
2.71 
2.24 
y    0.8   0.59 
x    0.76  0.50 
x    => yBP *BP 
Note:  x is the attacker. ■i 
1.2 Research Question / 
Is the breakpoint hypothesis as stated below consistent 
with the set of his.torical data available for this 
investigation? 
1.3 Breakpoint Hypothesis 
The breakpoint hypothesis used for this investigation is 
listed below.. Elements 1, 3a and 3b of"the hypothesis .come directly 
from Helmbold!s working hypothesis (Helmbold, 1971:7).  The second 
element, is unique. 
1) Termination of a battle can be considered as governed by 
the following mechanism, or one that gives the same 
results: prior to the battle, each side independently and 
at random selects a casualty-fraction value (breakpoint) 
from some distribution of casualty fractions.  Where 
either side experiences a casualty fraction equal to the 
preselected breakpoint, the battle terminates with a loss 
to the side that broke. 
2) The breakpoint distributions (break curves) mentioned 
above are generally applicable within one or more of the 
combinations of the observed variables contained within 
the engagement data matrix available for this 
investigation. 
3a) The losses, and hence equivalently the casualty-fraction, 
of the forces are deterrainistically and monotonically 
related to each other. There is a monotonically 
increasing function, ^ ('),  such that: 
fx(t) =4^ |fy(t)l 0<t<T (1.3) 
PR 
3b)  There is a monotone nondecreasing function 4* such that: 
fx = * (fy) O- (1.1) 
when the defender wins, while 
fX =  * -1(fy) (1-5) 
when the attacker wins. 
Also:  9 (s)>s for all s. 
A complete mathematical development of the above relations is 
contained in subsection 2.3-1.  .., 
The modifications embodied in element 2 utilizes many of the 
factors of combat considered significant in the* literatures.  To a 
significant extent, the results of this inve'stigation are an important 
statement on the validity of many of the Department of Defense 
sponsored combat models currently in use. 
The second chapter reviews several applications of the 
breakpoint hypothesis in force-on-force attrition studies as well as 
the empirical validation studies performed by Clark (1954) and 
Helmbold (1971).  It also discusses the applicability of historical 
7 
data in the analysis of present and future combat processes. 
Chapter 3 specifies the experimental design used for the 
current investigation.  This includes a description of the contents of 
the engagement data matrix, the procedure for break curve construction 
and the methodology used to examine their validity. 
Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results of the 
investigation.  The results of the data reduction process via factor 
analysis are described.  Break curves are presented along with 
■statements about their validity.  In addition, the results obtained 
using the Helmbold procedure are then compared with the results 
obtained via discriminant analysis. 
Chapter 5 documents what the results mean in terms of 
modelling the battle^ termination process. The limitations of the 
study results are reviewed and areas "for future research are 
identified. 
Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The breakpoint hypothesis has been used in many Department of 
Defense sponsored force-on-force attrition studies for modelling the 
battle termination process.  In spite of its widespread use, however, 
empirical support for the hypothesis is limited.  Further research 
found"~T3qly two empirical validation studies.  They-consist of a study 
performed on the validity of deterministic break curves (Clark, 1954) 
and an investigation into the validity of probabilistic break curves 
(Helmbold, 1971).  Both studies found significant problems with 
formulations of the breakpoint hypothesis currently in use. A 
significant obstacle to further investigative work is the question 
concerning the applicability of historical data in the analysis of 
present and future combat processes. 
This chapter provides a brief review of breakpoint hypothesis 
applications and its validity. 
2.1 Sample Applications 
Varying formulations of the breakpoint hypothesis -have been 
used in many force-on-force attrition studies.  One representative 
application is the current U.S. Army's procedures for the control of 
map exercises (Department of the Army, 1973:FM105-5, Appendix D).  The 
functions and values which they use are based on past Army studies and 
combat experience.  These procedures are considered valid for all 
military combat units up to and including battalion-sized units 
(Department of the Army, 1973:FM105-5, Appendix D).  The method for 
modelling the battle termination process for defending units is 
presented below, as taken verbatim from the Army manual.  Note that 
"the procedures provide distinct break curves to be used for attacking 
and defending units, respectively. 
Defending Units 
a. Casualties in a defending force can cause one of three 
results: 
(1) The defense is"continued without interruption by 
the survivors. 
(2) The defending unit requires up to 48 hours to 
recuperate before being able to resume the defense 
in another position.  (It must withdraw to a rear 
position.) 
(3) The defending unit is totally ineffective and must 
either be replaced immediately or risk being 
overrun. 
b. If the percentage of casualties is 25$ or less, result- 
ad) occurs. If the percentage of casualties is 40$ or 
greater, result a(3) . . . occurs.  If the percentage of 
casualties is greater than 25$ but less than 40$ the 
casualty percentage is used to determine the probability 
for the unit to continue defending without a delay .... 
This probability is used in conjunction with the table of 
random numbers to determine whether the event occurs.  If 
the decision is affirmative, the unit can continue to 
defend without interruption. 
c. If the decision is negative, result a(2) above occurs. 
(Department of the Army, 1973:FM105-5, Appendix D) 
This procedure utilizes two breakpoints.  Result ^(2) is 
controlled by a probabilistic break curve whose boundary conditions . 
are (see Appendix A for the definitions of the mathematical symbols 
used)-: 
10 
F
z(.25) = 0 
Fz(.UO) = 1.0 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
For .254114.40, the following break curve la used: 
PROBABILITY 
OF 
PERFORMING 
MISSION (PpM) 
1.00 
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.7 0 
£0 
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.4 0 
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.20 
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>  1 
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\                      t 
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Percentage casualties 
Figure 2.1 
Probability of Defending Unit Continuing 
to Perform Mission 
(Department of the Army, 1973:FM105-5, Appendix D) 
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Note that the probability that the unit breaks = 1 - Pp^.  The 
discontinuity in the curve occurs at the point where the probability 
of the defending unit becomes nonzero. 
Result a(3) is controlled by a deterministic break curve with 
the break occurring at ^0%  casualties.  It represents a more serious 
degradation of the military force. 
Another application of deterministic break curves is found in 
the ATLAS (A Tactical Logistical Air Simulation) model. A key 
assumption used to model battle termination states: 
a division-sized unit in a defensive position is 
considered combat ineffective and hence withdrawn from combat 
when its personnel strength falls below 67%.    The level at 
which an attacking unit becomes combat ineffective is 79%, 
although it is not withdrawn until the 675& level is reached. 
(Kerlin-4 Cole, 1969:17) 
A3 of 1977, this still is one of the most frequently used force-on- 
force attrition models in Department of Defense studies (Taylor, • 
1980:105). 
In each of these two studies, the break curves are defined 
differently,  The relevant breakpoints are listed in Table 2.1, along 
with nominal attacker and defender breakpoints identified by Taylor 
for company-sized units (Taylor, 1980:63,64). 
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Table 2.1 
Typical Breakpoints . 
Source 
Applicable 
Unit Size 
Attack 
Breakpo 
er 
int 
Defender 
Breakpoint 
Maneuver 
Control 
ATLAS 
Taylor 
battalion * 
or less 
division 
company 
N/A 
.79 
.7 
.6 
.67 
.5 
Taylor's values are inconsistent, with those used in Maneuver Control, 
although both are considered valid for company-sized units. The 
functional forms employed are different as well. The sample break 
curves from Maneuver Control are both probabilistic and deterministic 
while ATLAS and Taylor's are deterministic only.  These differenpes 
are significant, given the demonstrated sensitivity of the results of 
a battle termination model to the breakpoint values selected (see 
Table 1.1 and associated text). 
A typical justification for the use of battle termination 
breakpoints is clearly seen in a study performed by Spring and Miller 
(1970) entitled:  "Fast-Val:  Relationships among Casualties, 
Suppression and the Performance of Company-Sized Units".  It concerns 
evaluating the effects of air-delivered munitions during a land combat 
engagement. With respect to the unit breakpoints used, the study 
states: 
. . . because of the lack of available data or relevant 
reference materials, we have relied heavily on the judgement 
and experience of RANfi's military consultants throughout this 
study . . . while it must be emphasized that there is no 
13 
universal agreemehb as to the validity of, the parameters we 
have- defined, we feel that they 3erve as a much-needed working 
starting point . . . these assumptions and relationships are 
subjective and will undoubtedly undergo modification as empi- 
rical data become available.  (Spring and Miller, 1970:-11) 
Both this, and other studies.identify the requirement for the 
functional forms and values used to be empirically based whenever 
•possible. 
Two'empirical investigations into the validity of the 
functional forms and values used in break curves were found in the 
literature. The first concerns deterministic break curves while the 
second investigates probabilistic break curves.  The results are 
documented in the following two sections. 
2.2 Deterministic Break Curves 
Clark conducted the principle investigation into the validity 
of deterministic break curves. Specifically, the study's intent was: 
To investigate from actual combat data the validity of the 
statement that a unit may be considered no longer combat 
effective when it has suffered N percent casualties.  (Clark, 
195^:1) 
The data compiled for the study consisted of forty-four 
battalion-level engagements that occurred within seven divisional 
engagements in the European Theater of Operations during World War II 
(see Appendix B for Clark's definition of a divisional engagement). 
Twenty-seven distinct U.S. infantry battalions were used in the 
analysis. 
For each battalion-level engagement, there are eight data 
elements available.  They are'listed in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 
Data Elements Contained Within Clark's 
Engagement Data Base 
(Clark, 1954:2) 
Data 
Element        Description 
1 Date 
2 Geographic location of engagement 
3 Attacker 
4 Defender ♦ 
5 Initial U.S. force level , 
6 Daily U.S. casualties 
7 Daily U.S. replacements 
8 Number of days until breakpoint occurred 
Clark collected data from engagements involving battalion- 
.     & 
levels Infantry units only.  There are two reasons given for this.  It 
,■> 
was considered easiest to discern the significance of personnel 
casualties on combat effectiveness using infantry units since these 
units typically incurred the highest casualty rate in conventional 
warfare.  In addition, the effects of other combat variables on unit 
combat effectiveness would be minimized by using data from infantry 
battalions.  Clark notes that this was in contrast to other types of 
combat battalions. Specifically, "the effectiveness of a tank 
battalion . . . depends as much on the operability of its tanks as on 
adequate crews to man them. ... An artillery battalion may have to 
change its mission, not because of actual losses of material but 
because enemy counterbattery fire threatens to produce such losses and 
15 
n 
i 
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the battery must shift its position to safeguard its weapons." (Clark, 
1954:8-9).  This laok of qualitative correlation between personnel 
casualties and combat effectiveness in non-infantry combat units could 
be a significant problem where combat data consists of engagements 
/    between combined arms or wholly non-infantry forces. 
Clark took the casualty data for the engagements studied from 
the daily morning reports of battalion HQ, headquarters company, the 
three infantry companies, and the heavy weapons company.  Data 
contained in these reports included casualties, replacements and men 
returned from hospital or detachment to another unit (Clark, 1951:12).' 
There are limitations to Clark's data.  To the extent that 
division-related events that occurred outside the battalion's Area of 
Operations have an effect on the breaking of an individual infantry 
battalion, the observations within each divisional engagement are not 
independent.  In addition, no information on enemy force strengths, 
positions or  other significant data are included in the data base. 
This severe drawback is mitigated by World War II (Europe) being 
selected by Clark as the source for all engagements, since "... 
German equipment and methods accord ed more closely with the U.S. 
than did Japanese, North Korean or Chinese" (Clark, 1954:8).  Other 
than the casualties inflicted on the U.S. infantry battalions, 
however, no quantitative statement can be made about the effect of the 
enemy on a unit breaking. 
Clark examined three categories of deterministic break 
curves. \They are contained in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 
Deterministic Breakpoint Categories (Clark, 1954:11) 
Category       Description j. 
I Attack - Rapid Reorganization - Attack 
II Attack - Defense 
III Defense - Withdrawal by Order to a Quieter 
Sector 
The Category I break represents a temporary cessation of the attack 
imposed by the defending force. The attack is resumed within a 24 
hour period.  A Category II break represents a switch from attack to 
defense for the duration of the divisional engagement.  A Category III 
break constitutes the removal of the unit from the battalion-level 
engagement.  (Clark, 1954:9-12) 
In addition, Clark investigated the effect that the distri- 
bution of casualties over time has on a unit's breakpoint.  This 
included three alternative methods of calculating casualties and 
examining the breakpoint data with respect to total engagement 
length.  These three methods of calculating casualties are contained 
in Table 2.4. _ • 
.J, 
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Table 2.4 
Methods of Calculating Casualties 
(Clark, 1954:17) 
No. Method Rationale 
Losses and net losses, 
in percent, for th,e 
day of breakpoint 
Cumulative losses and 
cumulative net losses, 
in percent, for the two 
days preceeding plus 
the day of breakpoint 
Cumulative losses and 
cumulative net losses,, 
in percent, from the 
beginning of the engage- 
ment to the breakpoint 
Based on the present 
experience being the major 
demoralizing experience 
Suggested by the idea that 
men's memories encompass 
not only the present, 
but also the experiences 
of the very immediate past. 
Represents the battle exper- 
ience as entirely cumulative 
and provides as well the best 
measure of actual unit 
strength. 
The third method of calculation is the most desirable from a practical 
standpoint since it requires only the initial and final force levels 
of the units evaluated.  (Clark, 1954:17) 
The primary' result obtained by Clark is negative.  The 3tudy 
concludes: 
The statement that aAinit can be considered no longer 
combat effective ,w^en \£  has suffered a specific casualty 
percentage is a grbss/>oversimplification not supported by 
combat data. . . . individual differences in the ability of 
units to carry out their missions cannot be entirely explained 
on the basis of casualties and replacements alone.  (Clark, 
1954:3) 
Personnel casualties have a significant, but not dominating, influence 
on a unit's combat effectiveness. 
Clark also found that, when calculating casualties for unit 
18 
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breakpoint determination, cumulative casualties is the best of the 
three methods listed in Table 2.4.  This method suffers, however, from 
the drawback of not considering the time from the start of the 
engagement to the unit's breakpoint.  This varies significantly 
between the break types.  For Category I breaks, the time to 
breakpoint ranges from 2 to 11 days.  Category II times to breakpoint 
ranges from 2 to 22 days and Category III from 6 to 17 days (Clark, 
1954:20). 
In addition to the deficiencies mentioned above, Clark found 
that at least two additional factors need to be accounted for when 
specifying a breakpoint for a combat unit. These consist of the type 
and size of unit(s) involved in an engagement and the presence of 
"... widely differing ranges of loss percentages (being) associated 
with a breakpoint from attack to defense and a breakpoint from defense 
to withdrawal." (Clark, 1954:3) 
The specification of unit size is evident in the applications 
which the investigator found elsewhere in the literature, although 
these applications are not always consistent.  With respect to unit 
type, combat units whose effectiveness is not proportional to 
personnel strength limits the ability of personnel casualties to 
determine when a unit broke.  Evidence that loss percentages are 
signficantly different for attacker and defender breakpoints indicates 
that breakpoints shojild be divided, as a minimum, into these two 
categories, i 
Clark also found that, due to the variations in-athe data, 
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"... ranges of I033 percentages probabilistic break curves adhering 
to a uniform distribution must be used to give an accurate 
description of what happens in actual combat." (Clark, 1954:3) Put 
differently, deterministic break curves were found to be invalid.   , 
Probabilistic break curves are required to account for the variations 
in historical breakpoint data. 
2.3 Probabilistic Break Curves 
The second investigation by Helmbold examines the validity of 
probabilistic break curves.  Probabilistic break curves provide the 
necessary randomness in determining the breakpoint for a combat 
unit.  They constitute a generalizedytechnique for modelling the 
battle termination process, with the deterministic break curve being 
contained within the family of potential probabilistic break curves 
(Helmbold, 1971:3). /, 
Helmbold's work centered upon determining the^ degree of 
validity contained within the hypothesis which represents common 
formulations of probabilistic break curves in Department of Defense 
sponsored studies.  The hypothesis consists of the following three 
elements: 
1) .Termination of a battle can be considered as governed by 
the following mechanism, or one that gives the same 
results: prior to the battle, each side independently and 
at random selects a casualty-fraction value (breakpoint) 
from some distribution of casualty fractions.  When either 
side experiences a casualty fraction equal to the 
preselected breakpoint, the battle terminates with a loss 
to the side that "broke." 
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2) The breakpoint distributions (break curves) mentioned 
above are generally applicable. That is, they are the 
same for all battles, irrespective of the size of forces 
involved or when, where, by whom, or with what the battle 
was fought. 
3) The losses, and hence equivalently the casualty fractions, 
of the forces are deterministically and monotonically 
related to each other. That is, there is a monotonically 
increasing function, (^( •), such that 
fx(t) = (/?fy(t) ,  Gkt*T (2.3) 
(Helmbold, 1971:7-9) 
The complete development of Helmbold's breakpoint model is 
contained in section 2.3.1, as taken verbatim from Helmbold's 
report. The reader may skip to section 2.3-2 for a recitation and 
discussion of the more significant points without I033 of continuity. 
2.3-1 Complete Mathematical Development of Helmbold''s 
Probabilistic Break Curve Model (Helmbold, 1971:9-16) 
If the attacker is to win, then wo must have 
fx(t)<= Lx,     0 < t < T (2.4) 
and 
fy = fy(T) = Ly. (2.5) 
In particular, if the attacker wins, we must have 
L
x =*-
f
x = V?(fy> = <£>(Ly). (2.6) 
Conversely, if 
then, since 
^U )< Lx« (2.7) 
fy(t) < Ly, 0 < t < T, (2.8) 
it follows, by the monotonicity of (/?> that 
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(£>(fy(t)) <(/9(Ly) < Lx, 0<t<T, (2.9) ^ 
and  then using fx  (t)   =(/2(fy(t)), 
fx(t) <(/Q(Ly) >= Lx, 0 < t < T, (2.10) 
and the attacker wins.  Thus, the attaeker wins if, and only if, 
(£(Ly)<Lx. (2.11) 
Since we intend that battle outcomes be . . . well-defined by 
our model, we could assign viotory to the defender when(£)(L ) = L , 
or we could see to it that this equality has zero probability of 
occurrence. For some purposes, it may be convenient to adopt the 
convention that the battle is a toss-up when (,P(Ly) = Lx, and to award 
victory with equal probability to both sides.  In any case, we arrange 
things so that 
) P(WX) = 1 - P(Wy), (2.12) 
where P(W„) is the probability of a win for side z, z = x or y. 
Let 
r 
Fz(u) = P|LZ < u (2.13) 
be the break curve for side z.  Now, Fz(0) A  0 would imply that there 
is some positive probability that side z would break while its 
casualty fraction was zero, which may physically be interpreted as a 
refusal to engage Ja battle on the part of 3ide z. Since we wish to 
consider only cases where the battle has been joined, we take 
Fz(0) = 0. (2.14) 
Also, Fz(1) t  1 would imply that side z might not break even when its 
casualty fraction was unity. This seems to be intuitively 
unreasonable, and so we assume that 
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Fz(1) = 1. (2.15) 
[investigator note: This assumption ignores the situation where a 
foroe has had 100* of its personnel killed and wounded but at least a 
percentage of it3 wounded continue to fight.J 
We now wish to express P(W ) in terms of the Fz's. To do this 
we* begin by noting that the preceding discussion of the conditions 
under which the defender wins yields the following relationship 
P(Wy) = P Lx<(£?(Ly), 0< Ly< (2.16) 
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since t*x:>ty9(Ly) if, and only if, the attacker wins.  To calculate 
P(Wy)» we consider the schematic diagram shown as Figure 2.21.  The 
set of points (Ly> LX) = (u, v) for which the attacker wins is marked 
by Wx, and similarly for defender wins by Wy-  The joint density of ' 
C-ky, Lx) is,-by Element 1 of the Hypothesis , given by 
dFx(v) dFy(u), 
and so, 
r1  >(u) 
P(WV) =    /   /  dFx(v) dFv(u)       (2.17) Y
     u=0 vio Y 
= j     Fx( * (u)) dFy(u), 
■1 
0 
where we have truncated C/9(u) by setting 
(£(u) = Min[(£>(u), l]. (2.18) 
where (/9(u) is assumed to be monotonically increasing and defined for 
ail 0 < u «= 1 + Q. 
Similarly, 
,1   ,^-1(v) 
P(Wx) =    j       j dFx(v) dF (u), xx " *" y 
v=0 u=0 
(2.19) 
which becomes 
/-1 
P(WX) = j    Ft  v~1(v)) dF (v). (2.20) 
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Figure 2.3 
Another possible relation between Lx and Ly 
If C/9(D< 1, as illustrated in .[Figure 2.3], then we define 
_1, x =1 forQ9(1) «= v «= 1. This manner of defining the inverse 
y   \V) •    —  — 
function preserves the correctness of the formulae just given. 
By integrating in the reverse order with respect to the 
variables u and v, we obtain formulae equivalent to those that would 
result from an integration by parts, thus, 
v=0 v-1(v)=u 
1 
"o 
P(Wy) = /   / dFy(u) dFx(v) 
= /  [1 - Fy( y-1(v))] dFx(v)   (2.21) 
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and 
-1 A 
p(Wx) - J       j dFy(u) dFx(v) 
u=0 ^(u)=v 
,1 
=/  [1 - Fx(^ (u))] dFy(u).    (2.22) 
A
From Figures 2.2 and 2.3 , we see that the conditional joint density 
of (Ly, Lx), given Wx, is 
dFy(u) dFx(v)t     for (U| v) e    Wj(# 
P(WX) 
So the conditional density of L  given Wx, is * 
1 
dDy(u|wx) = /   dFy(u) dFx(v) 
v=4>(u)    p(wx) 
1 - Fx((p(u)) ■^1 .   (2.23, (P(WX) 
Integration of this expression with respect to u from u = 0 £o u = 1 
and comparing the result with Equation 2.22 shows \hat it represents 
a proper probability density. 
We now find the conditional distributions af casualty 
fractions on each side when the attacker wins.  We begin by recalling 
that when x wins, Ly = fy.  But we have just found the density of Ly 
when x wins.  Hence, 
P(fy<: q|Wx) =/  d Dy(u|Wx) 
= Dy(q|wx). (2.24) 
Since fx = v(fy)» the conditional distribution of the attacker's 
casualty fraction when the attacker wins is: 
26 
P(fx< s|wx) = P(^(fy)< s|wx) 
= Dy(^-1(s)|wx).        (2.25) 
In similar fashion we find the conditional density of Lx given Wy as 
d Dx(v|Wy) =    C       dFY(u) dFx(v) 
PTWyl 
U=y"
1(v) 
1 _ Fy(v-Hv)) dfv(v) 
_Ji__.  (2.26) 
P(Wy; 
Since Lx = fx whenever y wins, the conditional distribution1 of the 
attacker's casualty fraction when the defender wins is ju3t: 
P(fx< s|wy) = Dx(s|wy)< (2.27) 
Since fx = y (fy), the conditional distribution of the defender's 
casualty fraction when he wins is 
P(fy <=q|wy) = P(fx< v(q)|wy) 
= Dx( 9(q) Wy). (2.28) 
# 2.3.2 Review of Helmbold's Probabilistic 
Break Curve Model 
Section 2.3.1 contains a complete development of Helmbold's 
mathematical framework for the breakpoint hypothesis. This section 
reviews the important aspects of Helmbold's model. 
The three elements of the hypothesis contain certain under- 
lying principles.  The first element states that the casualty-fraction 
is the principle parameter used in the break curve.  In addition, 
Helmbold assumes that the battle is fought with the forces available 
at the start of the engagement.  This is analytically convenient 
". . . since this provides a well-defined (if not precise) base for 
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e3tablishing the casualty fradtion" (Helrabold, 1971:7).  The limita- 
tions to this approach are discussed in Chapter 3 of the current 
investigation. 
With regards to element 2, there is no inherent reason for 
only one break curve to be included.  Helmbold states that: 
The appropriate break curve could be made to depend on any 
condition that could be known at the time the break curve is 
sampled, such as whether the force i3 initially attacking or 
defending, its state of training, experience, morale, physical 
weariness, etc. . . . The approach adopted . here is in 
keeping with the spirit of Richardson's Principle to the 
effect that 'formulae are not to be complicated without 
evidence'.  (Helmbold, 1971:8) 
Later in the investigation, Helmbold altered element 2 by defining 
break curves on the basi3 of who won the engagement and the nature of 
the engagement. 
Element 3 of the hypothesis is an outgrowth of previous work 
performed by Weiss (1966).  Wei33 postulated that the casualty 
fractions were proportional to one another, or: 
fx(t) = Rfy(t) (2.29) 
This became a special case contained within Helmbold's hypothesis 
(Helmbold, 1971:10). 
In order to completely specify the probabilistic break curve 
model outlined in the hypothesis, Helmbold developed the mathematical 
characteristics of the probabilistic break curve.  This includes its 
boundary conditions, the relationship between each force's probability 
of winning and the relationship between the break curves of the two 
opposing.3ides. 
Helmbold specified physical meanings for the upper and lower 
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boundary conditions for the probabilistic break curves.  Letting: 
Fz(u) = P L^u (2.30) 
be the break curve for force z, he established the lower and upper 
boundary values for the function.  In the case of the lower boundary, 
F~(0) = 0 would imply .that there JjS some positive 
probability that side z wdtald break wn^ieits casualty 
fraction was zero, which may. physically be\frnferpreted a3 a 
refusal to engage in battle on the partp-f* side z.  Since we 
wish to consider only cases where the^battie has been joined, 
we take Fz(0) = 0.  (Helrabold, 1971:11) 
The argument for the upper bound was as follows: 
F2(1) = 1 would imply that 3ide z might not break even 
when its casualty fraction was unity. This seems to be 
intuitively unreasonable 3ince the unwounded personnel 
strength of the unit = 0 , and so we assume that F (1) = 1. 
(Helmbold, 1971:12) 
In addition, Helmbold proved a theorem stating that the 
two ^   functions relating the attacker and defender conditional 
casualty fraction distributions curves to each other are mathematical 
inverses (Helmbold, 1971:15-16).  He also proved that the following 
two lemmas are true: 
LEMMA I.  If 
Axx(u) = Ayy(u) (2-31) 
and 
Ayx(u) = Axy(u) - (2.32) 
then 
v = v
-1
 =1, where I is the identity function   (2.33) 
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where; 
AXX(3>   = p(fx«s|wx>   = V   ^"1(s>|wx) (2.34) 
Ayy(s)   =  P(fy<3|wy)   = Dx(  <u  (3)|wy) (2.35) 
Ayx(q)   =  P(fy q|wx)   =  Dy(q|wx) (2.36) 
Axy(Q)   =  P(fx«q|Wy)   = Dx(q|Wy) (2.37) 
LEMMA II.     If   4> (s)>s  for some 3,   then: 
Ayy(s)2AXy(3). (2*38) 
and 
AXy(3)«Ayr(3>- (2.39) 
Conversely, ifv(s)«s for some 3, then: 
/\yy(3)c/\xy(3), (2.40) 
and 
Axx(s)>Ayx(3) (2.41) 
The theorem, and to a lesser extent, the lemmas, were incorporated by 
Helmbold into his test procedure (Helmbold, 1971:18-20). 
2.3.3 Test Procedure 
Helmbold's test procedure is based upon whether the inverse 
relationship of the ^ and 4> -1 curves is consistent with the 
observed casualty fraction distributions.  Recall that: 
M(U) S MIN[(P(U),I] (2.18) 
where: if)  =    a strictly increasing monotonic function 
relating fx(t) to fy(t) via the formula: 
fx(t) = (p[fy(t)] (2.3) 
And: 
Axx(s) = Ayx( v -1(a)) (2.42) 
Ayy<3) =Axy( v(s)) (2'43) 
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The validity of the breakpoint hypothesis would then be dependent upon 
equations 2.42 and 2.43 holding true for the data set tested. 
Specifically: 
If i>  and l> -1 obey the inverse functional relationship, 
then this would tend to support the breakpoint hypothesis. 
If ^ and 41 ~'  do not obey the necessary mathematical 
relationship between inverse functions, then the breakpoint 
hypothesis would be definitely disproven.  (Helrabold, 1971:16) 
Helmbold developed a graphical procedure for obtaining the ^ 
and IJJ "' functions independently from the observed casualty fraction 
distributions.  The following subsection describing the procedure is 
taken verbatim from Helmbold's report. 
2.3.4 Graphical Procedure for Obtaining ^ and ^ "1 Functions 
from Casualty-Fraction Distributions (Helmbold, 1971:16-17) 
We have 3et down in explicit terms the breakpoint hypothesis 
Elements 1, 2 and 3 and have shown how to derive from these 
elements formulae that purport to describe empirical casualty- 
fraction distributions.  In carrying out this derivation, we have been 
careful to maintain the essential distinction between a break curve, 
which is a distribution of Lz breakpoint values and a casualty- 
fraction distribution, which is a distribution of fz values.  In this 
paragraph we show how observed casualty-fraction distributions can be 
used to test the breakpoint hypothesis. 
We begin by recalling relations 2.34 and 2.36 , which are 
P(fx <s|wx) = Dy( ^-1(s)|wx) =Axx(s), '  (2.34) 
and 
p(fy«cq|wx) = Dy(q|wx) =Ayx(q) (2.36) 
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where the £_\ x and^\xx notation is introduced as an abbreviation. 
Combining relations 2.3^ and 2.36 yields 
Axx(s) = P(fx<: a|wx) 
= P(fy < 4--1(s)|Wx) = Ayx( ^-1(s>). (2.UU) 
with a dual result obtainable by the usual transposition x -*-y, 
y—s. x, 9 -1-=» 4^ , ^  >^~1. 
Now suppose that we had a graphical plot of the observed 
casualty fractions for a collection of battles that were won by the 
attacker. A hypothetical plot is shown in Figure 2.4— and there 
will be a dual plot whose labels are obtainable from Figure 2.4 by 
the usual transposition, although the curves may, of course, be 
differently shaped on the dual. We have indicated by the dashed lines 
how, using equation 2.44 , the value of      ^ ""'(q-j) can be 
graphically read off this plot. An exactly analogous procedure 
applied to the dual plot will yield the value of ^(q-|).  By repeating 
the process for several values of q-j and interpolating, it is thus 
possible to determine suitable approximations to the functions 41 
and I|J"1. 
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^~\) 
Figure 2.k 
Hypothetical Casualty-Fraction Distribution 
in Battles Won by the Attacker 
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Now, 4* is the functional relation between f and fv, since x     y 
from the definition of ^ , we may write without loss of generality 
fy(t) (2.45) fx(t) = ^ 
Having determined ^ and ^ "^ by the graphical procedure just 
described, we may plot these functions on a graph and see whether or 
not they obey the necessary mathematical relationship between inverse 
functions, that is, whether or not ^ is a reflection of + "^ in the 
45-deg line through the origin, as illustrated in Figure 2.5 . 
If ^ and ^-1 obey the inverse functional relationship, then this 
would tend to support the breakpoint hypothesis.  If 41 and ^~1 do 
not obey the necessary mathematical relationship between inverse 
functions, then the breakpoint hypothesis would be definitely 
disproven. 
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2^3.5 Data 
/ 
7
      The quantity and, more importantly, the type of historical 
combat data available to Helmbold severely restricted the complexity 
of the hypotheses capable of being tested.  Helmbold used data from 
two of his earlier studies (Helmbold, 1961 and 1961) as well as a data 
set extracted from Bodart's Kriegs-Lexicon (Bodart, 1908) by Willard 
(Willard, 1962).  There are 173 engagements from Helmbold's earlier 
studies and 1,080 engagements in Willard's data set.  The data 
elements in the .engagement data matrix for the probabilistic break 
curve investigation are listed in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2^5 
Data Elements Contained in Helmbold's 
Engagement Data Matrix 
(Helmbold, 1971:5-6) 
Data 
Element Number Description 
1 Date 
2 Battle 
3 Source 
4 ''War or campaign 
5 Identification of attacker 
6 Identification of defender 
7 Initial attacker strength 
8 Initial defender strength 
9 Attacker casualties 
1Q Defender casualties 
11 Duration (in hours) 
12 Nominal victor 
13 Engagement type categories* 
I 
? 
Helmbold's engagement types are a slight modification of 
categories first developed by Willard. Helmbold's categories 
are as follows: Category I battles denote open battles in the 
sense that both sides could, with about equal facility, 
disengage and conduct an orderly withdrawal.  Category II 
battles denote closed battles in the sense that one of the 
parties in the battle is encircled or otherwise in a position 
from which an orderly withdrawal can't readily be made, and 
whose options for maneuver are correspondingly markedly more 
restricted than "those of his opponent. This categorization of 
the data is not available for the data sets from Helmbold's 
earlier studies (1961 and 1964). 
2.3.6 Results 
Helmbold initially tested the data using four groupings of the 
data.  They include: 
1) The set of data from Helmbold's earlier studies. 
2) Willard's complete data set.  This consists of all 
Category I and Category II engagements. 
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3) A subset of Willard's data set containing only all 
Category I engagements. 
4) A subset of Willard's data set containing only all 
Category II engagements. 
In none of these groups of the data are the associated + and 4^"^ 
curves mathematical inverses of each other (Helmbold, 1971:21-32). 
Upon visually examining the casualty-fraction distribution 
curves for each of the 4 data sets, it appeared to Helmbold that the 
following might hold true: 
Axx(u) =Ayy(") (2.46) 
Ayx(u). =AXy(") (2.47) 
(Helmbold, 1971:26) 
According to Lemma I, this signifies that <^   = ^-1 = I.  However, 
the i> and 4*   curves do not reflect this for any of the four data 
3ets.  The presence of relations 2.46 and 2.47 in the data, however, 
indicates that a force's break behavior might be'significantly 
dependent upon whether it won or  lost the engagement (Helmbold, 
1971:26). 
As a further test of the validity of equations 1 and 2, 
Helmbold used the Kolmogorov/Smirnov test for testing the equivalence 
of the appropriate casualty-fraction distributions for each of the 
four data sets.  The results are shown in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6 
Test Results on the Validity of Lemma I 
for the Specified Data Sets 
(Helmbold, 1971:28-30) 
No.  Description Axx^ = Ayy(u)  Ayx<u) =AXy^u^ 
Data Set from Helmbold's 
Earlier Studies .30* .30 
Willard's Complete 
Data Set .10 .10 
Category I Battles; 
Willard's Data Set .05 .03 
Category II Battles; 
Willard's Data Set .99 .98 
The value indicates the probability that the deviation between the 
two distributions would be greater than at present, ". . . given 
that the empirical distribution functions actually are obtained 
from independent random samples from a common continuous 
distribution function." 
With the exception of the fourth data set, the appropriate casualty- 
fraction distribution curves were not found by Helmbold to be 
equivalent for a reasonable level of confidence. The results of the 
visual examination are not, in general, confirmed by the statistical 
results (Helmbold, 1971:28-30). 
Another inconsistency between the breakpoint hypothesis and 
Helmbold's data is the failure of the empirical casualty-fraction 
distribution curves to exhibit the behavior mandated by Lemma II. 
Helmbold developed an alternative element 3 of the hypothesis to 
correct for this.  It consists of ths following: 
There is a monotonic non-decreasiiig function y such that: 
f
x = v Cfy) ■      (2.M) 
'i9 
when the defender wins, while: 
fx = * "1(fy) (2.49) 
when the attacker wins. 
^(s)>3, for all s. 
Thi3 results in the following significant change in Lemma II: 
When the defender wins, 
Ayy(3)2Axy(3) (2.50)' 
for all s. When the attacker wins, 
^ Axx<a>2Ayx<3> (2.51) 
for all s.  (Helrabold, 1971:33-35) 
The modified Lemma II is consistent with the empirical casualty- 
fraction distribution curves for Helmbold's data.  Despite this 
improvement, however, the division of the data into winner and loser 
groupings does not result in the 4> and-v"1 functions being 
mathematically inverse (Helmbold, 1971:36). 
On the basis of his results, Helmbold also demonstrated that 
the second element of the hypothesis needs t,o be altered to allow for 
specified subsets of the universe of possible types of engagements to 
be handled separately. For Helmbold's set of data, the division of 
the data into two subsets consisting of Category I and Category II, 
while an improvement, is not sufficient in defining subsets of data 
within which a break curve would be universally applicable (Helmbold, 
1971:45). 
Helmbold listed several properties which he believed should be 
contained in any theory for the battle termination process.  A listing 
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V 
of the properties applicable to this investigation is given below: 
v 
1) The theory should have a simplicity and "naturalness" of 
form in consonance with the principle of "Ocknam's 
Razor". . . that "multiplicity ought not to be posited 
without necessity." 
2) The theory must address the 'separate casualty distribution 
curves observed for the category I and the category II 
battles. / 
3) The theory must not produce an estimate of the ^ function 
relating casualty fractions via the relations: 
Tx = v (fy) (2.48) 
or 
f"l = * (fw) J2.52) 
that is at variance with the actual relations between 
these quantities. 
4) The theory ought to explain why the loser's and the 
winner's casualty-fraction distributions are very nearly 
the same, independent of the attack/defense status of 
forces.  (Helmbold, 1971:60-61) 
In regards to the battle termination models in use today, 
Helmbold concludes that ". . . the soundness of models of combat that 
make essential use of breakpoint hypotheses must be considered suspect 
until a better theoretical understanding of the battle termination 
process i3 obtained" (Helmbold, 1971:61). 
2.4 Data Issues 
Other analysts in the profession (Dupuy, 1979:143; Taylor, 
1980:110,111) share Helmbold's doubts about the validity of the 
breakpoint hypothesis currently used, and deplore the lack of 
empirical work.  In particular it is felt that the inadequacies 
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contained within the data currently used in combat models seriously 
degrade the utility of the output of force-on-force attrition 
models.  According to Stockfish: 
. . . the unverified findings of modelling conducted by 
one organization can be taken as fact by another organization 
and used as inputs for the latter's model. Another aspect is 
that a number or a set of numbers constituting data can be an 
admixture of subtle concepts, subjective evaluations, and 
limited but hard evidence based on actual physical testing. 
The particular testing, however, may have been undertaken for 
purposes remote from the use that another study makes of the 
data.  (Stockfish, 1975:vi,vii) 
The inadequacies of available data is also illustrated by the 
incompleteness of the data utilized in both empirical validation 
studies. 
The danger of unsuitable data is reinforced by a warning given 
by Dupuy on the interpretation of historical combat data. He 
demonstrated how seemingly contradictory statements based on the 3ame 
set of historical events could each have a basis in fact (Dupuy, 
1979:4-18). He concluded by stating: 
To some extent, they illustrate why it is both vain and 
dangerous to seek immutable lessons from the records of the 
past; the facts are too contradictory, too specialized, too 
subject to misinterpretation, to support unequivocal conclu- 
sions.  Certain generalized principles can be substantiated - 
usually.  But the specifics of combat processes and relation- 
ships are elusive.  (Dupuy, 1979:18) 
A3 an extrapolation of this, some military operations research 
analysts believe that ". . . the changes in weapons and technology of 
the past few decades have made all military history - even that as 
recent as World War II - irrelevant" (Dupuy, 1979:141).  If this is 
the case, it would be incorrect to attempt to validate a battle 
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termination technique using historical combat data since the combat 
processes that the data came from would be significantly different 
from present and future combat processes. 
Howeve;*, there is considerable disagreement with that 
suggestion. For example, Clark has successfully taken combat data 
from conventional ground warfare and, admittedly with considerable 
limitations, applied it to atomic warfare (Clark, 195^:27-28).  Dupuy 
investigated historical trends in weapon lethality and their effect on 
warfare.  He found that the technological change that most affected 
modern ground warfare, in contradiction to the assumption in the 
statement above, was the large-scale transition from the smoothbore 
infantry musket to rifled small arms that occurred between 1850 and 
1860 (Dupuy, 1979:6). 
The desirability of using historical combat data in 
investigative work is further indicated by Stockfish, who stated: 
The output or assertions of current campaign models are 
of questionable worth because of inadequate empirical work, 
which should consist of both operational testing . . . and 
empirical study of past wars. . . .' Without increased and 
definitive operational testing and empirical studies, the use 
of detailed models to treat larger force aggregations is 
probably of limited value in the analysis of conventional 
wars.  Overall, we are left with faulty concepts, such as the 
„  firepower indexes, as empirical inputs for aggregative models, 
and an abundance of unverified - or only partially verified - 
detailed models. This condition results from an imbalance 
between empirical and theoretical endeavor in DoD analysis and 
study. The image of scientific activity - an image that 
depicts theories and models as being independently tested by 
experiment or appeal to experience, with the empirical work in 
turn casting up new insight that contributes to theoretical 
advance - does not seem to prevail in the military 
establishment.  (Stockfish, 1975:vi,vii) 
In addition to its desirability, Dupuy felt historical combat 
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data remains applicable since ". . . the principle weapon of war is 
. . . man himself. . . . the nature of warfare has changed only in its 
details (sometimes dramatically, but always relatively slowly) as man 
adapts himself and his thinking to new weapons and technology." 
(Dupuy, 1979:142).  Therefore, using historical data to validate 
combat models is defensible. 
2.5 Summary * 
The breakpoint hypothesis is used in many Department of 
Defense sponsored force-on-force attrition studies to model the battle 
termination process.  Empirical support for these models, however, is 
limited. 
Clark found that deterministic break curves were not validated 
by combat data.  Individual differences in the ability of units to 
carry out their missions could not be explained on the basis of 
casualties and replacements alone. Furthermore, when using casualties 
as a measure of loss of combat effectiveness the type and size of the 
unit must be specified, different breakpoints must be specified for 
attacking and defending forces, and the time basis for loss 
percentages must be specified. 
Helmbold found that probablistic break curves, although 
inherently more flexible, are not valid as presently used.  Six 
groupings of the data were evaluated.  In each case, the theorem 
and/or lemmas mandated by the breakpoint hypothesis are violated by 
the empirical data. Suggested improvements included a more detailed 
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categorization of the data when constructing combat unit break curves. 
The negative results of past validation studies raise 
considerable doubt about the validity of current battle termination 
models.  One criticism of these results has been to question the 
applicability of historical data to present and future combat. On the 
basis of statements made by Dupuy (1979), Stockfish (1975) and Clark 
(1954), however, this investigation finds their use in validating 
combat models to be defensible. 
Further empirical work in this area has been, and is, hampered 
by a relative scarcity of available historical data.  A significant 
amount of historical data has been obtained for the current 
investigation, however. Chapter 3 contains a list of the data used 
and a description of its contents, in addition to documenting the 
experimental design for the current investigation. 
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Chapter 3 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
i> 
This investigation focuse3 on the identification and examina- 
tion of the validity of a series of break curve3 using an engagement 
data matrix.  The matrix contains 323 engagements; with'"24 data 
elements available for each engagement.  The data elements contained 
in the engagement data matrix represent those combat factors deemed 
significant in the literature for which data is available.  In addi- 
tion to the data required to specify an engagement's time and 
geographic location in history, the data elements consist mostly of 
environmental and operational factors significant to the combat 
process.  The conditions under which an engagement terminates are 
listed and described. Other considerations include the size and unity 
of mission of the respective combat forces in the engagement. 
The break curves are identified and their validity examined 
using the following methodology.  Note that a more detailed discussion 
of the methodology is contained in section 3.7. The data elements 
from the engagement data matrix are transformed into a set of observed 
variables in order to obtain variables having an appropriate level of 
measurement for the techniques to be used.  The observed variables are 
reduced to a set of defined factors using factor analysis.  All 
possible combinations of one or more defined factors are identified 
with each combination representing a specific break curve.  For each 
possible defined factor combination, a test procedure is performed 
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which determines the degree to which Helmbold's Theorem holds for the 
combination's associated engagement subset.  The break curves whose 
associated engagement subsets obey Helmbold's Theorem reasonably well 
are identified.  The results of this procedure are then confirmed 
using discriminant analysis.  Discriminant analysis identifies those 
observed variables which are significant in distinguishing between 
winners and losers in an engagement using the engagements contained in 
the engagement data matrix.  The observed variables found to be 
significant are compared to the observed variables which specify the 
break curves whose associated engagement subsets reasonably well. 
3-1 Categorization of the Data 
The formulation of break curves is based upon those factors 
that are significant to the battle termination process.  These factors 
are used in the modification of the second element of the hypothesis, 
thereby allowing the break curves to vary depending on the battle type 
under study.  Helmbold (1971) first suggested this potential modifi- 
cation.  He stated: 
The appropriate break curve could be made to depend on any 
condition that could be known at the time the break curve is 
sampled, such as whether the force is attacking or defending, 
its state of training, experience, morale, physical weariness, 
etc.  (Helmbold, 1971:8) 
Those combat factors identified in the literature as significant, and 
for which relatively accurate and precise data is available, are used 
in the current investigation. 
The number, of personnel casualties incurred by a combat force 
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are considered to be a very influential factor.  Clark (195*0 gave two 
reasons for the frequent use of personnel casualties in determining 
the residual combat effectiveness of a unit.  They are: 
1) Casualties are ... a factor always present in battle, 
and their magnitude may be "assumed to reflect to some 
degree the magnitude of other less tangible factors. 
2) ... of all possibly significant factors affeoting a 
unit's combat effectiveness, casualties alone can be 
directly quantified.  (Clark, 1954:7) 
Both Clark (1954) and Helmbold (1971), however, found that personnel 
casualties, while necessary, are not sufficient in explaining combat 
unit break behavior. 
Other factors significant to the combat process are identified 
in the literature.  Clark (1954) offered the list of combat factors 
given in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3-1 
Additional Combat Factors 
(Clark, 195^:2) 
Factor 
Number Description 
1 casualty rate 
2 level of training and battle experience of the 
troop3 
3 the influence of inclement weather or other 
unusual environmental stress 
4 the importance of the mission 
5 troop morale 
6 quality of leadership 
7 knowledge and intelligence on the enemy's 
intentions 
8 perceived vigor of enemy opposition 
9 scale of friendly fire support and troop 
reinforcement 
10 logistical supply situation 
11 command, control and communications 
More recently, the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization 
(HERO) compiled a more comprehensive, but nortexhaustive, list of 
factors which it determined have a significant effect on combat 
(Dupuy, 1979:33). They are included in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1 also 
includes a listing of the data elements contained in the engagement 
data matrix for the current investigation. These data elements are 
described in greater detail in section 3.4.  A more detailed listing 
of HERO'S factors is provided in Tables 3.2 A through K. 
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Data Elements 
Contained in 
Engagement 
• Data Matrix 
1) War 
2) Campaign 
3) Battle 
Set of Significant 4) Engagement 
Combat Factors 5) Starting Date 
Identified by HERO 6) Duration (in days) 
- 1. Weapons Effects 7) Attacker 
2. Terrain Factors 8) Defender 
3. Weather Factors 9) Victor 
4. Season Factors 10) Attacker Initial 
5. Air Superiority Strength 
Factors 11) Defender Initial 
Universe of 6. Posture Factors Strength 
Possibly     ^h ► 7. Mobility EffectsW ^  12) Attacker Casualties 
Significant   ^ 8. Vulnerability  i^ ^  13) Defender Casualties 
Combat Factors Factors 14) Willard's Category 
9. Taotical Air 15) Engagement Type 
Effects 16) Terrain 
10. Other Combat 17) Weather 
Processes 18) Season 
11. Intangible 19) Morale 
Factors 20) 
21) 
22) 
23) 
24) 
Presence of 
Surprise 
Presence of 
Setpiece Effect 
Overall Air 
Superiority 
Close Air Support 
for Attacker 
Close Air Support 
for Defender 
Figure 3-1 
Derivation of Data Elements Contained 
in the Engagement Data Matrix 
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Table 3-2A 
Weapons Effects 
Variable 
Number Description 
1 Rate of fire 
2 Potential targets per strike 
3 Relative incapacitating effect 
4 Effective range (or muzzle velocity) 
5 Accuracy 
6 Reliability 
7 Battlefield mobility 
8 Radius of action 
9 Punishment (vulnerability) factor 
10-13 Armor performance factors (4)* 
14 Helicopter 
15-21 Special weapons effects factors (7+)** 
22 Dispersion factor 
*  The armor performance factors consist of the rapidity of fire 
effect, the fire control effect, the ammunition supply effect and 
the wheel/halftracks effect. 
** HERO accounts for seven types of special weapons effects.  They 
consist of factors for self-propelled artillery, missile guidance, 
multi-barreled weapons, multiple charge artillery weapons, armored 
personnel carriers, fixed-wing aircraft and vehicles with 
amphibious capabilities.  HERO indicates that this set is not 
exhaustive. 
Table 3.2B 
Terrain Factors -] 
, /_ \ 
) 
Variable /     < 
Number Description / 
1 Mobility effect 
2 Defense posture effect 
3 Infantry weapons effect 
4 Artillery weapons effect 
5 Air effectiveness effect 
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Table 3-2C 
Weather Factors 
Variable 
Number Description 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Mobility effect 
Attack posture effect 
Artillery effect 
Air effectiveness effect 
Tank effect 
Table 3.2D 
Season Factors 
Variable 
Number Description 
1 
2 
3 
Attack posture effect 
Artillery effect 
Air effectiveness effect 
Table 3-2E 
Air Superiority Factors 
Variable 
Number Description 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Mobility effect 
Artillery effect 
Air effectiveness effect 
Vulnerability effect 
Table 3-2F 
Posture Factors 
Variable 
Number        Description 
1 Force strength effect 
2 Vulnerability effect 
Table 3-2G 
Mobility Effect3 
Variable 
Number        Description 
1 Characteristics of mobility 
2 Environmental effect 
Table 3-2H 
Vulnerability Factors 
Variable 
Number Description 
1 Exposure consideration, general     » 
2 Environmental effects, general 
3 Across beach 
4 Across major unfordable river 
5 Across major fordable or minor unfordable 
river 
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Table 3.21 
Taotical Air Effoots 
Variable 
Number Description 
1 
2 
3 
H 
5 
6 
Close air support damage and casualties 
Close air support morale effeot* 
Interdiction of logistical movement** 
Interdiction delays on ground movement* 
Interdiction damage and casualties 
Interdiction disruption effect* 
* 
*• 
Intangible; probably individually incalculable 
Probably calculable; not yet calculated 
Table 3-2J 
Other Combat Prooesses 
Variable 
Number Description 
1 
2 
3 
5 
6 
7 
Mobility effects of surprise 
Surpriser's vulnerability effect 
Surprised's vulnerability effect 
Other surprise effects* 
Degradation effects of fatigue and casualties* 
Casualty-inflicting capability factor 
Disruption* 
Probably calculable; not yet calculated 
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Table 3-2K 
Intangible Factors 
J 
Variable 
Number Description 
1 Combat effectiveness* 
2 Leadership** 
3 Training/experience** 
4 Morale*** 
5 Logistics* 
6 Time*** 
7 Space*** 
8 Momentum*** 
9 Intelligence 
10 Technology*** 
11 Initiative*" 
*  Sometimes calculable 
** Probably calculable; not yet calculated 
*** Intangible; probably individually incalculable 
The HERO factor set represents the nominal effects on combat 
of the weaponry used and the environmental and operational factors 
that affect their employment. The majority of the factors are 
considered quantifiable at a sufficient level of detail and 
established validity. 
Although HERO's listing is the basis for the factors tested in 
this investigation, only a limited number of combat factors are 
represented by the data elements included in the engagement data 
matrix.  In large measure, this is due to the limited amount" of 
verified historical combat data available.  The significance of the 
limitation is seen in a statement by Taylor who felt that ". . . the 
nature and quality of the available combat data is so extremely poor 
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that (there is) no reliable benchmark against whieh to "calibrate" our 
combat models" (Taylor, 1980:110). While a substantial amount of 
compiled combat data is available for this investigation, it is small . 
when compared to the amount of historical combat data thelt exists in 
raw form in the open^literature in the United States. 
3.2 Data Sources 
The data for this investigation consists of 323 engagements, 
with 2** data elements representing each engagement.  A listing of the 
complete engagement data matrix is given in section 3.3. 
Roughly one-half of the engagements are obtained from an 
historical combat data base compiled by HERO (Dupuy, 1976-1978, 
1979).  It is the source of all the engagements from World War II, the 
Korean conflict and the 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 Arab/Israeli Wars. 
It contains sufficient data for each engagement to specify the data 
elements used in the current investigation. The availability of this 
data is significant in the determination of the data elements to be 
included in the engagement data matrix. 
Additional compiled data sources of varying degrees of utility 
are available.  They consist of the engagement data base which 
Helmbold (1961, 1964, 1971) U3ed in his investigations, Clark's (1954) 
engagement data base and the engagement data base compiled by Willard 
(1962) from Bodart (1905). 
Helmbold's data base consists of 173 engagements contained in 
two papers published by Helmbold in 1961 and 1964.  The engagement 
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data matrix consists of the elements contained in Table 2.5.  The 
primary limitation is the lack of many of the data elements used in 
the current investigation.  Where 'possible, an engagement's data is 
augmented from additional sources and included in the current 
investigation's data matrix, further details will be given in 
section 3.3. 
Clark's investigation (195M also provides an historical 
combat data base.  A listing of the component data elements is 
provided in Table 3.1.  Its limitations are severe.  It does not 
include many of the data elements in the current investigation. Data 
is available for only one side in each engagement. In addition, the 
independence of some of the engagements is in doubt.  Due to these 
limitations, none of the engagements are included in the current 
engagement data matrix. 
Another compiled data source is that extracted by Willard 
(1962) from Bodart's Kriegs-Lexlcon (1905).  As in the Clark data, the 
data for each engagement does not include many of the data elements 
for the engagement data matrix used in the current investigation. 
Extracting additional data from the Kriegs-Lexicon is not possible for 
the investigator since it has never been translated into English.  In 
addition, HERO feels that "... the Bodart data wa3 not necessarily 
reliable or verifiable from other sources." (Dupuy, 1979:119).  For 
these reasons, the data set is not used in the investigation. 
In addition to the HERO and Helmbold data sources, combat data 
was compiled by the investigator from historical sources for this 
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investigation. Where applicable, classification of the data is based 
upon guidelines developed by HERO (Dupuy, 1979). These guidelines, 
together with the meaning and limitations for each data element in the 
engagement data matrix shown in section 3-3, are discussed in 
section 3.4. 
3-3 Listing of Engagement Data Matrix 
This section contains a listing of the data used in the 
current investigation. The engagement data matrix is followed by 
documentation of the data encoding scheme, footnotes pertaining to 
specific data entries and a listing, by war, of the sources used. The 
utility of each of the data elements' with respect to the current 
investigation is discussed in section 3.4. 
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Table 3.3 
Engagement Data Matrix 
1.1        Boston Bunker Bunker 17 Jun    1 
Hill Hill 1775 
British American       British      2400      1500     1050 440/A   13   6   2    Spring A-Ex  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
1.2  Canadian   Quebec    Quebec 31 Dec 1 
1775 
American    British   British  800   1800  490  18  I  4 14 12 Winter A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
1.3  New York    Long     Long    27 Aug 1   British/ 
Island   Island/B   1776      Hessian 
American British/ 
Hessian 
20000     3500      390  1500/C 12   5   2    Sunnier A-Gd   Sub-   No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd  stan- 
tial 
(A) 
1.4 New York Harlem 
Heights 
Harlem 
Heights 
16 Sept 1 
1776 
American British/ 
Hessian 
American 5000 5000 120 270 I 1 2 2 Simmer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Subs. No N/A N/A N/A 
(A) 
1.5 New York White 
Plains 
Chatterton's 
Hill 
28 Oct 1 
1776 
British/ 
Hessian 
American British/ 
Hessian 
4000 1600 240 250 I 2 5 2 Fall A-Gd 
rv-Fr 
No  No N/A N/A N/A 
1.6  New York    Ft.      Ft.    16 Nov 1   British/ 
Washington Washington  1776      Hessian 
American British/ 
Hessian 
8000  3000  460 150/D II 3 1 2  Fall 
1.7  Delaware   Trenton   Trenton 26 Dec 1 
1776 
American    Hessian   American  2400  1400   4  110/E II 2 14 12 Winter 
A-Gd No  No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
| |M       i m m   
A-Cd Major No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd (A) 
1.8 Delaware Princeton Princeton/F 3 Jan 
1777 
1 American British American 5200 1200 40 100/G I 2 6 3 Winter A-Gd Minor No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Ex (A) 
1.9 Saratoga Hubbardton Hubbardton 7 Jul 
1777 
1 British American British 850 700 150 96/H I 2 4 2 Sunmer A-Ex Subs. No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd (A) 
1.10 Saratoga Bennington Bennington/I 16 Aug 
1777 
1 Anvil can Hessian/ 
British 
American 1500 2500 60 610 II 2 13 2 Summer A-Gd Minor Yes N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd (A) 
1.11 Phlladel- Brandywlne Brandywine/J 11 Sep 1   British/ 
phia 1777      Hessian 
American British/ 
Hessian 
13000     12000     580    1350  12-3   5   2    Smrcer A-Gd Minor No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd    (A) 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
1.12 Philadel- 
phia 
Paoli Paoli 19 Sep    1 
1777 
British American British     700/K      1500        7       150     1     2   7   5    Sunror   A-Ex Major No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Ex (A) 
1.13 Philadel- 
phia 
Germantown Germantown/L 4 Oct 
1777 
1   American    British British  110CO  8000  1070 530  1  2 8 8  Fall  A-Gd Subs. No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd (A) 
1.14 Philadel- 
phia 
Fort 
Mercer 
Fort 
Mercer 
'••■" ■'/ 
22 Oct 1 
1777 
Hessian    American American  2000   400  400 10/M II 4 9 2  Fall  A-<kl  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
1.15  Saratoga Freeman's 
Farm 
Freeman's 
Farm 
19 Sep 1   American    British/  British/  3000  3250  320  600  I  2 4 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
1777 llessian   Itessian , D-Gd 
1.16  Saratoga 
1.17  Monmouth 
Bemis    Bernls 7 Oct 1   American British/ American  5000  2500/N 150  600  12-4 4 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
Heights  Heights/L 1777 Hessian                                            D-Gd 
Monmouth  Monmouth 28 Jun 1   British/ American American 13000  14000 720/0 720/0 I  2 13 1 Suimer A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
Courthouse Courthouse/L 1778 Hessian                                                      D-Gd 
1.18  Southern 1st Battle 
of 
Savannah 
1st Battle 
of 
Savannah 
29 Dec 1 
1778 
British    American British  3500  1000  20  250 II 3 8 2 Winter A-Gd Subs. No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd (A) 
1.19  Southern Kettle 
Creek 
Kettle 
Creek 
14 Feb 1 
1779 
American Tory    American  300   700   30  120  I  2 6 2 Winter A-Gd Major No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd (A) 
1.20  Southern 2nd Battle 
of 
Savannah 
2nd Battle 
of 
Savannah 
9 Oct  1  American/    British   British  4550  3300  830  i70 II 4 13 2 Winter A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
1779       French D-Gd 
1.21 Hudson Stony Stony 16 Jul 1   American    British American  1300   700   100 190/P II 4 13 5 Summer A-Ex Major No N/A N/A N/A 
Highlands Point Point 1779                                                                     D-Gd  (A) 
1.22 Observation Paulus Paulus Aug 1   American    British/ American  350   260   5  210 II 4 13 2 Summer A-Gd Major No N/A N/A N/A 
of New York Hook Hook 1779 Hessian                                               D-Gd (A) 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
1.23     Southern Mount Mount 2 Feb     1 
Pleasant       Pleasant 1780 
British/ 
Hessian/ 
Tory 
American British/      450 
Hessian/ 
Tory 
450       20     50/g.   13   5   2    Winter   A-Cd Major No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd    (A) 
1.24 Southern Ramson's 
Mill 
Ramson's 
Mill 
20 Jun 
1780 
1 "American Tory American 1200 1300 150 150 T 2 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Major 
(A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
1.25 Carolinas 
(Gates) 
Camden , Camden 16 Aug 
1780 
1 British American British 2300 3050 320 
/R 
1100 
11 
1 2 9 2 Summer A-Ex 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
1.26 Carolinas Fishing 
Creek 
Fishing 
Creek 
18 Aug 
1780 
1 Tory American Tory 160 700 20 150/T I 2 5 2 Summer A-Ex 
D-Gd 
Major 
(A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
1.27 Carolinas 
(Greene) 
King's 
Mountain 
King's 
Mountain 
7 Oct 
1780 
1 American Tory American 900 1020 90 320/U 11 2 2 8 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
1.28 Carolinas 
(Greene) 
Cowpens Cowpens 17 Jan 
1781 
1 British American American 1120 1100 340_/V 70 I 2 6 2-3 Winter A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
1.29 Carolinas 
(Greene) 
Ouilford 
/Courthouse 
Guilford 
Courthouse 
15 Mar 
1781 
1 British/ 
Hessian 
American British/ 
Hessian 
2000 4300 530 260/W I 2 5 2 Winter A-Ex 
"D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
1.30 Carolinas 
(Greene) 
Hobkirfcs!s 
Hill > 
Hobkirk's 
Hill 
25 Apr 
1781 
1 British American British 
(Marginal) 
900 1400 260 270 I 2 6 2 Spring A-Cd 
D-Fr 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
1.31 Carolinas 
(Greene) 
Seige of 
Point 
Ninety-Six 
Assault on 
June 18th 
18 Jun 
1781 
1 American Tory Tory 1000 550 150 ' 90 II 4 8 1 Spring A-Gd 
D-Ex 
No No N/A N/A N/A. 
1.32 Carolinas 
(Greene) 
Eutaw 
Springs 
Eutaw 
Springs - 
8 Sep 
1781 
1 American British British 
(Marginal) 
2450 2000 520 870 I 2 8* 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-€d 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
1.33 Yorktown Yorktown Yorktown/L 30 Sep 
1781 
20 American/ 
French 
British/ 
Hessian 
American/ 
French 
18000 7800 370 550/X II 4 13 8 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
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2.1   Italy 
(1796-97) 
Lodi Lodi 10 May 1 
1796 
French    Austrian   French  25200  10000  350 450/0 I 2 5 2 Spring A-Ex  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Fr 
2.2 Italy 
(1796-97) 
Castig- 
lione 
Castig- 
lione 
5 Aug     1 
1796 
French Austrian        French      28750 25000    1500   2000    I 
/Y 
2   5   2    Sunrer   A-Gd  Subs.   No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd     (A) 
2.3   Italy 
(1796-97) 
Arcola    Arcola 15 Nov 3 
1796 
French    Austrian   French  20000  17100 4500 7000 I 2 13 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
2.4   Italy 
(1796-97) 
Rivoli    Rlvoll 14 Jan 2 
1797 
French Austrian   French  20400 28000 5000 3000 I 
/Z 
2 2 2 Winter A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
.D-Gd 
2.5  Egyptian ,  Aboukir   Aboukir 25 Jul  1 
1799 
French     Egyptian   French  10000 15000  970 2000 II 
/AA 
3 10 2 Sunrer A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
2.6  Italian   Marengo   Marengo   14 Jun 1 
(1799-1800) 1800 
Austrian French    French  31000  28000 14000 7000 I 2 5 2 Simmer A-Gd Minor No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd  (A) 
2.7   Third 
Coalition 
Darren-   Durren- 
stein    stein 
11 Nov 1 
1805 
Russian French    French  40000  5000 -4000 3000 II 2 5 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
2.8   Third 
Coalition 
Austerlitz Austerlitz 2 Dec  1 
1805 
French Austrian/ 
Russian 
French  75000 89000 8820 15000 I 
/BB 
2 5 8  Fall  A-Gd Subs. No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd  (A) 
2.9  Prussian 
(1806-7) 
Saalfeld  Saalfeld 10 Oct  1 
1806 
French     Prussian   French  14000  8300  172 900/CC I 2 4 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
2.10  Prussian 
(1806-7) 
Jena/     Jena 
Auerstadt 
14 Oct  1 
1806 
French     Prussian   French  96000 53000 5000 10000 I 
/DD 
2 1 2  Fall  A-Ex Minor No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Pr (A) 
2.11  Prussian 
(1806-7) 
Jena/   Auerstadt . 14 Oct  1 
Auerstadt 1806 
Prussian     French   Prussian 63500  27000 13000 7000 I 2 4 8  Fall  A-Fr Minor No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Ex (A) 
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2.12     Prussian 
(1806-7) 
Eylau Eylau 8 Feb   41 
1807 
French Russian French      75000     76(XX)   25000 15000   I     2   5   12   Winter A-Cd 
D-Gd 
No     No N/A N/A N/A 
2.13     Prussian 
(1806-7) 
lleilsburg     Heilsburg 10 Jun    1 
1807 
French Russian        Russian     50000     68000   1(3570  8000    13   5   2    Spring A-Cd 
D-Gd 
No     No  N/A N/A N/A 
2.14     Prussian 
(1806-7) 
Friedland     Friedland 14 Jun    1 French Russian French      80000     60000    8000  20000   I 
1807 /EE 
2   5   2    Spring A-Gd 
IKki 
No     No  N/A N/A N/A 
2.15   Peninsular 
(1808) 
Pancorbo       Pancorbo 31 Oct 1 
1808 
French     Spanish   French  21000  19000  200  600  I  2 6 2  Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No  No N/A N/A N/A 
2.16 Peninsular 
(1808) 
Corunna   Corunna 16 Jan 1 
1809 
French British   British  19500  15200 1500 800 II 2 5 3 Winter A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No  No N/A N/A N/A 
2.17  Danube 
(1809) 
Ecknuhl   Ecknuhl 22 Apr 1 
(1809) 
French    Austrian French  60000  35000 6000 12000 I 
/FF 
2 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No  No N/A N/A N/A 
2.18  Danube 
(1809) 
Assper- 
nessling 
Asspem- 
nessling 
21 May    2 
1809 
Austrian French        Austrian    95800     70000   23400 21000   12   8   2    Spring A-Gd 
D-<kl 
Minor 
(A) 
No  N/A N/A N/A 
2.19       Danube 
(1809) 
Wagrara Wagram 5 Jul     2 
1809 
French Austrian        French     170500   146600 39500 40000   12   5    1    Sunrer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No  No N/A N/A N/A 
2.20  Russian   Borodino  Borodino 7 Sep  1 
1812 
French Russian    French  133000 120000 30000 44000 12 2 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No  No N/A N/A N/A 
2.21  Germany    Lutzen    Lutzen    2 May  1 
(1813) 1813 
Prussian    French    French  73000 110000 18000 20000 12 4 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No 
/GG 
No N/A N/A N/A 
2.22  Germany   Bautzen   Bautzen   20 May 2 
(1813) 1813 
French Prussian/ 
Russian 
French     200000    96000   20000 20000   13   2   2    Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No     No  N/A N/A N/A 
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2.23  Germany 
(1813) 
Dresden   Dresden 26 Aug 2 
1813 
French Allied    French  120000 170000 10CO0 38000 I  2 14 11 Sunrcr A-Gd Subs. 
D-Gd  (A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
2.24  Germany 
(1813) 
Kulm    Kulm/HH 30 Aug 1    Allied     French    Allied  54000  32000 110CO 16000 II 
1813 /II 
2 5 2 Simmer A-Fr Subs. 
D-Ex (A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
2.25  Germany 
(1813) 
Dennewitz  Dennewitz 6 Sep  1 
1813 
French Swedish   Swedish  55000  80000 100QQ 7000 13 5 2 Sunror A-Gd Subs. 
D-Gd (D) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
2.26  Germany 
(1813) 
Leipsig Leipsig 
(Part I) 
16 Oct 1 
1813 
Allies French    French  257000 177000 30000 25000 I  2 13 2  Fall A-Gd Minor 
D-Cd (A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
2.27  Germany 
(1813) 
Leipsig Leipsig 
(Part II) 
18 Oct 2 
1813 
Allies French    Allies  365000 195000 24000 13000 I  5 14 2  Fall A-Gd  No 
D-Gd 
No N/A N/A N/A 
2.28  France 
(1814) 
Brienne   Brienne 29 Jan 1 
1814 
French Allied    French  43000  28000 3000 4000 12 8 3 Winter A-Gd  No 
D-Gd 
No N/A N/A N/A 
2.29   France 
(1814) 
La       La     1 Feb  1 
Rothiere   Rothiere   1814 
Allied French    Allied  110000 40000 6000 6000 I  2 8 12 Winter A-Gd  No 
D-Gd 
No N/A N/A N/A 
2.30  France 
(1814) 
Champ-    Champ- 
aubert    aubert 
10 Feb" 1    French     Allied    French  24000  5000  200 4000 I 
1814 /JJ 
2 8 11 Winter A-Gd  No 
D-Gd 
No N/A N/A N/A 
2.31   France 
(1814) 
Montmirail Montmirail 11 Feb  1    Allied     French    French  21000  20000 4000 2000 I 
1814 /KK 
2 8 11 Winter A-Gd  No 
D-Gd 
No N/A N/A N/A 
2.32  France 
(1814) 
Vauchamps  Vauchamps 14 Feb 1 
1814 
French    Prussian   French  25000  22000  600 7000 I  2 8 11 Winter A-Gd  No 
D-Gd 
No N/A N/A N/A 
2.33   France 
(1814) 
Montereau  Montereau 18 Feb  1 
1814 
French Allied    French  45000  40000 2500 6000 I  3 5 11 Winter A-Gd  No 
D-Gd 
No N/A N/A N/A 
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2.34 France 
(1814) 
Craonne Craonne 7 Mar 
1814 
1 French Allied French 
(Marginal) 
37000 30000 5500 5000 I 2 5 11 Winter A-Gd 
D-Cd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
2.35 France 
(1814) 
Laon Laon 9 Mar 
1814 
2 Allied French Allied 85000 47600 4000 6000 I 2 5 11 Winter A-Pr 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
2.36 France 
(1814) 
Arcis-sur- 
Aube 
Arcis-sur- 
Aube 
20 Mar 
1814 
2 Allied French Allied 80000 28000 4000 3000 I 5 5 11 Winter A-Fr 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
2.37 100 Days Ligny Ligny 16 Jun 
1815 
1 French Prussian French 80000 84000 11000 25000 I 2 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
2.38 100 Days Quatre 
Bras 
Quatre 
Bras 
16 Jun 
1815 
1 French 
(Nominal) 
British/ 
Dutch 
French 
(Marginal) 
24000 36000 4000 4800 I 1 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
2.39 100 Days Waterloo Waterloo 18 Jun 
1815 
1 French Allies Allies 72000 140000 
/LL 
41000 22000 I 2 5 8 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
2,40 100 Days Warve Warve 18 Jun 
1815 
1 French Prussian Prussian/MM 33000 17000 2500 2500 I 5 5 8 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.1 Bull Run Bull Run Bull Run 21 Jul 
1861 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
32000 35000 2710/111980 I 2 5 2 Sumier A-Gd 
D-Ex 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.2 Missouri 
(1861) 
Wilson 
Creek 
Wilson 
Creek/NN 
10 Aug 
1861 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
5400 12480 1240 1190 1 2 1 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Subs. 
(A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
3.3 Tennessee Ft. 
Donelson 
Ft. 
Donelson/00 
12 Feb 
1862 
5 Union Confed- 
erate 
Union 27000 21000 2830 2000 
/PP 
II 4 13 2 Winter A-Gd 
D-Fr 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.4 Missouri 
(1862) 
Pea Ridge 
Arkansas 
Pea Ridge 
Arkansas/QQ 
7 Mar 
1862 
2 Confed- 
erate 
Union Union 16210 12100 800 1380 I 2 1 2-3 Winter A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
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3.5 Valley 
Campaign 
(Jackson) 
Kernstown  Kemstown 23 Mar 1   Confed-     Union    Union   42CO  9000  700  550  I  2 5 2 Spring A-€d  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
1862       erate D-Gd 
3.6 Valley 
Campaign 
(Jackson) 
McDowell McDowell 8 May 
1862 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
4000 9000 250 500  I 2 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Subs. 
(A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
3.7 Valley 
Campaign 
(Jackson) 
Winchester Winchester 25 May 
1862 
1 Confed- 
erate 
Union Confed- 
erate 
16000 7000 350 1800 I 2 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.8 Valley- 
Campaign 
(Jackson) 
Cross Keys/ 
Port 
Republic 
Cross Keys 8 Jun 
1862 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
15000 6500 650 300  I 2 5 T Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.9 Valley 
Campaign 
(Jackson) 
Cross Keys/ 
Port 
Republic 
Port 
Republic 
9 Jun 
1862 
1 Confed- 
erate 
Union Confed- 
erate 
6000 5000 800 1000 I 2 5 8 Spring A-Cd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.10 Valley 
Campaign 
(Jackson) 
Front 
Royal (I) 
Front 
Royal (I) 
23 May 
1862 
1 Confed- 
erate 
Union Confed-' 
erate 
16000 1000 50 800/RR II 2 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.11 Valley 
Campaign 
(Jackson) 
Front 
Royal (II) 
Front 
Royal (II) 
30 May 
1862 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Union 500 300 14 200  I 2 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
3.12 Penninsula Williams- 
burg 
Williams- 
burg 
4 May 
1862 
2 Union Confed- 
erate 
Union 43840 34090 ' 2240 1700 I 2 8 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.13 Penninsula Fair Oaks  Fair Oaks 31 May 
1862 
Confed- Union Confed-     44960     44940    6130   5030    12   8   2    Spring   A-Gd Minor No N/A N/A N/A 
erate erate D-Gd    (A) 
(Marginal) 
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3.14 Penninsula 
3.15 Penninsula 
Seven   M-.chanics-  26 Jun 1   Confed-     Union    Confed- 17590  16810 1480 360  I  2 5 2 Summer A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
Day's    ville    1862       erate             crate D-Gd 
Seven    Gaine's   27 Jun 1   Confed-     Union    Confed- 36790  60410 8750 4040 12 8 2 Summer A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
Day's     Mill    1862       erate              erate D-Gd 
Union    Confed- 92520 105860 9480 8040 12 5 2 Summer A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
erato D-Fr 
3.16 Penninsula Seven Peach 29 Jun 3 Confed- 
Day's Orchard 
through 
Malvern 
mii/ss 
1862 erate 
3.17 Second 
Bull Run 
Cedar 
Mountain 
Cedar 
Mountain 
9 Aug 
1862 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
8750 18260 2350 1140 I 2 5 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.18 Second 
Bull Run 
Second 
Bull Run 
Manasas & 
Chantilly/TT 
29 Aug 
1862 
5 Confed- 
erate 
Union Confed- 
erate 
81390 54330 16050 9200 I 2 2 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.19 Antietam South 
Mountain 
South 
Mountaln/UU 
14 Sep 
1862 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Union 30490 19570 1810 2690 1 2 2 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.20 Antietam Antietam Antletam/L 17 Sep 
1862 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
87160 55220 13720 12410 1 2 5 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.21 Confederate 
Kentucky 
Offensive' 
Richmond, 
Kentucky 
Richmond, 
Kentucky 
30 Aug 
1862 
1 Confed- 
erate 
Union Confed- 
erate 
7450 6990 450 1050 
/W 
11 2 5 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.22 Conferate 
Kentucky 
Offensive 
Perryville Perryville 8 Oct 
1862 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
39720 17200 4210 3400 I 2 5 1 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.23 Iuka/ 
Corinth 
luka luka 19 Sep 
1862 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
13000 17000 790 540 I 2 4 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
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3.24   Iuka/ 
Corinth 
Corinth   Corinth 3 Oct  1 
1862 
Confed- 
erate 
Union Union  23660  23080 4230 2520 12-3 5 2  Fall A-Gd  No 
D-Gd 
No N/A N/A N/A 
3.25 Vicksburg Chickasaw 
Bluffs 
Chickasaw 
Bluffs 
27 Dec 
1862 
3 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
40000 14000 1780 210 I 4 2 2 Winter A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.26 Arkansas Prairie 
Grove 
Prairie 
Grove 
7 Dec 
1862 
1 Confed- 
erate 
Union Union 11830 13180 1320 1250 I 2 6 2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.27 Freder- 
icksburg 
Freder- 
icksburg 
Freder- 
icksburgAW 
13 Dec 
1862 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
113990 78510 12650 5310 I 4 2 6 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.28 Mirfrees- 
boro 
Murfrees- 
boro 
Murfrees- 
boro/L 
31 Dec 
1862 
2 Confed- 
erate 
Union Union 37710 44800 11740 12910 I 2 4 3 Winter A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.29 Vicksburg Arkansas 
Post 
Arkansas 
Post 
11 Jan 
1863 
c 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Union 31120 4910 1060 110/XX II 4 13 3 Winter A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.30 Chancel- 
lorsville 
Chancel- 
lorsville 
Chancel- 
lorsville/YY 
2 May 
1863 
3 Confed- 
erate/ZZ 
r 
Union Confed- 
erate 
60840 104890 12760 16850 I 2 5 2 Spring A-Ex 
D-Gd 
Major 
(A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
3.31 Vicksburg Champion's 
mil 
Champion's 
Hill 
16 May 
1863 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Union 31700 21510 2440 4360 I 2 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.32 Vicksburg Seige of 
Vicksburg 
Assault on 
May 22 
22 May 
1863 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
47170 23800 3200 130 II 4 2 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.33 Vicksburg Port 
Hudson 
Assault on 
May 27 
27 May 
1863 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
13980 4790 2000 240 II 4 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd' 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.34 Vicksburg Port 
Hudson 
Assault on 
June 14 
14 Jun 
1863 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
6000 3750 1790  50 II 4 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
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3.35 Gettysburg Gettysburg Gettysburg 
/AAA 
1 Jul 
1863 
Confed- Union Union       81840     90620   23050 28060   12   5   1    Sunrer   A-Ex     No     No N/A N/A N/A 
erate D-Gd 
3.36      Coastal Fort Fort 18 Jul    1 
Blockade        Wagner Wagner 1863 
(1863) 
Union Confed-        Confed-      5680       1920     1520    170    II    A   8   7    Simmer   A-Gd     No     No N/A N/A N/A 
erate erate D-Gd 
3.37      Chlcka-        Chlcka-        Chicka- 
maugua iraugua        maugua/L 
19 Sep    2 Confed- Union Confed-     72760     63420   18470 16170   12   4   2    Sinner   A-Ex     No     No N/A N/A N/A 
1863 erate erate D-Gd 
3.38      Chatta-        Chat 
nobga 
hatta- 
nooga 
Chatta-   25 Nov 2    Union     Confed-    Union  60600  50100 5820 6670 14 2 2  Fall  A-Ex  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
nooga/BBB   1863 erate D-Gd 
3.39 Red River   Sabine   Pleasant   9 Apr 
Crossing    Hill     1864 
1   Confed-     Union    Confed-  15450  13730 1500 1370 I  2 4 2 Spring A-Gd MLnor No N/A N/A N/A 
erate erate D-Gd (A) 
3.40  Mine Run  Mine Run  Mine Run 27 Nov 5    Union     Confed-   Confed-  75760  40750 1190 1650 12 4 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
1863 erate    erate D-Gd 
3.41  Coastal   Olustee,  Olustee,  20 Feb 1 
Blockade   Florida   Florida   1864 
(1864) 
Union     Confed-   Confed-  5500  5590  1860 930  I  4 7 2 Winter A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
erate    erate D-Gd 
3.42 Wilderness/ Spotsyl- 
Spotsyl-   vania , 
vania/Cold 
Harbor 
Drewry's  12 May 5    Union     Confed-   Confed-  16990  19380 4160 3070 12 18 Spring A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
Bluff -     1864 erate    erate D-Gd 
3.43 Wilderness/   Cold 
Spotsyl-   Harbor 
vanta/Cold 
Harbor 
Cold 
Harbor 
3 Jun  1 
1864 
Union Confed-   Confed-  50000  34000 6500 1500 13 6 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
erate    erate D-Gd 
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3.44      Peters- 
burg (1) 
Weldon Globe 18 Aug    4        Confed- Union Union       15720     21520    1600   4500    12   4   2    Summer   A-Gd     No     No N/A N/A N/A 
Railroad        Tavern 1864 erate D-Gd 
3.45 Valley 
(1864) , 
Cedar 
Creek 
Cedar 
Creek/L 
19 Oct 
1864 
1 Confed- 
erate 
Union Union 19970 34200 2910 5670 I 2 5 5 Fall A-Gd 
D-Cd 
Major 
(A) 
Yes N/A N/A N/A 
3.46 Missis- 
sippi Area 
Operations 
Brice's 
Cross 
Roads 
Brice's 
Cross 
Roads 
10 Jun 
1864 
1 Confed- 
erate 
Union Confed- 
erate 
3,000 5400 500 620 
/COC 
I 2 5 2 Spring A-Ex 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.47 Missis- 
sippi Area 
Operations 
Tupelo Confed- 
erate 
Attack 
14 Jul 
1864 
1 Confed- 
erate 
Union Union 7100 14000 1300 670 I 2 14 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.48 Franklin- 
Nashville 
Franklin Franklin 30 Nov 
1864 
1 Confed- 
erate 
Union Union 28550 29560 6250 2330 I 4 5 3 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.49 Franklin- 
Nashville 
Nashville Nashville 15 Dec 
1864 
2 Union Confed- 
erate 
Union 54700 24950 3060 4460 
is. 
I 3 5 11 Fall A-Gd 
D-Pr 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.50 Atlanta Buzzard's Buzzard's 25 May 4 
Roost to Roost to 1864 
New Hope New Hope 
Church Church/DDD 
Union Confed-        Confed-    117530    72190   11770 9190    13   4   2    Spring   A-Gd     No     No N/A N/A N/A 
erate erate D-Gd 
3.51 Atlanta Kenesaw 
Mountain 
Kenesaw . 
Mountain 
27 Jun 
1864 
1 Union Confed- 
erate 
Confed- 
erate 
17290 19040 2050 440 I 3 2 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.52 Atlanta Atlanta Peachtree 
Creek 
20 Jul 
1864 
1 Confed- 
erate 
Union Union 20250 21660 2500 1600 1 2 4 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
3.53 Atlanta Atlanta Atlanta/L 
• 
22 Jul 
1864 
1 Confed- 
erate 
Union Union 40440 36810 8000 3720 I 2 4 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No N/A N/A N/A 
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3.54      Atlanta Atlanta Ezra 28 Jul     1 Confed- 
Church 1864 erate 
Union Union       19520     14170    4300    630     12   4   2    Simmer   A-Gd     No     No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
3.55  Atlanta  Jonesboro  Joncsboro  31 Aug I   Confed- 
(lst)    1864       erate 
Union    Union  25600  15240 1730 180  I  2 5 2 Sunrcr A-Fr  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
3.5'>  Valley   Opequon   Opequon   19 Sep 1 
Campaign   Creek    Creek    1864 
(1864) 
Union     Confed-    Union  41300  18910 5020 3920 12 5 2 Sunrer A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
erate D-Gd 
3.57  Valley   Monocacy  Monocacy   9 Jul  1   Confed- 
Campalgn 1864       erate 
(1864) 
Union    Confed-  8000  8750  700 1800 15 5 2 Sinner A-Fr  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
'  erate D-Gd 
3.58 Wilmington Ft. Fisher Ft. Fisher 15 Jan 1    Union     Confed-    Union  10000  2500  1340 500 II 4 113 Winter A-Ex  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
1865 erate D-Ex 
3.59 Carollnas  Benton- Benton- 19 Mar I   Confed- Union    Union  18170  18590 2120- 1100 I  2 4 2 Winter A-Gd Subs. No N/A N/A N/A 
ville ville/L   1865       erate D-Gd (A) 
4.1   Natal    Eland- Eland- 21 Oct 1   British Boer    British  3150   650  280  210 I  2 6 2 Spring A-Gd No  No N/A N/A N/A 
slaagte slaagte    1899 /EEE D-Gd 
4.2   Nar:al    Colenso   Colenso 15 Dec 1   British      Boer     Boer   14100  5500  1120  30  I  3 3 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
1899 D-Gd 
4.3 Cape Colony  Modder   Belmont   23 Nov 1 
River 1899 
British      Boer    British  7500  2000  370  100  I  5 6 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
4.4 Cape Colony  Magers-   Magers-   10 Dec 2 
fnntein  fonteln/L   1899 
British      Boer     Boer   11300  8500  970  250  I  3 6 1  Spring A-Gd  No  No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
4.5   Cape Colony     Paartle-     Assault on     18 Feb    1 
berg       the 18th/FFF     1900 
British Boer Boer        17300      4100     1200    300    II    2   6   2    Suirer   A-Gd     No     No N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
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5.1 Yalu        Yalu River   Yalu River     30 Apr 
Crossing       Crossing 1904 
2       Japanese Russian       Japanese    40000      6100     1100   2500    15   2   2    Spring A-Cd     No     No  N/A N/A N/A 
D-Gd 
5.2 Central 
Manchuria 
Telissu Telissu 14 Jun 
1904 
2 Japanese Russian Japanese 35000 29500 1160 3480 I 3 3 8 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
5.3 Port 
Arthur 
Nanshan Nanshan 25 May 
1904 " 
1 Japanese Russian Japanese 30000 3000 4500 1500 I 4 3 2 Spring A-Gd 
A-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
5.4 Central 
Manchuria 
Uaoyang liaoyang/L 25 Aug 
1904 
10 Russian Japanese Japanese 158000 125000 19000 23000 I 2 3 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No N/A N/A N/A 
6.1 Invasion 
of Italy 
Salerno Port of 
Salerno 
9 Sep 
1943 
3 British; 
46th INF DIV 
German; 
16th PZ DIV 
German 12920 4250 1360 120 I 3 5 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) No Yes 
6.2 Invasion 
of Italy 
Salerno Amphitheater 9 Sep 
1943 
3 British; 
56th INF DIV 
German; 
16th PZ DIV 
German 12920 4250 1040 100 I 3 5 2 Suomer A-Gd' 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) No Yes 
6.3 Invasion 
of Italy 
Salerno Sele-Calore 
Corriluor 
11 Sep 
1943 
1 U.S.; 
45th INF DIV 
German; 
16th PZ DIV 
German 12450 8390 240 160 I 2 5 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) Yes Yes 
6.4 Invasion 
of Italy 
Salerno Vietri I 12 Sep 
1943 
3 German; 
HG PZ DIV 
British; 
46th INF DIV 
British 15000 12920 670 820 II 
/FFF 
2 5 2 Suomer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (D) Yes Yes 
6.5 Invasion 
of Italy 
Salerno Battipaglia 12 Sep 
1943 
4 German; 
16th PZ DIV 
British; 
56th INF DIV 
British 14730 11230 830 1570 II 
/GGG 
2 5 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (D) Yes Yes 
6.6 Invasion 
of Italy 
Salerno Tobacco 
Factory 
13 Sep 
1943 
2 German; 6th & 
29th PZ DIV 
U.S.; 
45th INF DIV 
U.S. 14730 12690,. 630 390 II 2 5 2 
/GGG 
Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (D) Yes Yes 
6,7 Invasion 
of Italy 
Salerno Vietri II 17 Sep 
1943 
2 German; 
HG PZ DIV 
British; 
46th INF DIV 
British 13300 18910 390 250 II 2 5 2 
/GGG 
Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (D) Yes Yes 
11 
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6.8  Invasion   Salerno  Battipaglia 17 Sep 2   British;    German; 
or Italy II     1943    56th INF DIV 16th PZ DIV 
British  14730 7000  300  110  I  S S 2 Surmcr A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.9  Invasion   Salerno    Eboli    17 Sep 2    U.S.;    German; 16th 
of Italy 1943    45th INF DIV & 26th PZ DIV 
U.S.   15580 6700  380  110  I  5 5 2 Simmer A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.10  Voltumo  Grazzanise Grazzanlse 12 Oct 3 
1943 
British; 7th 
Armored DIV 
German; 15th 
PZ GRDIV 
British  14560 8070  370  80  13 8 2  Fall  AH3d  No  No (A) No No 
D-Gd 
6.11  Voltumo   Capua    Capua 13 Oct 1 
1943 
British; 
56th INF DIV 
German; 
HG PZ DIV 
German  16860 8000  420  90  13 8 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.12     Voltumo      TrlfLisco     Trlfllsco 13 Oct    2 
1943 
U.S.; 
3rd INF DIV 
German; 
IE PZ DIV 
U.S.   18480 7250  260  70  13 5 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.13  Voltumo   Monte    Monte    13 Oct 2    U.S.; 
Acero    Acero    1943    45th INF DIV 
German; 
' 3rd PZ GR 
& 26 PZ DIV 
U.S.   21270  6440  120  130  I  5 2 8  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) No Yes 
(Marginal) D-Gd 
6.14  Voltumo   Caiazzo   Calazzo 13 Oct 2 
1943 
U.S.; 
34th INF DIV 
German; 3rd 
PZ GR DIV 
U.S.   18210 6440  130  50  15 5 8  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
D-€d 
6.15  Voltumo   Castel    Castel   13 Oct 3   British;   German; 15th 
Voltumo  Voltumo   1943     46th INF DIV  PZ GR DIV 
British  17770 8160  600" 60  I  3 8 2  Fall  ArCd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.16  Voltumo   Dragoni   Dragoni 15 Oct 3 
1943 
U.S.; 
34th INF DIV 
German; *3rd 
PZ GR DIV 
U.S.   17030 5150  60  50  15 5 8  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.17  Voltumo   Canal I   Canal I 15 Oct 6 
1943 
British; 
46th INF DIV 
German; 15th 
PZ GRDIV 
British  17500 8140  440  280  I  3 5 8  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.18  Voltumo   Monte    Monte   16 Oct 2   British;    German; 
Grande    Grande    1943     50th INF DIV  HG PZ DIV 
British  16400 7240  200  70  I  3 7 11  Fall  A-Cd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Cd 
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6.19  Voltumo  Canal II  Canal II   17 Oct 2   British;  German; 15th British  14600  8140  130  50  I 3 8 11  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) No No 
1943     7th INF DIV  PZ GR DIV D-Gd 
6.20 Voltumo  Francolise Francolise 20 Oct 3   British; 
1943     7th INF DIV 
German; 15th German  14000  8090  80  40  13 5 8  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) No No 
PZ GR DIV (Marginal) 4    D-Gd 
6.21  Voltumo Santa Maria Santa Maria  4 Nov  2    U.S.;    German; 3rd 
Oliveto   Oliveto   1943    34th INF DIV  PZ GR DIV 
U.S.   16870  6320 400  210  I  3 5 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.22     Voltumo Monte Monte 5 Nov     3        British;       German; 15th 
Caraino I       Cand.no I 1943 56th INF DIV      PZ GR DIV 
German      19510      6750 240      20      14   2   8      Fall     A-Gd     No     No  (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.23  Voltumo Monte    Monte    6 Nov  2    U.S.;    German; 3rd 
Lungo    Lungo    1943     3rd INF DIV  PZ GR DIV 
German . 16600  6570 350  170  I  4 2 8  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.24     Voltumo       Pozzilli       Pozzilli 6 Nov     2 U.S.; 
1943 45th INF DIV 
German; 3rd 
PZ GR DIV 
German     20120      6570 140      30      14   2   8      Fall     A-Gd     No     No  (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.25  Voltumo Monte    Monte    8 Nov  5 German; 15th  British; 
CanrLno II  Caraino II   1943      PZ GR DIV  56th INF DIV 
German  7940  5200 60  510  I  2 2 8  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (D) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.26 Voltumo Monte    Monte    8 Nov  3    U.S.;    German; 3rd 
Rotondo   Rotondo    1943     3rd INF DIV  PZ GR DIV 
German  16350  7940 160  60„  I  4 2 8  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.27 "Winter 
line" 
Calabritto Calabritto 1 Dec  2   British; 
1943     46th INF DIV 
German; 15th British  17770  7590  250  20  14 2 8  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
PZ GR DIV  (Marginal) , D-Gd 
6.28  "'Winter    Monte    Monte    2 Dec 
Line"   Camino III Camino III   1943 
5   British; 
56th INF DIV 
German; 15th 
PZ GR DIV 
British 20740  3290 700  170  I  4 2 8  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.29  "Winter    Monte    Monte    2 Dec 
Line"    Maggiore  Maggtore   1943 
2    U.S.; 
36th INF DIV 
German; 
15th PZ GR 
& 29 PZ DIV 
U.S.   5550  3290  80  20  I  4 2 11  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
(Marginal) D-Gd 
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6.30   Anzio   Aprilia I  Aprilia I 25 Jan 2   British; 
1944     1st INF DIV 
German; 3rd  British  19350 
PZGRDIV 
6750  1140 100  I  2 8 11 Winter A-Gd Minor No (A) No Yes 
D-Gd (A) 
6.31   Anzio The      The    27 Jan 1  German; 3rd 
Factory   Factory   1944      PZ GR DIV 
British;   British  15320 
1st INF DIV 
17980  70  60  12 8 3 Winter A-Gd Minor No (D) Yes Yes 
D-Gd (D) 
6.32   Anzio   Campoleone Campoleone 29 Jan 3   British; 
1944     1st ™F DIV 
German; 3rd  German  17770 
PZ GRDIV 
15100  740  220  I  3 8 3 Winter A-Gd Minor No (A) Yes Yes 
D-Cd (A) 
6.33   Anzio Campoleone Campoleone  3 Feb 
Counter-  Counter-   1944 
attack    attack 
3 German; Com- 
bat Command 
Greizer 
British;   British  26030 
1st INF DIV 
9730  1950 2150 12-3 8 8 Winter A-Gd  No  No (D) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.34   Anzio   Carroceto Carroceto 7 Feb  2  German; 3rd 
1944      PZ GR DIV 
British;   British  26490 
1st INF DIV 
4520  340  370  12-3 8 3 Winter A-Gd  No  No (D) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.35   Anzio Moletta Moletta 7 Feb 3   German; U.S.; U.S. 
River 
Defense 
River 
Defense 
1944 65th INF Div 45th INF DIV 
7420  5000  250  120  12-3 8 3 Winter A-Gd  No  No (D) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.36   Anzio  Aprilia II Aprilia II 
6.39   Anzio 
9 Feb  1 German; Com-  British;   German  27520 
1944     bat Command  1st INF DIV 
Greizer 
17730  230  310  12-3 8 3 Winter A-Gd  No  No (D) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.37 Anzio Factory 
Counter- 
attack 
Factory 
Counter- 
attack 
11 Feb 
1944 
2 U.S.; 
45th INF DIV 
German; 
715th LT 
INF DIV 
German 13400 7080 120 210 12-3 8 9 Winter A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) No Yes 
6.38 Anzio Bowling 
Alley 
Bowling 
Alley 
16 Feb 
1944 
4 German; 
4 Divisions 
U.S.; 
45th INF DIV 
U.S. 41980 20500 1900 1300 II2-3 8 3 Winter A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (D) Yes Yes 
Moletta   Moletta   16 Feb 4   German;    British;   German  21480 
River II  River II   1944     65th INF &  56th INF DIV (Marginal) 
45h PARA DIV 
3 
9760     1430   1670   II2-3   8   3    Winter   A-Gd Major No  (D) Yes Yes 
D-Gd     (A) 
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6.40   Anzio    Fiocda   Fioccia 21 Feb 3 German; 114th   U.S.;     U.S.   15640 
1944      LT INF DIV  45th INF DIV 
19610  570  260 II 3 8 9 Winter A-Gd  No  No (D) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.41   Rome Santa 
Maria 
Infante 
Santa 
Maria 
Infante 
12 May 2 
1944 
U.S.; 
88th INF DIV 
German;    U.S. 
94th & 71st 
INF DIV 
18700  9250  550  960  I  4 3 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.42   Rome San 
Martino 
San 
Martino 
12 May 2 
1944 
U.S.; 
85th INF DIV 
German;    U.S. 
94th INF DIV (Marginal) 
17970  8140  1150 680  I  4 3 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.43   Rome     Spigno    Spigno 14 May 2 
1944 
U.S.; 
88th INF DIV 
German;    U.S. 
94th & 71st 
INF DIV 
18310  8220  340  720  I  5 3 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.44   Rome   Castello-  Castello-  14 May 2    U.S.; 
novato    novato    1944    85th INF DIV 
German;    U.S. 
94th INF DIV 
16460  7500  540  440  I  4 3 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.45   Rome    Forrala    Formta 16 May 3 
1944 
U.S.; 
85th INF DIV 
German;    U.S. 
94th INF DIV 
23190  7630  400  720  I  5 5 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No (A) No No 
D-Gd 
6.46   Rome     Monte    Monte   17 May 3    U.S.;     German;    U.S.   13100 
Grande    Grande    1944     88th INF DIV 94th INF DIV 
4560  300  490  I  2 3 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.47   Rome   Itrl-Fonde Itri-Fonde 20 May 3 
1944 
U.S.; 
88th INF DIV 
German;    U.S. 
94th INF DIV 
17910  6650  270  380  I  5 3 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
6.48   Rome   Terracina  Terracina 22 May 3 
1944 
U.S.; 
85th INF DIV 
German;    U.S. 
94th INF DIV 
18030  6650  270  380  I  2 2 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.49   Rome    Moletta   Moletta   23 May 2   British; 
Offensive  Offensive   1944     5th INF DIV 
German;   British 
4th PARA DIV 
17350  12570  230  470  I  4 8 8 Spring A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
. D-Gd 
6.50 Rome Anzio- Anzio- 23 May    2    .    British; 
Albano Road Albano Road      1944 1st INF DIV 
German; British 
65th INF DIV 
17310     11340     190     480     1,488    Spring   A-Gd     No     No  (A) Yes  No 
D-Gd 
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6.51   Rome     Anzio    Anzio   23 May 
Breakout  Breakout   1944 
3  U.S.; 1st 
Armored DIV 
German; 
3 PZ GR& 
362 INF DIV 
U.S.        16220 12820     710    1320    14   8   8    Spring   A-Gd  Subs.  No  (A) Yes No 
D-Gd    (A) 
6.52 Rome Cistema Cisterna 23 May 
1944 
3 U.S.; 
3rd INF DIV 
German; 362nd 
INF DIV 
U.S. 19970 11930 1520 1590 I 4 8 8 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) Yes No 
6.53 Rome Sezze Sezze 25 May 
1944 
3 U.S.; 
85th INF DIV 
German; 
29th PZ DIV 
U.S. 17930 6960 160 280 I 6 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) Yes No 
6.54 Rome Velletri Velletri 26 May 
1944 
1 U.S.; 1st 
Armored DIV 
German; 362nd 
INF DIV 
German 14620 12330 770 1310 I 4 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(D) 
No (A). Yes No 
6.55 Rome Campoleone 
Station 
Campoleone 
Station 
26 May 
1944 
3 U.S.; 
45th INF DIV 
German; 
65th INF DIV 
U.S. 19050 10590 530 870 I 4 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) No No 
6.56 Rone Villa 
Crocetta 
Villa 
Crocetta 
27 May 
1944 
2 U.S.; 
34th INF DIV 
German; 3rd 
PZ GR DIV 
German 18000 13720 310 600 I 4 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) No No 
6.57 Rome Ardea Ardea 28 May 
1944 
3 British; 
5th INF DIV 
German; 4th 
PARA DIV 
British 15560 7660 240 380 I 4 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) No Yes 
6.58 Rome Lahuvio lanuvio 29 May 
1944 
4 U.S.; 
34th INF DIV 
German; 3rd 
PZ GR DIV 
German 17300 6110 820 590 I 4 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) Yes Yes 
6.59 Rome Campoleone Campoleone 29 May 
1944 
3 U.S.; 1st 
ARM DIV & 
45th INF DIV 
German; 3rd 
PZ GR& 
65th INF DIV 
U.S. 
(Marginal) 
29710 15800 1300 1380 I 4 5 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) Yes Yes 
6.60 Rome Tarto-Tiber Tarto-Tiber 3 Jun 
1944 
2 British; 
1st & 5th 
INF-DIV 
German; 
45th PARA DIV 
British 38010 10860 570 850 I 4 8 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) Yes No 
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6.61  Normandy   Seine    Seine   23 Aug 3    U.S.; 
Breakout   River    River    1944      XX CORPS 
German;    U.S.   40620 
FIRST ARM? 
15000  230  890  I 3 5 8 Summer A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.62 Advance to  Moselle   Moselle   6 Sep  6    U.S.; 
the Westwall  Metz     Metz     1944      XX CORPS 
German;    U.S.   59630 
FIRST ARMY 
41500 1650 1670 I 5 5 8 Summer A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.63 Advance to 
the Westwall 
Metz     Metz    13 Sep 1    U.S.; .    German;    German  60790 
1944      XX CORPS   FIRST ARMY 
39580  360  210  I 4 5 8 Summer A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.6^ Advance to 
the Westwall 
Chartres  Chartres 16 Aug 1  U.S.; 7th    German;    U.S.   15650 
1944     ARMORED DIV  FIRST ARMY 
8330  110  580  I 2 5 5 Summer A-Gd  NoTJo--(A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.65 Advance to 
the Westwall 
Melun     M2lun 23 Aug 3  U.S.; 7th    German;    U.S.   17230 
1944     ARMORED DIV 48th INF DIV 
6000  100 1080 I 3 5 8 Summer A-Gd  No  No (A) No No 
D-Gd 
6.66  Slgfreld Foret de  Foret de  10 Nov 2   German;   U.S.; 35th,   U.S.   11190 
Chateair-  Chateau-   1944     11th PZ DIV 26th INF DIV (Marginal) 
Salins   SalinsAlUH XIII CORPS & 4th ARM DIV 
43590  450  720  I 2 5 12  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (D) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.67  Slgfreld 
Line 
Morhange  Morhange 13 Nov 3  U.S.; 4th    German;    U.S.   25880 
1944      ARM DIV &  11th PZ DIV, 
35th INF DIV 361st INF DIV 
7560  1200 200  I 5 5 12  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) No No 
D-Gd 
6.68  Slgfreld  Bourgal-  Bourgal-  14 Nov 2 
Line     troff     r.roff    1944 
U.S.; 4th    German;    German  21860 
ARM DIV &  11th PZ DIV, 
26th INF DIV 361st INF DIV 
6520  390  140  I 5 5 12  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) No No 
D-Gd 
6.69  Slgfreld  Baerendorf Baerendorf  24 Nov 
Line       I      I/III     1944 PZ !ehr DIV 
361 INF DIV 
U.S.; 4th   U.S.   5370 
Armored DIV 
7940  220  60  I 2 5 6  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (D) No No 
D-Gd 
6.70  Slgfreld  Baerendorf Baerendorf  26 Nov 1   U.S.; 4th    Carman; 
Line      II       II      1944     Armored DIV  PZ Leiir DIV 
U.S.   15870  7000  60  230  I 3 5 5  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) No No 
D-Gd 
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6.71  Sigfreid 
Line 
Burbach-  Burbach-  27 Nov 3    U.S.;     German;    German  16230  6710  80  220  I  5 5 9 
Durstel   Durstel    1944     4th ARM DIV  PZ Lehr DIV - 
Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) No No 
D-Gd 
6.72  Sigfreid   Sarre-    Sarre-   1 Dec  2    U.S.; 
Line     Union    Union    1944     4th ARM DIV 
German; 11th  U.S.   19770  6040  280  130  I  3 5 5 
PZ, PZ Lehr, '  * 
25th PZ GR DIV 
Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) No No 
D-Cd 
6.73  Sigfreid 
Line 
6.74  Sigfreid 
Line 
Singling-  Singling-  6 Dec  2    U.S.;    German; 25th German  15220  5040  160  120  I  4 5 8 
Bining    Bining    1944     4th ARM DIV  PZ GR DIV, 
11th PZ DIV 
Seille- 
Nied 
Seille- 
Nied 
6.75  Sigfreid 
Line 
Morhange- 
Fav.lque- 
roont 
Morhange- 
Faulque- 
mont 
8 Nov  5    U.S.;    German; XIII  U.S.   99580  23590 4280 4870 I  4 5 12 
1944      XII CORPS    & LXXXLX 
CORPS 
13 Nov 4    U.S.;    German; XIII  Incon-  92390  28380 3220 3670 15 5 3 
1944      XII CORPS    & LXXXIX   lusive 
CORPS (Arbi- 
trarily 
German) 
Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
D-Cd 
Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Cd 
Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) No No 
D-Gd 
!, 6.76  Sigfreid   Serre-    Serre-   20 Nov 8    U.S.; 
Line    St. Avoid  St. Avoid   1944      XII CORPS 
German; XIII  U.S.   88940  32400 3270 4950 15 5 6 
& LXXXLX 
CORPS 
Fall  A-Cd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
6.77 Sigfreid 
Line 
Durstel- 
Farebers- 
villes 
Durstel- 
Farebers- 
villes 
28 Nov 
1944 
2 U.S.; 
XII CORPS 
German; XIII 
& LXXXLX 
CORPS 
German 90080 30710 490 810 I 5 5 '9 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) No No 
6.78 Sigfreid 
Line 
Sarre- 
Singling 
Sarre- 
Singling 
5 Nov 
1944 
3 U.S.; 
XII CORPS 
German; XII 
& XI CORPS 
U.S. 89980 31500 1130 1170 I 5 5 6 Fall A-Cd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) Yes No 
79 
Table 3.3 (continued) 
6.79       Kursk Oboyan Oboyan 4 Jul     9        German; Soviet; 6th     German      62000     gOOOO?  5640  30940   14   5   8    Summer   A-Cd     No     No   (A) Yes Yes 
Kursk Kursk 1943 XLVIII PZ      GD & 1st TK D-Gd 
CORPS ARM* 
6.80 Gothic 
Line 
11 Giogo 
Pass 
11 Giogo 
Pass 
13 Sep 
1944 
5 U.S.; 
85th INF DIV 
German; 12th 
PARARGT 
U.S. 15720 3700 560 500 I 4 2 8 Summer A-Gd 
D-Cd 
No No (A) Yes No 
6.81 Ardennes Ardennes- 
Sauer 
Ardennes- 
Sauer 
16 Dec 
1944 
2 German; 
212th VG DIV 
U.S.; 
4th INF DIV 
German 10000 8630 270 140 I " 2 5 6 «Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Major 
(A) 
No (A) No No 
6.82 Invasion 
of France* 
Sedan Sedan 13 Mar 
1940 
2 German; 
XIX CORPS 
French; ELMS 
7 & 9 ARMIES 
German 48000 45000' '' 800 4500, I 3 5 2 Sprlng A-Gd 
D-Pr 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) Yes Yes 
6.83 Kiev 
(1941) 
Rovno 
(Ukraine 
1941) 
Rovno 
(Ukraine 
1941) 
21 Jul 
1941 
5 German; 
1st PZ GR 
Soviet; ELMS 
Southwest 
Army Gr (SWAG) 
German 132000 150000 3300 87530 I 3 5 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) Yes Yes 
6.84 Malaya 
(1941) 
Jitra Jitra 12 Dec 
1941 
1 Japan; 
5th INF DIV 
British; 11th 
INDIAN DIV 
Japan 7000 12000 600 1200 I 2 12 7 Fall A-Ex 
D-Fr 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) No No 
6.85 Leningrad 
(1943) 
Leningrad Leningrad 12 Jan 
1943 
7 Soviet; 2nd 
Armored ARMY 
German; 
Elements 
18th ARMY 
Soviet 120000 30000 47960 3150 I 4 5 12 Winter A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No Yes (D) Yes Yes 
6.86 Soviet 
Summer 
Offensive 
Kharkov- 
Belgorad 
Kharkov- 
Belgorad 
3 Aug 
1943 
3 Soviet; 
53rd ARM* 
German; 
167 INF DIV 
Soviet 70000 15000 11680 410 I 4 5 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No Yes (D) Yes Yes 
6.87 Normandy 
Breakout 
Cobra 
(St. Lo) 
Cobra 
(St. Lo) 
24 Jul 
1944 
3 U.S.; 
VII- CORPS 
German; 
LXXXW CORPS 
U.S. 126000 30700 2270 7500 I 4 5 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) Yes No 
6.88 Manchurian Mutangiang Mutangiang 
(Manchuria) (Manchuria) 
9 Aug 
1945 
8 Soviet; 
5th ARM* 
Japan; 
5th ARMY. 
Soviet 147000 75000 10000 36000 I 4 2 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Pr 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) Yes Yes 
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7.1  Wen Men  Siege of  Assault on 
Phu    Men Blen  Beatrice 
Phu 
13 Mar I  Vietminth    French    Viet-   8000   750  1710 560 II 4 6 8 Winter A-Gd  No  No (D) No Yes 
1954 minth D-Gd 
7.2 Wen Bien 
Phu 
Siege of  Assault on 
Men Men Gabrielle/JJJ 
Phu 
14 Mar 
1954 
1 Vietminth French Viet- 
minth 
6800 1950 5800 1000 II 4 6 8 Winter A-Gd 
D-Ex 
No No (D) No Yes 
7.3 Dlen Bien 
Phu 
Siege of 
Dlen Bien 
Phu 
Huguette 
(4/4) 
4 Apr 
1954 
1 Vietminth French French 4000 410 2170 280 II 4 6 8 Spring A-Gd 
D-Ex 
No No (D) No Yes 
-8.1 Invasion of 
S. Korea 
Invasion of 
S. Korea 
Invasion of 
S. Korea 
25 Jun 
1950 
3 N. Korea; 
NKPA ELMS 
S. Korea; 
R0KAELMS 
N. Korea 60000 38000 5510 18000 I 2-3 3 2 Summer A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No (D) Yes Yes 
9.1 Northern Mtshmar- 
Haemek 
Mishmar- 
Haemek 
- 4 Apr 
1948 
6 Arab Israeli Israeli 1500 1000 50 30 I 3 6 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No None No No 
9.? Northern Haifa Haifa 21 Apr 
1948 
3 Israel Arab Israel 
(Marginal) 
1500 500 60 25 II 3 6 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No None No No 
9.3 Northern Safad Safad 28 Apr 
1948 
15 Israel Arab Israel 1500 2100 100 150 I 3 3 8 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No None No No 
9.4 Eastern Jerusalem 
(Nachson) 
Jerusalem 
(Nachson) 
6 Apr 
1948 
7 Israel/KKK Arab Israel 2000 1500 150 500 I 3 6 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No None No No 
9.5 Eastern Jerusalem 
(Jebussi) 
Jerusalem 
(Jebussi) 
21 Apr 
1948 
10 Israel Arab Israel 3000 . 3600 375 500 I 3 14 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No None No No 
9.6 Eastern Jaffa 
(Chametz) 
Jaffa 
(Chametz) 
25 Apr 
1948 
19 Arab/LLL Israel Israel 3500 2100 300 240 I 3 14 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-CJ 
No No (A) No Yes 
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9.7  Eastern Kfar 
Etzion 
Kfar 
Etzion 
4,12-14 4 
May 
1948 
Arab Israel    Arab 1100   930  200  160 II 3 6 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No None No No 
D-Gd 
9.8 Northern Jordan 
Valley 
Jordan 
VaUey 
15 May 
1948 
6 Arab Israel Israel 2000 1250 200 150 
0 
I 4 9 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No Nei-Yes Yes 
ther 
9.9 Northern Mishniar 
Hayarden I 
Mishnar 
.Hayarden I 
6 Jun 
1948 
5 Arab Israel Arab 4000 2500 250 2500 I 3 9 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Subs. 
(A) 
No None No No 
9.10 Northern Ein 
GeV 
Ein 
Gev 
10 Jun 
'948 
3 Arab Israel Israel 500 100 50 20 I 4 9 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No None No No 
9.11 Northern Gesher Gesher 16 May 
1948 
3 Arab Israel Israel 600 500 60 30 I 3 9 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No None No No 
9.12 Northern Jenln Jenln 31 May 
1948 
5 Israel Arab Arab 1500 2000 150 20 I 3 3 1 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (D) No No 
9.13  Eastern  Jerusalem Jerusalem 
(Sheik "   (Sheik 
Jarrah-   Jarrah- 
Notre Dane) Notre Dame) 
19 May 5 
1948 
Arab Israel    Israel  1800 1700  180  100 II 3 14 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No None No No 
D-Gd 
9.14 Eastern Latrun I  Latrun I 26 May 
1948 
2 Israel Arab Arab 2000 1000 800 20 I 4 6 1 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No None No No 
9.15 Eastern Latrun II  Latrun II 30 May 
1948 
1 Israel Arab Arab 2000 1000 570 20 I 4 6 1 Spring A-Gd 
D-Fr 
No No None No No 
9.16 Southern Kfar Darom- Kfar Daronr- 
Nirlra    Nirlm 
15 May 
1948 
2 Arab Israel Israel 500 200 270 20 I 3 10 2 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No None No No 
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9.17  Southern Yad      Yad    19 May 6 
Mordechai  Mordechai   1948 
Arab Israel    Arab   2000   300  300  45  I  3 10 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No None No No 
D-Gd 
9.18  Southern Neqba- 
Ashdad 
Neqba- 
Ashdad 
29 May    6 
1948 
Israel/MSM Arab Arab 1500       2000      150      20      I     3   10  2    Spring   A-Gd     No     No Nei-Yes Yes 
I>Gd ther 
9.19  Southern  Nitzanin  Nltzanln 7 Jun  1 
1948 
Arab Israel    Arab   1840   150   18  150  I  3 9 2 Spring A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd 
9.20  Northern   Mishmar   Mlshnar   9 Jul  6 
Hayarden II Hayarden II  1948 
Arab Israel    Arab   3000 
(Marginal) 
2700  250  270  I  2 9 2 Summer A-Gd  No  No (D) No No 
D-Gd 
9.21     Northern        Sejera Sejera 11 Jul    6 
1948 
Arab Israel Israel       2000 1000      150      20      13   6   2    Sunror   A-Gd     No     No  (A)  No Yes 
D-Gd 
9.22     Northern      Nazareth      Nazareth       15 .Tul    2 
(Dekel) (Dekel) 1948 
Israel Arab Israel       2500 2000       25      95      13   6   2    Summer   A-Gd  Subs.  No None No   No 
D-Gd    (A) 
9.23      Eastern      Jerusalem     Jerusalem      9 Jul     5 
Corridor      Corridor 1948 
(Danl) (Dani) 
Israel Arab Israel       4500 2500      150     250     I     4   3   2    Summer   A-Gd     No     No Nei-Yes Yes 
D-Gd ther 
9.24  Southern  Death to  Death to 
the Invader the Invader 
14 Jul 5   Israel Arab     Arab   2500  3000  250  300  I  3 6 2 Summer A-Gd  No  No (D) No Yes 
(Marginal) D-Gd 
9.25  Southern   Tragel-   Tragel-   16 Oct 2 
Manshiya-  Manshiya-   1948 
Faluja    Faluja 
Israel      Arab     Arab   2000  2000  200  150  I  3 6 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
(Marginal) D-Gd 
9.26  Southern  Hulelqat-  Hulelqat-  20 Oct 2 
Suweidan  Suweidan   1948 
Israel Arab    Israel  1500  1000 .150  75  I  3 6 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No None No No 
(Marginal) D-Gd 
9.27  Southern   Hiram Hiram    28 Oct 4    Israel      Arab     Israel  6000  6000  650 2100 II 3 6 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes No 
1948 D-Gd 
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9.28  Southern Ayinr 
El Auja 
Ayin- 
El Auja 
25 Dec 3 
1948 
Israel Arab    Israel  6000  4000  350  600  I  3 10 2 Winter A-Gd Subs. No (A) Yes No 
D-Gd (A) 
9.29 Southern Ayin- 
Abu Ageila- 
Rafah 
Ayin- 
Abu Ageila- 
Rafah 
28 Dec 
1948 
11 Israel Arab Israel 4000 3000 400 600 I 3 10 2 Winter A-Gd 
D-Pr 
Subs. 
(A) 
No (A) Yes No 
10.1 Sinai Sabha- 
Kusseima 
i 
Sabha- 
Kusseima 
30 Oct 
1956 
1 Israel Egypt Israel 2340 1800 50 420 I 3 3 1 Fall A-Gd 
D-Fr 
Minor 
(A) 
No Nei- No No 
ther 
10.2 Sinai Thamad Thamad 30 Oct 
1956 
1 Israel Egypt Israel 1000 600 10 80 I 4 3 1 Fall A-Gd 
D-Fr 
Minor 
(A) 
No Nei-Yes Yes 
ther 
10.3 Sinai Nakhl Nakhl 30 Oct 
1956 
1 Israel Egypt. Israel 750 1100 4 80 T 4 3 1 Fall A-Gd 
D-Pr 
Minor 
(A) 
No Nei- No No 
ther 
10.4 Sinai Abu Ageila- Abu Ageila- 
m Katef  Urn Katef 
30 Oct 
1956 
4' Israel Egypt Israel 4700 4800 320 3000 I 4 3 1 Fall A-Gd 
D-Fr 
Minor 
(A) 
No Nei-Yes Yes 
ther 
10.5 Sinai Mitla 
Pass 
Mitla 
Pass 
31 Oct 
1956 
1 Israel Egypt Israel 
(Marginal) 
1000 1850 190 710 I 3 3 1 Fall A-Gd 
D-Fr 
No No Nei-Yes Yes 
ther 
10.6 Sinai Mr Rud 
Salim-Bir 
Gifgafa 
Bir Rud 
Salim-Mr 
Gifgafa 
1 Nov 
1956 
2 Israel Egypt Israel 2670 3300 10 300 I 2-3 3 1 Fall A-Gd 
D-Fr 
No No Nei-Yes Yes 
ther 
10.7 Sinai Rafah- 
El Arish 
Rafah- 
El Arish 
1 Nov 
1956 
1 1
 Israel Egypt Israel 10000 10050 230 3430 I 4 10 1 Fall A-Gd 
D-Pr 
No No-Nei-Yes-No 
ther 
10.8 Sinai Gaza- 
Khan Yunis 
Gaza- 
Khan Yunis 
2 Nov 
1956 
1 Israel Egypt Israel 4000 6400 120 1990 II 3 14 1 Fall A-Gd 
D-Pr 
No No Nei-Yes No 
ther 
10.9 Sinai Shann 
el Sheikh 
Sharm 
el Sheikh 
4 Nov 
1956 
2 Israel Egypt Israel 1800 1500 50 ' 1000 H 4 3 .1 fall A-Gd 
D-Fr 
No No Nei-Yes No 
ther 
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11.1   Sinai    Rafah    Rafah 5 Jun 
1967 
1   Israeli; 
Tal DIV 
Egyptian; 
7th IMF 
DIV (+) 
Israeli 19520     19520     700    2700    14   6    1    Spring   A-Gd  Subs.  No  (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd    (A) 
11.2 Sinai Abu 
Ageila 
Abu 
Ageila 
5 Jun 
1967 
2 Israeli; 
Sharon DIV 
Egyptian; 
2nd INF DIV 
Israeli 19280 18450 600 1800 I 4 6 1 Spring A-Gd Major 
D-Gd (A) 
No (A) No No 
11.3 Sinai Gaza 
Strip 
Gaza 
Strip 
6 Jun 
1967 
2 Israeli; 
Tal DIV (-) 
Palestinian; 
20th FLA DIV 
Israeli 12150 17450 110 630 I 4 14 1 Spring A-Gd Minor 
D-Gd (A) 
No (A) Yes Yes 
11.4 Sinai El Arish El Arlsh 5 Jun 
1967 
2 Israeli; 
Tal DIV (-) 
Egyptian: 
7th INF 
DTV (-) 
Israeli 6910 12750 270 450 I 4 6 
/NNN 
1 Spring A-Gd Minor 
D-Gd (A) 
No (A) Yes No 
11.5 Sinai Mr 
Lahfan 
Mr 
Lahfan 
5 Jun 
1967 
2 Israeli; 
Yoffe DIV 
Egyptian; 
' 3rd INF DIV 
Israeli 10450 10050 180 2700 I 5 6 1 Spring A-Gd Minor 
D-Gd (A) 
No (A) Yes Yes 
11.6 Sinai Jebel 
Ubni 
Jebel 
Ubni 
6 Jun 
1967 
1 Israeli; 
Yoffe DTV 
Egyptian; 
3rd INF DIV 
Israeli 10800 10050 70 450 I 3 6 
/OOO 
1 Spring A-Gd Minor 
D-Gd (A) 
No (A) Yes No 
11.7 Sinai Mltla 
Pass 
Mltla 
Pass 
7 Jun 
1967 
1 Israeli; 
Tal DIV 
Egyptian; 
3rd INF DIV 
& 4th ARM DIV 
Israeli 10200 13500 80 550 I 5 3 1 Spring A-Gd Minor 
D-Pr (A) 
No (A) Yes No 
11.8 Sinai Mr Hama Mr Hama 7 Jun 
1967 
1 Israeli; 
Tal DIV; 
Egyptian; 
3rd INF DIV 
& 4th ARM DIV 
Israeli 8700 11000 60 550 I 2 6 1 Spring A-Gd Minor 
D-Pr (A) 
No (A) Yes No 
11.9 Sinai Mr 
Hassna 
Mr 
Hassna 
7 Jun 
1967 
2 Egyptian; 
3rd INF DIV 
& 6th 'INF DIV 
Israeli; 
Yoffe DTV 
(-) 
Israeli 
4> 
22000 7250 1100 180 I 2 6 1 Spring A-Pr Minor 
D-Gd (D) 
No (D) Yes No 
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11.10  Sinai Bir      Bir  . 8 Jun 
Gifgafa   Gifgafa   1967 
1  Egyptian;   Israeli; 
4th ARM DlV  Tal Div ( 
(-) 
-)   ^P* 3500       3600      450      60      12   6   1    Spring   A-Gd     No     No  (D)  No   No D-Pr 
11.11 Sinai Nakhl Nakhl 8 Jun 
1967 
1 Israeli; 
Sharon DIV 
Egyptian: 
6th MCZD DIV 
Israeli 18780 18450 60 630 I 2 6 1 Spring A-Gd 
D-Pr 
No No (A) Yes No 
11.12 West 
Bank 
Jerusalem ■ Jerusalem 5 Jun 
1967 
3 Israeli; 
CENTRAL 
COMMAND 
Jordanian; 
' 27th INF 
BDE 
Israeli 27680 13600 2620 2250 I 4 14 1 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) Yes Yes 
11.13 West 
Bank 
Jenin Jenin 5 Jun 
1967 
2 Israeli; 
Peled DIV (-) 
Jordanian; 
25th INF BDE 
Israeli 10900 6160 450 400 I 3 3 1 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) Yes No 
11.14 West 
Bank 
Kabatiya Kabatiya 6 Jun 
1967 
2 Israeli; 
Peled DIV 
Jordanian; 
40th ARM BDE, 
25th ARM BDE 
Israeli 12800 9900 
1 
750 700 I 2 3 1 Spring .A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) Yes No 
11.15 West 
Bank 
Tilfit- 
Zababida 
Tilfit- 
Zababida 
6 Jun 
1967 
2 Israeli; 
' Ram BDE 
Jordanian; 
40th ARM BDE, 
25th INF BDE 
Israeli 5350 5450 500 50O, I 2-3 3 1 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) Yes No 
11.16 West 
Bank 
Nablus Nablus 7 Jun 
1967 
1 Israeli;   Jordanian; 
Peled DIV (-) 40th ARM BDE, 
25lh INF BDE 
Israeli 10700 
i 
10640 380 430 I 2-3 3 1 Spring A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) Yes No 
11.17 Golan Zaoura 
Kola 
Zaoura- 
Kola 
9 Jun 
1967 
1 Israeli; 
MEND BDE 
Syrian; 11th 
INF BDE (-) 
Israeli 5850 8560 230 500 I 4 3 1 Spring A-Gd 
D-Pr 
No No (A) Yes No 
11.18 Golan Tel Fahar Tel Fahar 9 Jun 
1967 
1 Israeli; 
Golani BDE 
Syrian; 11th 
INF BDE (-) 
Israeli 5380 8160 300 850 I 4 3 1 Spring A-Gd 
D-Pr 
No No (A) Yes No 
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11.19  Golan    Ravlyeh   Rawiyeh 9 Jun  1   Israeli;    Syrian;   Israeli  5350 
1967       Ram BDE   8th INF BDE 
(-) 
4350  150  300  I  4 3 1 Spring A-Gd Minor No (A) No No 
D-Pr (A) 
12.L Sinai Suez Canal Suez Canal 
Assault (N) Assault (N) 
6 Oct 
1973 
1 Egyptian; 
2nd ARM* 
Israeli; 
Mend DIV (-) 
Egyptian 29490 4460 400 280 13-4 6 
/PPP 
2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Major 
(A) 
YesNei-Yes Yes 
ther 
12.2 Sinai Suez Canal Suez Canal 
Assault (S) Assault (S) 
6 Oct 
1973 
1 Egyptian; 
3rd ARMY 
Israeli; 
Mend DIV (-) 
Egyptian 22850 3020 230 350 13-4 6 
/PPP 
2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Major 
(A) 
YesNei-Yes Yes 
ther 
12.3 Sinai Second 
Amy 
Buildup 
Second 
Army 
. Buildup 
7 Oct 
1973 
1 Egyptian; 
2nd ARMY 
Israeli; 
SOUTHERN 
COMMAND (-) 
Egyptian 63910 14000 800 450 I 2-3 ""6 2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Subs. 
(A) 
YesNei-Yes Yes 
ther 
12.4 Sinai Third 
Army 
Buildup 
Third 
Army 
Buildup 
7 Oct 
1973 
1 Egyptian; 
3rd ARMY 
Israeli; 
SOUIHERN 
COMMAND (-) 
Egyptian 45160 10980 750 400 I 2-3 6 2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Subs. 
(A) 
YesNei-Yes Yes 
ther 
12.5 Sinai Kantara- 
Firdan 
Kantara- 
Firdan 
8 Oct 
1973 
1 Israeli* 
SOUIHERN 
COMMAND (-) 
Egyptian'; 
2nd ARMY 
Egyptian 25850 67440 700 700 12 6 2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(D) 
No Nei-Yes Yes 
ther 
12.6 Sinai Egyptian 
Offensive 
(N) 
Egyptian 
Offensive 
(N) 
14 Oct 
1973 
1 Egyptian; 
2nd ARMY (-) 
i 
Israeli; 
SOUIHERN 
COMMAND (-) 
Israeli 81160 43400 1620 380 12 6 2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No Nei-Yes Yes 
ther 
12.7 Sinai Egyptian 
Offensive 
(s) 
Egyptian 
Offensive 
(S) 
14 Oct 
1973 
1 Egyptian; 
3rd ARMY (-) 
Israeli; 
SOUIHERN 
COMMAND (-) 
Israeli 57910 28600 1350 260 12 6 2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No Nei-Yes Yes 
ther 
12.8 Sinai Chinese 
Farm I 
Qdnese 
Farm I 
15 Oct 
1973 
2 Israeli;' 
Sharon DIV 
Egyptian; 
16th (-) & 
21st (7) DIV 
Israeli 22790 30970 800 1000 I 2-3 6 2 Fall ArGd 
D-Gd 
Subs. 
(A) 
No Nei-Yes Yes 
ther 
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12.9   Sinai    Chinese   Chinese   16 Oct 
Farm II   Farm II    1973 
2   Israeli; 
Adan DIV (+) 
Egyptian;   Israeli  28700  36840  950 2400 12-3 6 2 
16th (-) & 
21st (-) DIV 
Fall  A-Gd Minor No (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd (A) 
12.10 Sinai Deversoir 
West 
Deversoir 
West 
18 Oct 
1973 
1 Israeli; 
Adan DIV 
Egyptian;       Israeli 
2nd ARMY (-) 
16200 18180 800 230 I 2-3 6 2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
Minor 
(A) 
No (A) Yes Yes 
12.11 Sinai Jebel 
Geneifa 
Jebel 
Geneifa 
19 Oct 
1973 
3 Israeli; 
Adan DIV 
Egyptian;       Israeli 
3rd ARMY (-) 
16200 35630 300 1650 I     6 6 2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) Yes Yes 
12.12 Sinai Ismailia Ismailia 19 Oct 
1973 
4 Israeli; 
Sharon DIV 
Egyptian;      Egyptian 
2nd ARMY (-) (Marginal) 
17000 23860 150 1800 I 2-3 6 2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) Yes Yes 
12.13 Sinai Adabiya Adabiya 21 Oct 
1973 
2 Israeli; 
Magen DIV 
Egyptian;       Israeli 
3rd ARMY (-) 
10900 14630 150 800 I     6 6 2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) Yes Yes 
12.14 Sinai Shijlluf a I Shallufa T 22 Oct 
1973 
1 Israeli* 
Adan DIV 
Egyptian;       Israeli 
3rd ARMY (-) 
16200 25600 150 1100 I     2 6 2i Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) Yes Yes 
12.15 Sinai Suez Suez 23 Oct 
1973 
2 Israeli; 
Adan DIV (-) 
Egyptian;      Egyptian 
3rd ARMY (-) (Marginal) 
14680 22570 340 1100 II 2-3 14 2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
MinorNo 
(D) 
(A)YesYes 
12.16 Sinai Shalluf a II Shallufa II 23 Oct 
1973 
2 Israeli; 
Adan DIV (-) 
Egyptian;       Israeli 
3rd ARMY (-) 
11700 27570 150 1350 •I     2 6 2 Fall A-Gd 
D-Gd 
No No (A) Yes Yes 
12.17 Golan Ahmadiyeh Ahmadiyeh 6 Oct 
1973 
2 Syrian? 
7th INF BDE 
(+) 
Israeli;        Israeli 
7th ARM BDE 
(-) 
22750 5750 700 250 I 3-4 3 2 Fall AGd 
D-Gd 
Subs. 
(A) 
YesNei-Yes Yes 
ther 
12.18  Golan   Kuneitra  Kuneitra 6 Oct  2   Syrian; 
1973     9th INF BDE 
(+) 
Israeli   Syrian  17750  3630  350  200  I  3 3 2 
7th & 188th /QQQ 
ARM BDE (-) 
Fall  A-Gd Subs. YesNei-Yes Yes 
D-Gd (A)    ther 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
12.19  Golan    Rafid    Rafid 6 Oct  2  Syrian; 5th   Israeli;   Syrian  19530  4960  700  500  13-4 3 2  Fall  A-Gd 
1973     INF BDE (+)   188th BDE D-Gd 
Major Yes Nei-Yes Yes 
(A)   ther 
12.20  Golan Yehudia-  Yehudia-   7 Oct 
FJ. Al    El Al    1973 
2  Syrian; 5th   Israeli;   Israeli  21980  6300  1000 300  12 3 2  Fall  A-Cd 
5th INF (+) Laner DIV (-) D-Gd 
Subs. No Nel-Yes Yes 
(A)    ther 
12.21  Golan    Nafekh    Nafekh 7 Oct  2  Syrian; 1st   Israeli;   Israeli  12500  6950  1000 500  I  2 3 2  Fall  A-Gd 
1973     ARM DIV (+)  Ori BDE (+) D-Gd 
Subs. No Nel-Yes Yes 
(A)    ther 
12.22       Golan Mt. Mt. 8 Oct 
llermonit       Henranlt 1973 
2     Syrian; 7th    Israeli; 7th    Israeli     31350      5230     1200    400     12-3   3   2      Fall     A-Gd 
INF DIV (+)     ARM BDE (-) D-Gd 
Minor No  (D) Yes Yes 
(A) 
12.23  Golan Mt. Herraon Mt. Hermon  8 Oct 
I       I      1973 
1 Israeli; 1st   Syrian;    Syrian  2690  1580  50  100  I  3 3 2' Fall  A-Gd 
INF BDE (-) PARA BDE (-) D-Gd 
Minor No (A) Yes Yes 
(D) 
12.24  Golan   Hishinlyah ftishiniyah 8 Oct  3   Israeli;    Syrian;   Israeli  12730  14680  450 1120 I  2 3 2  Fall  A-Gd 
1973    laner DIV (-)  1st ARM & D-Gd 
9th INF DIV 
Minor No (A) Yes Yes 
(D) 
12.25  Golan   Tel Farls  Tel Farls 8 Oct  3   Israeli;   Syrian; 5th  Israeli  23750  17830  450 1500 12 3 2 
1973    Peled Div (+)  INF & 1st 
ARM DIV (-) 
Fall  A-Gd Minor No (A) Yes Yes. 
D-Gd (D) 
12.26  Golan   Tel Shams  Tel Shams 11 Oct T   Israeli;   Syrian; 7th  Israeli  16100  19400  530  980  I  4 3 2 
1973      Eitan DIV   INF & 3rd 
ARM DIV (-) 
Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
12.27   Golan   Tel Shaar  Tel Shaar 11 Oct 2   Israeli;   Syrian; 1st, Israeli  14700  21500  280  900  I  3 3 2 
1973      Laner EjIV  3rd ARM DIV 
& 9th INF DIV 
Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
1
    D-Gd 
12.28  Golan Tel      Tel    13 Oct 
el Hara   el Hara   1973 
1    Iraqi;     Israeli;   Israeli  12500  11000  450  40  12 3 2 
3rd ARM DIV  Laner DIV 
Fall  A-Gd  No  No (D) Yes Yes 
D-Gd 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
12.29  Golan Kfar Share- Kfar Shams- 15 Oct 1   Israeli;     Iraqi;    Israeli  11000  12000  100  200  I  2 3 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
Tel Antar  Tel Antar   1973    Laner DIV (-) 3rd ARM DIV D-Gd 
12.30  Golan Naba     Naba    16 Oct 1  Jordanian;   Israeli;   Israeli  11500  11000  450  100  I  2 3 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (D) Yes Yes 
1973    40th ARM BDE  Laner DIV < D-Gd 
(-) 
12.31  Golan Arab     Arab    19 Oct '  Syrian 9th   Israeli;   'Israeli  35750  16100  550  160  I  3 3 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (D) Yes Yes 
Counter-  Counter-   1973     INF & Iraqi  Peled DIV D-Gd 
offensive  offensive 3rd ARM DIV 
12.32  Golan Mt. Hermon Mt. Herman  21 Oct 1   Israeli;    Syrian:    Syrian  5700  4750  80  150  1-432  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
II.       II      1973     1st INF BDE PARA BDE (-) D-Gd 
12.33  Golan Mt. Hermon Mt. Hermon  22 Oct 1   Israeli:    Syrian;   Israeli  11400  4750  100  250  I  4 3 2  Fall  A-Gd  No  No (A) Yes Yes 
III      III     1973      1st INF &    PARA BDE ' D-Gd 
31st PARA BDE 
; 
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DATA. ELEMENT ENCODING SCHEME: 
In order to conserve space, the data for three data elements are 
numerically encoded In the matrix.  Their meanings are provided below. 
Data Element State Code 
Engagement Type Meeting engagement 
Attack on a hasty defense 
Attack on a prepared defense 
Attack on a fortified defense 
Attack on a delaying force 
Attack on a withdrawing force 
Terrain Rugged-heavily wooded 
Rugged-mixed (or extra rugged-bare) 
Rugged-bare 
Rolling-heavily wooded 
Rolling-mixed 
Rolling-bare 
Flat-heavily wooded 
Flat-mixed 
Flat-bare 
Hard; Flat-desert 
Rolling dunes 
Swamp-jungled 
Swamp-mixed or open 
Urban 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
U 
Weather Dry-sunshine-extreme heat 
Dry-sunshine-temperate 
Dry-sunshine-extreme cold 
Dry-overcast-extreme heat 
Dry-overcast-temperate 
Dry-overcast-extreme cold 
Wet-light-extreme heat 
Wet-light-temperate 
Wet-light-extreme cold 
Wet-heavy-extreme heat 
Wet-heavy-temperate 
Wet-heavy-extreme cold 
1 
2 
3 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
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FOOTNOTES: 
/A   Most casualties were Incurred during the retreat of. the American 
force. 
/B   This action contains four distinct engagements.  They consist of 
the Gowanus Road, Flatbush Pass, Bedford Pass and Jamaica Pass 
engagements.  Sufficient data is not available to represent each 
engagement separately, however, 
if 
/C   This includes 1,100 captured personnel, of whom many were 
wounded. 
/D   This does not include 2,722 unwounded personnel which were 
captured in a mass surrender after the breakpoint occurred. 
/E   This does not Include 948 unwounded personnel which were 
captured In a mass surrender after the breakpoint occurred. 
/F This action contains two distinct engagements. They consist of 
the Stoney Brook and Princeton engagements. Sufficient data is 
not available to represent each engagement separately, however. 
/G   This does not include 200 unwounded personnel which were mostly 
captured in a mass surrender after the breakpoint occurred.  No 
further details as to when the personnel which were captured 
were found. 
/H   This does not include 228 unwounded personnel which were 
captured in a mass surrender after the breakpoint occurred. 
/I   This action consists of two sequentially distinct engagements. 
Sufficient data is not available to represent each engagement 
separately, however. 
I 
/J   This action contains two distinct engagements.  They consist of 
the Chadd,'s Ford and Birmingham Meeting House engagements. 
Sufficient data Is not available to represent each engagement 
separately, however. 
/K   This is estimated from the typical sizes of the units which made 
up the British force. 
/L    This action consists of several distinct engagements. 
Sufficient data is not available to represent each engagement 
separately, however. 
/M    This value is estimated.  Casualties were said to be negligible. 
/N    This value is estimated from the approximate sizes of the units 
i 
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which made up the American force. 
/0   This value is estimated. 
/P   This does not include approximately A10 unwounded personnel 
which were captured in a mass surrender after the hreakpolnt 
occurred. 
/Q   This does not include approximately 80 unwounded personnel which 
were captured in a mass surrender after the breakpoint occurred. 
/R   The British are suspected of having significantly understated 
their casualties. 
/S This does not include approximately 500 unwounded personnel 
which were captured after the breakpoint occurred. 
/T This does not Include approximately 300 unwounded personnel 
which were captured after the breakpoint occurred. 
/U   Some of the casualties occurred after the Tory forces 
surrendered.  The casualty figure does not Include approximately 
700 unwounded personnel which were captured In a mass surrender 
after the breakpoint occurred. 
/V This does not include approximately 570 unwounded personnel 
which were captured in mass surrenders after the breakpoint 
occurred. 
/W   This Is the reported casualty figure.  Actual casualties are 
probably higher. 
/X   This does not include approximately 8,090 unwounded personnel 
which were captured in a mass surrender after the breakpoint 
occurred. 
/Y    This does not Include 1,000 unwounded personnel which were 
captured after the breakpoint occurred. 
/Z    This does not Include 1 1 ,\000 unwounded personnel which were   ' 
captured after the breakpoint occurred. 
/AA This includes casualties which occurred during the Egyptian 
retreat. ' 
/BB . This,does not Include 12,000 personnel (some wounded) which were 
captured primarily during the Austrian retreat.  No further 
details about this were found. 
/CC   This does not include 1,800 unwounded personnel which were 
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primarily captured after the breakpoint occurred. 
/DP  This does not Include 6,500 unwounded personnel which were 
primarily captured after the breakpoint occurred. 
/EE  This Includes casualties incurred during the Russian retreat. 
/FF  This includes a sizable number of unwounded captured 
personnel.  No further details about this were found. 
/GG  Both sides achieved surprise to some degree.  The effects are 
assumed to cancel each other out. 
/HH  This action consists of two distinct engagements (Prlesten and 
Kulm).  Sufficient, data is not available to represent each 
engagement separately, however. 
/Il   This includes a significant number of unbounded captured 
personnel, which may or may not have|occurred after the 
breakpoint was reached.  No further details as to when the 
personnel which were captured were found. 
/JJ   This includes casualties incurred during the French retreat. 
/KK  This does not include Yorck's casualties. 
/LL  This includes Prussian reinforcements. 
/MM  This is a Prussian victory primarily due to the French being 
unable to break the resistance of the Prussian force (low French 
mission accomplishment). 
f /NN  This action contains two distinct engagements.  They consist of 
the Bloody Hill and Sharp's Creek engagements.  Data is not 
available in sufficient detail to represent them separately, 
however. 
/00   This action contains several distinct engagements.  These 
Include the Confederate breakout attempt and the Union selge 
operations.  Data is not available In sufficient detail to 
represent them separately, however. 
/PP   This does not include approximately 14,620 unwounded captured 
personnel since these primarily occurred in a mass surrender 
after the breakpoint was reached. 
/QQ   This action contains three distinct engagements.  The 
engagements consist of Leetown, Elkhorn Tavern (first day) and 
Elkhorn Tavern (second day).  Data is not available in 
sufficient detail to represent them separately, however. 
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/RR  The force was overwhelmed.  This figure probably Includes many 
personnel who were captured In a mass surrender after the 
breakpoint occurred. 
/SS  This action contains five distinct engagements.  They consist of 
the Peach Orchard, Savage Station, White Oak Swamp, Glendale and 
Malvern Hill engagements.  Data Is not available in sufficient 
detail to represent them separately, however. 
/TT  This action contains several distinct engagements.  The 
engagements Include Manasas and Chantllly.  Data Is not 
available In sufficient detail to represent them separately, 
however. 
/UU  This action consists of several geographically distinct 
engagements.  Data is not available In sufficient detail to 
represent them separately, however. 
/VV  This does not Include 4,300 unwounded personnel which were 
captured after the breakpoint occurred. 
/WW Th/ls action contains two distinct engagements. They consist of 
Marye's Hill and Deep Run/Massaponax. Data Is not available in 
sufficient detail to represent them separately, however. 
/XX  This does not Include 4,790 unwounded personnel which were 
captured In a mass surrender after the breakpoint occurred. 
/YY  This action contains several distinct engagements.  They Include 
Jackson's assault, Frederlcft'sburg 1 and Frederlcksburg 11.  Data 
Is not available in sufficient detail to represent them 
separately, however. 
I'L'L       The designation of attacker and defender Is not clear.  The 
Union force advanced to contact but the battle primarily 
consists of the Confederate attacks about Chancellorsvllle.  In 
the Frederlcksburg area, while the Union force drove the. 
Confederate force from their entrenchments, subsequent 
Confederate: attacks forced the Union force to withdraw.  Since 
the decisive attacks during the battle were made by the 
Confederate Army, it Is designated the attacker. 
/AAA This action contains several distinct engagements.  The 
engagements include Gettysburg town, Peach Orchard/Devi 1's 
Den/Little Round Top, Cemetery Hill, Culp's Hill I, Culp's 
Hill II and Plckett's Charge.  Data Is not available In 
sufficient detail to represent them separately, however. 
/BBB  This action contains several distinct engagements.  The 
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engagements Include Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge (Nov. 
24), Missionary Ridge (Nov. 25; Union left flank) and Missionary 
Ridge (Nov. 25; center).  Data is not available in sufficient 
detail to represent them separately, however. 
/CCC This does not include 1,620 unwounded personnel which were 
captured after the breakpoint occurred. 
/DDD This action contains several distinct engagements.  The 
engagements consist of Buzzard's Roost, Snake Creek Gap and New 
Hope Church.  Data is not available in sufficient detail to 
represent them separately, however. 
/EKE This does not Include 180 unwounded personnel which were 
captured after the breakpoint occurred. 
/FFF This action contains several distinct engagements.  The 
engagements consist of the North Bank, the South Bank and the 
Eastern River Valley.  Data Is not available in sufficient ' 
detail to represent them separately, however. 
/GGG  Although amphibious withdrawal was possible, It would have been 
extremely risky in the face of German attacks. 
/HHH The engagement starts as an attack by the American force against 
a fortified German defense, but soon changes to the recorded 
engagement type^. 
/Ill  The engagement starts as an attack by the American force against 
a German hasty defense, but soon changes to the recorded 
engagement type. 
/JJJ  The action contains several distinct engagements.  These 
engagements Include the Vletmlnth attack and the French relief 
attack.  Data is not available In sufficient detail to represent 
them separately, however. 
/KKK The engagement is characterized by HERO as an Israeli attack on 
an Arab prepared'defense which later c.hanges t6 an Arab attack 
on an Israeli hasty defense.  It Is treated as an Israeli attack 
on an Arab prepared defense. 
/LLL  The engagement Is characterized by HERO as an Israeli attack on 
an Arab fortified defense which later changes to an Arab attack 
on an Israeli prepared defense.  It is treated as an Arab attack 
on an Israeli prepared defense. 
/MMM The engagement is characterized by HERO as an Arab attack on an 
Israeli prepared defense which later changes to an Israeli 
attack on an Arab prepared defense.  It is treated as an Israeli 
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attack on an Aral? prepared defense. 
/NNN  The engagement Is characterized by HERO as a fortified defense 
which later changes into a delaying action.  It is treated as a 
defense of a fortified position. 
/OOP The engagement is characterized by HERO as a delaying action 
which becomes a defense of a prepared position.  It is treated 
as a defense of a prepared position. i 
/PPP  The attack Involves crossing a major water obstacle. 
/QQQ The engagement Involves an attack on a prepared defense by the 
Israelis which later changes Into a withdrawal in the face of 
continuing Syrian pressure.  The engagement Is treated as an 
attack on a prepared defense. 
& 
\ 
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War Author, Title,, Date of Source 
9. First Arab/Israeli War 
(1948) 1)  HERO, Combat Data Subscription 
Service, vol. 1, no..3, 1975. 
2) Kurzman, Dan, Genesis 1948, 'Hie 
First Arab-Israeli War, 1970. 
3) Lorch, Netanel, Israe1's War of 
Independence, 1947-1949, 1968. 
10. Second Arab/Israeli War 
(1955) °   1)  Barker, A.J., Arab-Isrne11 Wars, 
1981. 
2) HERO, Combat Data Subscription 
Service," vol. 1, no.3, 1975. 
3) O'Ballance, E., The Slnal Campaign 
of 1956, 1960. 
11. Third Arab/Israeli War 
(1967) 1)  Dayan, David, Strike First.  A 
Battle History of Israel's Six Day 
War, 1968. 
2)  Dupuy, T.N., Numbers, Predictions 
and War, 1979. 
3)~HER0, Combat Data Subscription 
Service, vol. 2, no. 1, 1976. 
4) Young, Peter, The Israeli Campaign 
1967, 1967. 
12. Fourth Arab/Israeli War 
(1973) 1)  Dupuy, T.N., Numbers, Predictions 
and.War, 1979. 
2) HERO, Combat Data Subscription 
Service, vol. 2, no. 2, 1977. 
3) Herzog, Chalm.  The War of 
Atonement, October, 1973, 1975. 
Note:  In addition to the sources listed, the following document was 
used as a general reference for each of the wars listed: 
Dupuy, R.E. and T.N., Encyclopedia of Military History, 1970. 
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3-^ Data Elements Contained within 
the Engagement Data Matrix 
Each engagement in the engagement data matrix is represented 
by 21 data eTements. The set contains those factors identified in the 
literature as being significant. It is further constrained by the 
availability of suitable data. The data elements this investigation 
uses are listed in Table 3.4. The sources of all engagement data are 
t 
I 
included in section 3-3. 
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Table 3-4 
ments Cont 
Engagement Data Matrix 
Data Ele ained in 
Number Data Element 
1 War 
2 Campaign 
3 Battle 
4 Engagement          , 
5 Starting Date 
6 Duration (in Days)    . 
7 Attacker 
8 Defender 
9 Victor 
10 Attacker Initial Strength 
11 Defender Initial Strength 
- 12 Attacker Casualties 
13 Defender Casualties 
14 Wlllard's Category 
15 Engagement Type 
16  i Terrain 
17 Weather 
18 Season 
19 Morale 
20 Surprise 
421 Setpiece Effect 
22 Overall Air Superiority 
23 Close Air Support for Attacker 
24 Close Air Support for Defender 
\ \ 
Table 3.5 gives the variables contained within each of the 
elements listed above. 
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Table 3-5 
Data Elements and Their Associated 
Observed Variable Subsets 
Data 
Element No. Name Observed Variables 
WAR American Revolutionary War 
Napoleonic Wars 
American Civil War 
Boer War 
Russo/Japanese War 
World War II 
"First Indochinese War 
Korean War 
First Arab/Israeli War (1948) 
Second Arab/Israeli War (1956) 
Third Arab/Israeli War (1967) 
Fourth Arab/Israeli War (1973) 
VICTOR Winner, Loser 
14 WILLIARD'S 
CATEGORY Category I, Category II 
15 ENGAGEMENT TYPE Meeting Engagement 
Attack on a Hasty Defense 
Attack on a Prepared Defense 
Attack .on a Fortified Defense 
Attack on a Delaying Force 
Attack on a Withdrawing Force 
/' 
16 TERRAIN Rugged-Heavily Wooded, 
Rugged-Mixed 
(or Extra Rugged-Bare), 
Rugged-Bare, 
Rolling-Heavily Wooded, 
Rolling-Mixed, Rolling-Bare, 
Flat-Heavily Wooded, Flat-Mixed, 
Flat-Bare, Hard, Flat-Desert, 
Rolling-Dunes, Swamp-Jungled, 
Swamp-Mixed or Open, Urban 
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Table 3.5 (continued) 
Data 
Element No. Name Observed Variables 
17 WEATHER Dry-Sunshine-Extreme Heat 
Dry-Sunshine-Temperate 
Dry-Sunshine-Extreme Cold 
Dry-Overcast-Extrerae Heat 
Dry-Overcast-Temperate 
Dry-Overcast-Extreme Cold 
Wet-Light-Extrerae Heat 
Wet-Light-Temperate 
Wet-Light-Extreme Cold 
Wet-Heavy-Extreme Heat 
Wet-Heavy-Temperate 
Wet-Heavy-Extreme Cold 
18 SEASON Winter, Spring, Summdr, Fall 
19 MORALE Excellent, Attacker; 
Good, Attacker; 
Fair, Attacker; 
Poor, Attacker; 
Panic, Attacker; 
Excellent, Defender; 
Good, Defender; 
Fair, Defender; 
Poor, Defender; 
Panic, Defender; 
20 SURPRISE Major, Attacker; 
Substantial, Attacker; 
Minor, Attacker; Major, Defender; 
Substantial, Defender; 
Minor, Defender; None 
21 SETPIECE EFFECT Present, Absent 
22 OVERALL AIR 
SUPERIORITY 
Neither Side, Attacker 
Defender, None 
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Table 3.5 (continued) 
Data 
Element No.  Name Observed Variables 
23 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 
FOR ATTACKER Present, Absent 
24 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 
FOR DEFENDER Present, Absent 
The first element indicates the specific war within which the 
engagement occurs.  It is included since it enables the effect that 
the, different historical periods have on the break behavior of a 
militaryi force to be analyzed. For example, one distinction between 
historical periods is the increasing weapon lethality observed over 
history and the related increase in manpower dispersion on the 
battlefield (Dupuy, 1979:6). Table 3-6 lists the number of 
engagements for each war contained in the engagement data matrix. 
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Table 3.6 
Number of Engagements for Each War 
in the Engagement Data Matrix 
Number of 
War Engagements 
American Revolutionary War 33 
Napoleonic Wars 40 
American Civil War 59 
Boer War 5 
Russo/Japanese War 4 
World War II 88 
First Indochinese War 3 
Korean War 1 
First Arab/Israeli War (1948) 29 
Second Arab/Israeli War (1956) 9 
Third Arab/Israeli War (1967) 19 
Fourth Arab/Israeli War (1973) 33 
Elements 2, 3i 4 and 5 specify the precise time and geographic 
location in which the engagement takes place. All observations in the 
data matrix ire  at the engagement level. One or more engagements are 
contained within a battle and one or more battles are contained within 
a campaign (see Appendix B for precise definitions of these terms). 
The identification of an engagement within a battle is discussed in 
further detail in section 3-5.  Element 5, start date, specifies the 
starting time of the engagement to the nearest day. 
I 
Element 6 specifies the duration of the engagement to the 
nearest day.  The values are relatively imprecise, however. 
Engagements which occur over portions of a two-day period are recorded 
as being two days in length.  In addition, no distinction is made 
between continuous and intermittent fighting during multi-day 
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engagements. 
Elements 7 and 8 specify the identity of the attaoker and 
defender in the engagement.  In addition to the nationality(ies) of 
the respective forces, the individual units involved are sometimes 
identified. ] 
Element 9 indicates the victor in the engagement.  The victor 
is determined on the basi3 of three criteria developed by HERO.  The 
criteria consist of mission accomplishment, spatial effectiveness and 
casualty effectiveness. Mission ac/complishraent is a numerical 
^assessment of ". . . the extent to which each side in an engagement 
accomplished its assigned or perceived mission." (Dupyy, 1979:48). 
Spatial effectiveness is a quantitative assessment of ". . . the 
extent to which each side was able to gain or hold ground." (Dupuy, 
1979:^8).  Casualty effectiveness consists of a quantitative 
comparison of the casualties incurred by one force to those incurred 
I 
by the opposition.  Upon obtaining the three scores for each side, 
they are summed and compared to determine the victor j,Dupuy, 1979:47- 
49). 
This victor determination procedure was rigorously performed 
by HERO for all engagements contained in the HERO data base.  For the 
remaining engagements, the guidelines are used but the judgements are 
qualitative. 
Elements 10 and 11 contain the initial strengths for the 
attacking and defending forces.  The addition of significant rein- 
forcements and replacements are accounted for by attempting to ensure 
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that this dpes not occur within a specified engagement.  A more 
detailed discussion of this is contained in section 3-5. 
There is error associated with the initial troop strengths for 
the opposing forces in an engagement. With regards to both available 
troop strengths and casualty data, Helmbold (1971) stated that: 
. . . there is often much scope for human error and for 
capriciousness in selecting the forces to be included in 
establishing troop strength or casualties, as well as in 
arriving at an accurate inventory of these quantities. 
(Helmbold, 1971:6) 
The initial force levels, as well as other engagement data, obtained 
from the HERO data base are considered very acqurate.  Data for the' 
other engagements has been collected by the investigator from those 
outlined earlier. 
Elements, 12 and 13 specify the casualties suffered by the 
attacking and defending forces, respectively.  These values include 
the personnel killed, wounded, captured or otherwise missing prior to 
the breakpoint in the engagement.  Helmbold's statement concerning the 
i 
inaccuracies in initial force personnel strengths also holds for 
casualties.  In addition: 
. . .  personnel casualties consist of not necessarily 
only those inflicted prior to reaching a breakpoint.  In some 
cases,  a portion of the historically reported casualties may 
have occurred after the breaki  For example, routs sometimes 
degenerate into massacres, and\on occasion troops that have' 
surrendered may have been slairu^ (Helmbol'd, 1971:5) 
With respect to the current investigation, attempts are made to ensure 
that personnel killed, wounded, captured or who become otherwise 
missing after'the breakpoint occurs are not included in the casualty 
values.  In particular, mass surrenders by unwounded personnel after 
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the breakpoint occurs in an engagement are excluded wherever possible. 
Element 14 indicates which of the two Willard categories the 
engagement is classified under.  This is a relatively crude categori- 
zation of the engagements first developed by Willard (1962:2) and 
slightly modified by Helmbold (1971:25-26) (see Appendix B for a 
concise definition of each category). 
Element 15 represents a categorization of engagement types on 
the basis of the postures of the two respective forces in the 
engagement. The strength of a military force is enhanced by a 
defensive posture and its vulnerability decreases proportional to its 
increase in defense readiness. Although the categories used in the 
investigation are obtained from work published by HERO (Dupuy, 
1979:210-211,230), similar categories have been in common usage in the 
field prior to that time.  The categories consist of a meeting 
engagement, an attack on a hasty defense, an attack on a prepared 
defense, an attack on a fortified defense, an attack on a delaying 
force, an attack on a withdrawing force and a holding engagement. 
A meeting engagement consists of both forces moving to contact 
followed by predominantly offensive actions by each side against the 
other.  This category is seldom used since, upon two forces making 
contact, one force usually assumes a defensive posture,  these 
engagements are properly classified as attacks on a hasty defense. 
Attacks on hasty, prepared or fortified defenses consist of an 
attack by one force against the other in a defensive position.  The 
three categories differentiate among the possible 'relative strengths 
/ 
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of the defensive position, independent of the size of the defending 
force.  It is a function of the concentration of the defending force, 
its time in the defensive position and the presence of attached 
engineering troops to aid in the preparation of the defenses. 
Relatively precise quantitative rules are developed by HERO for 
distinguishing between these categories (Dupuy, 1979:210-211).  The 
engagements from the HERO data base are classified according to these 
rules.  For the remaining engagements in the engagement data matrix, 
the guidelines are used but the judgements are qualitative.  This 
represents a significant limitation to MJ of the data contained in 
element 15 of the engagement data base. This is unavoidable, however, 
given the scope of the current investigation. 
Attacks on a delaying or withdrawing force consist of an 
attack by one force against a force which is deliberately engaged in 
permanent retrograde movement. The two categories differ in the 
degree of resistance offered to the pursuing force.  A delaying force 
actively resists an advancing force while it moves rearward to a new 
position.  A withdrawing force attempts to avoid combat, if possible, 
during the retrograde movement.  It does defend as a coherent military 
force if attacked but, it attempts to disengage as rapidly as 
possible. 
The seventh category specified by HERO, holding, is not 
used.  Holding is defined as the occupation of a position or area by a 
military force for the purpose of defending it but in tha absence of 
any significant enemy attack.  Contact is maintained with an opposing 
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military force, however*.  It is an engagement in the sense that both 
foroes incur losses as a result of their interactions.  Furthermore, 
it is possibile for a military force that is holding to break because 
it is unable to sustain the losses incurred by the low-intensity 
combat interactions. However, a set of such low-intensity engagements 
would contain many instances where the breaking of one of the two 
forces is determined by primarily external events. Due to this 
drawback, the holding category is not used in the current 
investigation. This is further discussed in section 3.5. 
Element 16 is a categorization of the various types of 
battlefield terrain. The terrain has an effect on the weapon 
effectiveness, mobility and posture of a military force. The set of 
terrain types used were developed by HERO (Dupuy, 1979:228).  A 
complete listing is included in Table 3.5. 
Elements 17 and 18 represent the various types of climate 
which can be present during an engagement. These categories were 
developed by HERO (Dupuy, 1979:229).  A complete listing is included 
in Table 3.5. The following distinction is made between the two 
factors. Weather (element 17) pertains to the specific conditions at 
the time of the engagement while the season indicates the long-term 
climatic effects that the forces are operating under.  Weather has an 
effect on the weapon effectiveness, mobility and posture of a military 
force.  The season affecrs weapon effectiveness and reflects the 
significance of changes in the hours of daylight and darkless in the 
Temperate Zone. 
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Element 19 accounts for the various levels of morale which can 
be present in the two respective forces in the engagement.  The 
categories used were defined by HERO (Dupuy, 1979:231).  A listing of 
the levels is included in Table 3.5. 
Due to the imprecision in this behavioral variable, 
conservative classification rules are adopted.  'Good' morale is 
assumed for a military force unless historical evidence clearly 
indicates otherwise.  In addition, only two groupings of the five 
categories are used. The first consists of good and excellent morale 
while the second contains fair morale, poor morale and panic. Based 
on these groupings, the presence or absence of significant differences 
in morale are identified. This is discussed in more detail in 
section 3.6- These guidelines are adopted in order to ensure that 
only significant differences in morale are considered. 
Element 20 indicates the level of surprise achieved by the 
attacking or defending force. The levels were developed, and their 
significance verified, by HERO (Dupuy, 1979:63-6^,231).  A listing of 
the surprise levels is included in Table 3.5. 
The engagements in the HERO data base are already classified 
with respect to the level of surprise achieved by the attacking or 
defending force.  Conservative classification rules are adopted for 
the remaining engagements. Surprise is not recorded unless the his- 
torical record clearly indicates that it has been achieved by the 
attacking or defending force.  In addition, only the presence, not the 
level, of surprise is used in the analysis.  This is discussed in 
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further detail in 3ection 3.6. 
Element 21 indicates the presence or absence of a setpiece 
effect.  This represents the advantage that an attacking force has as 
a result of intensive preparations against a specific defensive 
position. These preparations may include a rehearsal of the assault 
against dummy positions. This effect is applicable only to an 
attacking force which is, otherwise, inferior to the defending 
force.  This effect was proposed and verified by HERO (Dupuy, 
1979:203). 
Element 22 indicates the presence or absence of overall air 
superiority for one of the two sides in an engagement. The presence 
of overall air superiority has four effects on the engagement. The 
achievement of air superiority for a military force: 
1) Enhances the effectiveness of its own tactial air support 
while degrading the opposition's. 
2) Slightly enhances the effectiveness of its artillery while 
degrading the effectiveness of hostile artillery. 
3) Slightly enhances its own ground mobility while 
substantially degrading the mobility of the opposing 
military force. 
4) Reduces the vulnerability of its own force while 
increasing that of the ho3tUe force.  (Dupuy, 1979:77) 
Four categories, or conditions, are used in this investi- 
gation.  The first two conditions, attacker air superiority or 
defender air superiority, are present when one side's combat airpower 
dominates.  The third condition, air superiority not being achieved by 
either side in an engagement, exists when, despite the presence of 
combat airpower on both sides, neither side has achieved overall air 
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superiority.  The fourth category indicates'that no combat aircraft 
are available to either military force.  This primarily consists of 
cases where militarily-significant airpower is not present in the time 
period within which the engagement occurs. 
Elements 23 and 24 indicate the presence or absence of close 
air support for the attacking or defending forces, respectively.  On 
the basis of work performed by HERO (Dupuy, 1979:71-76), this 
represents only close air support sorties actually flown in support of 
engaged ground troops. 
Data for each of the 24 elements for each engagement is 
included in the engagement data matrix. The identification of which 
interactions between military forces constitute engagements is 
discussed in the following section. 
3-5 Engagement Identification 
All observations in the data matrix are at the engagement 
level. The identification of an engagement within a battle is 
performed or. the basis of two factors.  A significant degree of 
independence of the actions of the engaged forces on both sides must 
exist with respect to the remainder of the battle.  In addition, the 
military units for each aide are required to have unity of mission for 
the engagement's duration. 
The termination of an engagement represents a change in the 
state of at least one of the two military forces involved in the 
engagement.  Five states are identified for a military force involved 
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in active combat operations.  The effects of temporary pauses in 
operations and the addition of reinforcements and replacements to the 
initial forces are also accounted for. 
The following subsection describes the importance of unity of 
mission in engagement identification. 
■3.5.1 Unity of Mission 
The aggregation of units into an engagement is performed, in 
part, on the basis of the unity of mission exhibited.  For example, a 
U.S. infantry battalion in World War II is an aggregation of three 
infantry companies, a headquarters company and a heavy weapons company 
(Clark, 1954:12).  Each of these companies are subdivided into 
platoons, sections, squads and, lastly, individual soldiers.  Within a 
particular battalion-level operation, if a high degree of dependence 
is present among the subordinate units in carrying out their 
respective missions, then their combination into a single battalion- 
level operation is required.  In this instance, the identification of 
the operation of the subordinate units as separate engagements would 
bias the results of the analysis since the engagements would contain a 
high degree of interdependence.  The proper level of aggregation is 
dependent on the nature of the operation being conducted by the 
overall military force. 
It is also necessary to account for changes in military 
operations which occur during the course of the battle.  It is 
conceivable for a military unit to be involved in a number of 
operations during a battle, each of which possibly constitutes an 
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engagement.  Military units could be involved in a series of 
engagements each having the 3ame objective or be involved in a series 
of engagements each having different objectives.  The following 
example illustrates the identification of distinct engagements within 
a particular battle.  The battle consists of two primary operations. 
The first consists of one component battalion of a three-battalion 
infantry regiment, force X, having the objective of blocking the line 
of retreat of a reduced enemy infantry regiment, force Y, consisting 
of two infantry battalions.  Guarding force Y's line of retreat is one 
component infantry company.  Concurrent with this operation, the 
remainder of force X (two infantry battalions plus support) is to 
attack the bulk of force Y (two infantry battalions plus support less 
one infantry company).  The enciroling attack by force X's infantry 
battalion i3 successful and force Y's line of retreat closed. 
Force X's main assault, however, fails.  As a result of this, the 
battle ends with the encircling battalion of force X being forced to 
withdraw from its exposed position. 
At least two sufficiently independent engagements occur, -the 
first being a success and the second a failure from the perspective of 
force X.  Dependencies such as the bulk of force Y being surrounded as 
a result of the success of force X's encircling attack are accounted 
for by classifying force X's main attack as a Willard category II 
engagement.  A possible third engagement, the withdrawal of the 
encircling force X infantry battalion, is strongly influenced by the 
failure of force X's main attack.  Since this is an external event, 
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the operation is not included as an engagement in the engagement data 
matrix.  If the infantry battalion is forced to withdraw as a result 
of an attack against it by part or all of force Y, however, then it is 
treated as a third distinct engagement. 
3.5.2 Engagement Termination 
In addition to unity of mission, the complete identification 
of an engagement requires a precise termination point.  The 
termination point used^by Clark consists of ". . . the beginning of a 
period of relative inactivity following definite success or failure in 
achieving the mission." (Clark, 1954:9).  A similar approach was used 
by Helmbold (1971:1,2).  The current investigation uses a more precise 
v 
structuring of these concepts coupled with the incorporation of the 
3et of engagement types developed by HERO (Dupuy, 1979:230). 
The termination of an engagement represents a change in the 
state of at least one of the two military forces involved in the 
engagement. Five possible states are identified for a military force 
involved in active combat, operations.  These are depicted in 
Figure 3.2. 
J 
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1  ATTACK 
2a DEFEND 2b HOLD 
5 ROUTED 
Figure 3.2 
Military Force States 
A military force is in a state of attack when it is engaged in 
an offensive operation against an opposing military force. This holds 
true regardless of the state of the opposing military force. 
The second possible state consists of a military force in a 
fixed defensive posture. The defensive posture is fixed in the sense 
that permanent retrograde movement by the defending force is not 
envisioned.  A mobile defense, however, is included in this state. 
The distinction between defend and hold is that a unit defends against 
an enemy attack while holding consists of the occupation of a position 
or area for the purpose of defending it but in t'he absence of any 
significant enemy attack.  In both cases, however, contact is 
maintained with the opposing military force.  The importance of this 
distinction is made later in this section. 
The delay and withdraw states consist of military forces 
engaged in permanent retrograde movement with respect to an initial 
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position, usually the initial line of contact with the opposing 
military force. These states differ in the degree of resistance 
offered to the pursuing force.  A delaying force actively resists the 
opposing military force while it moves rearward.  A withdrawing forqe 
avoids combat, if possible, during the retrograde movement.  If 
attacked, it defends as a coherent military force, but attempts to 
disengage as rapidly as possible.  In both cases, it is assumed that 
the opposing military force is attempting to engage the delaying or 
withdrawing force. ' 
Lastly, the routed state consists of military units which, at 
least temporarily, have lost all ability to function as a coherent 
military force.  Within this state it is possible for small, 
relatively insignificant, subsets of the military force to remain 
combat effective. 
In both Clark's and Helmbold's studies, engagement termination 
is synonymous with one of the two military forces moving from a higher 
to a lower state.  If the victor is the attacker, the defender moves 
from the defend to a lower state.  If the victor is the defender, the 
attacker moves from the attack to a lower state. 
These movements are included in the set of possible state 
changes for the,current investigation.  In addition, there are 
f 
movements associated with the delay, withdraw and routed states.  It 
is not necessary for a military force to drop to the next lower state, 
given that it does drop.  For example, there have been historical 
engagements where an unsuccessful attack has led directly to the 
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attacking force's withdrawal or rout. 
The termination of an engagement could also occur as a result 
of a military force moving upward inNstate. This may, or may not, 
occur with a simultaneous movement downward in state by the opposing 
military force. The possible state changes are indicated in 
Table 3-7. 
Table 3-7 
Possible Transitions to Higher States 
Initial State 
Routed 
Withdrawal 
Delay 
Defend (or hold) 
Final State 
Withdrawal Delay Defend (or hold) Attack 
X X X X 
N/A X X X 
N/A N/A X X 
I   N/A N/A N/A X 
x  = possible higher state 
N/A = not applicable 
If the upward movement of the military force to a state other than the 
attack state is coupled with a movement downward from the attack state, 
by the opposing military force, then no second engagement occurs. If 
the upward movement in state of the military force is coupled with no 
change in the attack state of the opposing military force, this 
results in the start of a new engagement.  The initial engagement i3 
considered terminated and the new engagement begun because the change 
in posture in one of the military forces significantly changes the 
nature of the engagement. 
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There are three additional situations which need to be 
accounted for when identifying the conditions under which an 
engagement is terminated. These consist of temporary pauses in 
operations, the replacement of losses in currently engaged military 
foroes and the addition of reinforcements to one or both military 
forces in the engagement. The occurrence of any of the three 
conditions represents a significant change in the engagement. To 
account for this, guidelines are employed which ensure that none of 
the three conditions occur within an engagement. The guidelines for 
each situation are discussed below. 
A temporary pause in combat operations of any significant 
length constitutes a termination of the engagement. This usually 
occurs in concert with the addition of reinforcements or replacements 
for the military force. 
The addition of significant reinforcements to one or both 
engaged military forces significantly changes the nature of the- 
engagement. Reinforcements are previously uncommitted military forces 
with respect to the particular engagement. 
To account for this, HERO (1979) employs a rule stipulating 
that, when significant reinforcements enter into an engagement, in 
effect it becomes a new engagement, with the original engagement 
coming to an end.  This is in recognition of the occurrence of either 
of two conditions: 
1) A military force moving to a higher state upon the addition of 
reinforcements,  This is already accounted for since an upward 
movement in state by one of the engaged military forces 
indicates the termination of the engagement. 
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2) A military force drops to a lower state if not for the 
addition of reinforcements. This does not coincide with a 
change in state. In this event, the addition of 
reinforcements at least alters the duration of the engagement 
and the personnel casualties incurred by each side, if not the 
outcome of the engagement itself. 
».     The third situation concerns the replacement of losses 
incurred by a military force during an engagement.  Clark found that 
the effects of replacements on a military force conducting military 
operations are significant. In the case of military units which 
eventually break, replacements enable the military unit to remain in 
its initial state for a significantly longer period of time than would 
otherwise be the case (Clark, 1954:34-35).  It appears reasonable to 
infer that, given less adverse conditions, replacements allow a 
military force to move to a higher state or maintain its initial state 
for the duration of the military operation. 
The possibility of the replacement of losses incurred by a 
military force while still engaged in a particular engagement as 
defined in this study is slim, however. Clark noted that, for the set 
of World War II data, replacements did not reach the military unit 
during the first week of operations-(Clark, 1954:20).  Much faster 
replacement rates were observed in the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict 
(Barker, 1974:123).  For example, as of 16 October 1973, the Israeli 
14th Armored Brigade had suffered nearly 100% casualties in tanks, 
along with a percentage of the tanks' personnel, in each of the 
following three engagements: 
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7 October 1973, (Egyptian) Third Army Buildup 
8 October 1973, Kantara/Firdan 
15/16 October 1973, Chinese Farm I. 
The brigade was replenished with respect to men and equipment between 
engagements. However, no instances where losses incurred by a 
military unit in a particular engagement being replaced during the 
same engagement were found in the literature for that war. 
Furthermore, this situation does not occur in any of the engagements 
included in the engagement data matrix.  In the event that significant 
replacement of losses in a combat unit within an otherwise singular 
engagement does occur, however, it would be handled in a fashion 
identical to that for reinforcements. 
3.5.3 The Effect of Data Limitations 
The ability to identify engagements is constrained by the 
available historical combat data.  In many cases, the engagements in 
the engagement data matrix contain levels of data aggregation not 
based on the procedures ennunciated in the previous sections. These 
are used because sufficient data at a lower level of data aggregation 
is not available to the investigator. These limitations have an 
effect on essentially all of the guidelines for identifying military 
engagements.  The engagement data matrix for the current investigation 
contains 29 case3 where unavoidable aggregation of engagements 
occurred due to aggregated force strength and/or force casualty data 
alone.  For further details concerning these limitations, please refer 
to section 3.3. 
These constraints on the availability of historical combat 
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data affect the type and quantity of data included in the engagement 
data matrix.  The next section discusses its impact on the methodology 
used for this investigation. 
3.6 Transformation of the Data 
The research question 3tated in Chapter 1 for this 
investigation is answered with respect to the set o^" engagements as 
identified by the combat data elements used to specify the 
. engagements. The data elements within the matrix, however, can not be 
directly used. The set of values within almost all of the data 
elements are at the nominal level of measurement. This level of 
measurement is not suitable for the methodology used. 
In order to correct for this, the variables used in the 
investigation are based on the different values contained in a data 
element. These are referred to as observed variables.  The observed 
variables are indicator variables (taking on values of 0 or 1) by 
virtue of the fact that they indicate the absence or presence of a 
particular condition in a specified engagement.  The variables are 
also dichotomous and provide a ratio level of measurement.  This is 
based on the following: 
Although a rank order may not be inherent in the category 
definitions, either arrangement of the categories satisfies the 
mathematical requirements of ordering which is the requirement for 
ordinal-level measurement.  The requirement of a distanCQ»-measure 
based on equal-sized intervals is also satisfied because there is 
only one interval naturally equal to itself which is the 
requirement for interval-level measurement.  (SPSS, 1975:5). 
The ration level of measurement requires that all the properties of an 
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interval scale be obeyed and, in addition, that the zero point is 
inherently defined by the measurement scheme. The observed variables 
contain ratio-level measurements that meet this requirement (a value 
of 0 for an indicator .variable means t"W_absence of the effect).  This 
level of measurement is adequate for all of the statistical techniques 
used in the investigation, JLn particular since it is the highest level 
of measurement in the traditional classification of measurement levels 
developed by S.S. Stevens (1946). 
The group of observed variables contained within a data 
element is coMMfcfcivelv referred to as the subset of observed 
variables for that data element. The data elements treated in this 
fashion include war (1— the number refers to the number of the data 
element in Table 3.3), victor (9), Willard's category (14), engagement 
type (15), terrain (16), weather (17), season (18), morale (19), 
surprise (20), setpiece effect (21), overall air superiority (22), 
close air support for attacker (23) and close air support for the 
defender (24).  Please refer to Table 3.5 for a complete listing of 
the observed variables for each data element. 
The remaining data elements are employed differently. The 
campaign (2), battle (3), engagement (4), starting date (5), attacker 
(7), and defender (8) data elements are used for engagement 
identification purposes only.  The attacker initial strength (10), 
defender initial strength (11), attacker casualty (12) and defender 
casualty (13) data elements are used in constructing cumulative 
casualty fraction distribution curves. 
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The attaoker and defender initial strengths are also used to 
represent the jnagnitude of the engagement.  This requires two 
transformations of the data elements. The first concerns the sum of 
the personnel strengths of the two opposing military forces.  The 
range of the combined personnel strengths are divided into several 
intervals. The interval boundaries are arrived at by dividing the 
engagements in the engagement data matrix into five equal groupings. 
The intervals are listed in Table 3-8. 
Table 3.8 
Combined Personnel Strength Summation Intervals 
Combined Personnel 
Interval Strength Range 
1 0-20,000 
2 20,001-68,000 
3 68,001 and up 
Observed variables are defined for each interval. 
The second transformation concerns the force ratio.  It is 
commonly believed that a personnel strength ratio of 3:1 is sufficient 
fox an attacker to overcome a defender in a wide range of 
circumstances (Dupuy, 1979:5).  In accordance with this, the observed 
variable subset contains two observed variables.  These consist of the 
force ratio less than 3:1 and the force ration 3:1 or greater.  These 
observed variables are indicator variables as well. 
Due to the techniques used in the present analysis, the set of 
observed variables just described are recombined into a smaller set 
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for the sake of data managability. The set of recomblned observed 
variables is listed and described in Table 3-9. This recombined 3et 
of observed variables is the basis for the specification of the break 
curves tested in the investigation.  This is elaborated upon in the 
following subsections. 
Table 3.9 
Observed Variables List (Recombined) 
Number 
Variable 
Name Description 
ENGN1 
ENGN2 
ENGN3 
4 DURDAY1 
5 DURDAY2 
6 DURDAY3 
7 DURDAY4U 
8 WILCAT1 
9 WILCAT2 
10 ENGTYP1 
11 ENGTYP2 
Indicates that the engagement occurred in 
the American Revolutionary or Napoleonic 
wars. 
Indicates that the engagement occurred in 
the American Civil, Russo-Japanese, or 
Boer wars. 
Indicates that the engagement occurred in 
WW II, Korean war, First Indoohinese war 
or one of the four Arab/Isreali wars. 
engagement lasting one day or less 
engagement lasting one day or less 
engagement lasting one day or less 
engagement lasting one day or less 
indicates a category 1 Williard engagement 
indicates a category 2 Williard engagement 
indicates a meeting engagement or an 
attack on a hasty defense 
indicates an attack on a pepared defense 
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Table 3.9 (continued) 
Number 
Variable 
Name 
12 ENGTYP3 
13 ENGTYPU 
14 TERR1 
15 TERR2 
16 TERR3 
17 TERRU 
18 TERR5 
Description 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
WEAT1 
WEAT2 
WEAT3 
WEAT4 
WEAT5 
WEAT6 
SEASN1 
SEASN2 
SEASN3 
SEAShW 
indicates an attack on a fortified defense 
indicates an attack on a delaying or 
withdrawing force 
indicates a rugged-type terrain 
indicates a rolling-type terrain 
indicates a flat-type terrain 
indicates an urban-type terrain 
indicates a very soft type of terrain 
(i.e. sand dunes, swamp) 
indicates dry-sunshine-extreme heat 
weather conditions 
indicates dry-temperate weather conditions 
indicates dry-estreme cold weather 
conditions 
indicates wet-extreme heat weather 
conditions 
indicates wet-temperate weather conditions 
indicates wet-extreme cold weather 
conditions 
■ r 
indicates that the engagement was fought 
in the winter 
indicates that the engagement was fought 
in the spring 
indicates that the engagement was fought 
in the summer 
indicates that the engagement was fought 
in the fall 
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Table 3.9 (continued) 
Number 
Variable 
Name Description 
29 
30 
31 
M0R1 
M0R2 
M0R3 
32 BTHSURN 
33 ATTSURY 
34 DEFSURY 
35 SETEFFO 
36 STEFFI 
37 •; AIRSPRO 
38 AIRSPR1 
39 AIRSPR2 
indicates a significant morale advantage 
existed for the attacker 
indicates a significant morale advantage 
existed for the defender 
indicates that no significant morale 
advantage existed for either the attacker 
or the defender 
indicates that neither side achieved 
surprise against the other 
indicates that the attacker achieved 
surprise 
indicates that the defender achieved 
surprise 
indicates the absence of the setpiece 
effect 
indicates the presence of the setpiece 
effect 
indicates the absence of air superiority 
for either side in the engagement 
indicates the presence of air superiority 
for the attacker 
indicates the presence of air superiority 
for the defender 
40 
41 
AIRSPR3 
CAIRO 
indicates that military-3ignificant 
airpower was not a factor in the 
historical period within which the 
engagement took place 
indicates that close air support was not 
available to either side in the engagement 
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Table 3.9 (continued) 
Number 
Variable 
Name Description 
42 
43 
44 
CAIR1 
CAIR2 
CAIR3 
45 
46 
47 
48 
TPERSTR1 
TPERSTR2 
TPERSTR3 
FRATI01 
49 FRATI02 
indicates that close air support was 
available to the attacker in the 
engagement 
indicates that close air support was 
available to the defender in the 
engagement 
indicates that military-significant 
airpower was not present in the historical 
period within which the engagement took 
place 
indicates that the combined personnel 
strength of both sides in the engagement 
totaled less than 20,000 men 
indicates that the combined personnel 
strength of both sides in the engagement 
totaled between 20,001 and 68,000 men 
indicates that the combined personnel 
strength of both 3ides in the engagement 
totaled more than 68,000 men 
indicates that the attacking forces in the 
engagement had a personnel strength 
greater than or equal to triple that of 
the defending forces 
indicates that the attacking forces in the 
engagement had a personnel strength less 
than triple that of the defending forces 
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3.7 Methodology 
An outline of the procedure followed in the analysis is given 
in Table 3.10. Following that is a more detailed discussion of the 
Q 
steps taken. 
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Table 3-10 
Research Methodology Steps 
Step Description 
Name of Program(s) 
Where This is 
Implemented  
2a 
The reduction of the 3et of observed 
variables to a simplified set of 
defined factors using factor analysis. 
The identification of all possible 
combinations of one or more factors 
together with their associated engage- 
ment subsets. 
SSPS Subprogram 
FACTOR, FACTCOM 
HLMBD 
2b   Construction of the attacker and      HLMBD 
defender cumulative casualty fraction 
distributions for each engagement 
subset. 
2c   Generation of data points for the      HLMBD 
^EjlP andqT1gj|p functions. 
2d   Using regression, fit the best        HLMBD 
functional form to the ^EMP 
data set. 
2e   Obtain the inverse to the + 
curve obtained in step 2d. 
33
 ^"
1CALC. 
CALC 
Defined 
HLMBD 
2f   Determine the probability that the 
set of discrete data points for 
^~ EMP are contained within the 
continuous distribution represented by 
^" CALC*  Identify those factor 
combinations whose associated engage- 
ment subsets obey Helmbold's Theorem 
reasonably well. 
HLMBD 
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.A 
In this investigation it i3 necessary to examine all possible 
combinations of one or more types of factor combinations within the 
particular types of engagements identified by the observed 
variables. Unfortunately, this results in the identification of a 
very large number of observed variable combinations. Figure 3*3 
depicts the number of possible combinations a3 a function of the 
number of observed variables. ' 
S 
DEFINED 
FACTOR 
COMBINATIONS 
2 50,000- 
200,000 
50,000 
100,000 
50,000 
5    10 
DEFINED FACTORS 
Figure 3.3 
Possible Combinations of Common Factors 
\ 
13: 
This problem is alleviated by using factor analysis to achieve 
the reduction of the set of observed variables to a set of underlying 
factors which accounts for most of the variation present in the 
data. The factor analysis is performed using the Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS, 1975).  The initial extraction of 
factors is performed using the principle components method.  The 
primary motivation for this is that the observed variables are each 
dichotomous, and that dichotoraous variables should not be used in 
classical factor analysis (Kim and Mueller, 1978:74). Nevertheless, 
it is acceptable to use dichotomous variables in principle components 
analysis, since it is an exact mathematical transformation of the data 
and does not hypothesize factorial causation and the specification of 
common and unique components. 
The rotation to a terminal solution is performed using one of 
the three methods of orthogonal rotation available in SPSS. These 
methods consist of Quartimax, Varimax and Equimax. Quartimax 
minimizes the complexity of the observed variables with respect to the 
number of defined factors upon which it loads. Varimax minimizes the 
complexity of the defined factors with respect ^p the number of 
observed variables which each contains.  Equimax is a compromise 
between the first two.  The method used is the one which best 
represents the significant differences between the engagements in the 
engagement data matrix. 
The rotated factor matrix is then reduced via the 
identification of those observed variables which load significantly on 
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the rotated factor matrix. This is accomplished for each observed 
variable by identifying the smallest set of defined factors which 
ensures that at least 75% of the variance accounted for in the 
original rotated factor matrix be accounted for in the reduced rotated 
factor matrix. This is performed in program FACTCOM.  FACTCOM then 
explicitly relates the defined factor set to its significant component 
variables and the engagements within which they are presented via the 
Defined Factor/Observed Variable matrix and the Defined 
Factor/Engagement matrix. 
These matrices are then input to program HLMBD where the main 
portion of the analysis is performed.  Program HLMBD evaluates all 
potential combinations of the defined factors, or factor combinations, 
that have been identified as a result of the factor analysis. Each 
factor combination is identified and undergoes preliminary screening 
to determine its suitability. "'These matrices are then input to 
program HLMBD where the main portion of the analysis is performed. 
Program HLMBD evaluates all unique combinations of the defined 
factors, or defined factor combinations, that have been identified as 
a result of the factor analysis. Each defined factor combination is 
identified as a result of the factor analysis.  Each defined factor 
combination is identified and undergoes preliminary prescreening to 
determine its suitability. 
There are two reasons^for the prescreening of the unique 
defined factor combinations that are identified* The first is the 
removal from consideration those defined factor combinations whose 
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evaluation adds little to the results of the analysis.  The second is 
the reduction in defined factor combinations to a number which is 
realistic from the standpoint of computer resources. There are three 
prescreening techniques identified for use in this investigation.  All 
three are based on the associated engagement subset being key to the 
evaluation of a defined factor combination.  Note that, regardless of 
the prescreening techniques used, the set of all engagements is 
evaluated to serve a3 a baseline against which to compare the results 
of the evaluation of the other selected defined factor combinations. 
The first prescreening technique involves the rejection of all 
defined factor combinations whose associated number of engagements 
meets or exceeds a maximum number of engagements specified as a 
fraction of the total engagement set.  This technique is based upon 
the logic that, beyond a certain engagement subset size, the results 
of its evaluation differs little from the results obtained by 
evaluating the entire engagement set. This is the initial • 
prescreening technique to be employed and uses a cutoff value of 0.80, 
or Q0%  of the total engagement set. . 
The second prescreening technique consists of the rejection of 
all defined factor combinations whose associated number of engagements 
is less than a specified minimum number of engagements. The basis for 
this technique is that, below a certain number of engagements, the 
^ CALG equation fits and their associated descriptive statistics 
become invalid.  This technique is used only if the first prescreening 
technique is not sufficient in reducing the number of defined factor 
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combinations with respect to available computer resources. 
The third prescreening technique rejects any defined factor 
combination whose associated engagement subset is not unique with 
respect to the other defined factor combinations to be evaluated. 
This prescreening technique is the most demanding in terms of computer 
resources and 13 used only if the first two prescreening techniques 
are not sufficient. 
For each defined factor combination which is not rejected by 
tho prescreening process, the following procedure is performed.  The 
attacker and defender cumulative casualty fraction curves are 
generated for the attacker-win and defender-win portions of the 
associated engagement subset. The attacker and defender cumulative 
casualty fraction curves for the attacker-win portion are used to 
generate data points for the ^~1^p data set. The attacker and 
defender cumulative casualty fraction curves for the defender-win 
portion are used to generate data points for the ^gvjp data set. 
1 ' Given the ^gMp and ^ RMP data sets, the test is made to 
determine whether the inverse is, in fact, inverse.  Using bivariate 
regression, the best available functional form is then fit to the 
^EMP data set.  The three functional forms evaluated for this 
investigation are listed in Table 3.11. 
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Table 3-11 Functional Forms Fit to ^EWP Data Set 
Form Mathematical Description 
linear y = bQ + ^x 
b1 
power y = BQ X 
log y = b0 + b1 (log x) 
The best of the three functional forms is then selected on the basis 
of each fitted equation's multiple correlation coefficient squared and 
its associated F ratio.  The multiple correlation coefficient squared 
shows the amount of variance in the ^"1EMP data set accounted for by 
the fitted^equation. The F ratio judges the significance of the 
value of the multiple correlation coefficient squared statistic.  The 
fitted equation is defined as ^PALO 
The mathematical inverse to ^cALC or ^ CALC is tnen 
examined to determine the degree to which the ^"^ALC rePre3ents the 
variation present in the ^~ gwp data set.  The basic quality of the 
fit is again performed using the multiple correlation coefficient 
squared and associated F ratio statistics relating the ^ cALC 
equation and the ^" j?Mp data set.  The subset of defined factor 
combinations are identified whose associated engagement subsets best 
obey Helmbold's Theorem.  In particular, the results obtained for each 
associated engagement subset is compared to the full engagement set 
evaluation results. 
The results are then checked using discriminant analysis.  The 
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i 
discriminant analysis is performed using the subprogram DISCRIMINANT 
available in SPSS. The full set of observed variables are entered 
into a single run of subprogram DISCRIMINANT.  Using two groupings; 
the winners and losers of the engagements contained in the engagement 
data matrix, the subset of observed variables which are significant in 
determining the winner and loser in an engagement are identified. 
Observed variable selection is performed using a stepwise procedure 
using th Wilks lambda criterion. 
This criterion is described as follows: 
The Wilks criterion is the overall multivariate F ratio for the 
test of differences among the group centroids. The variable which 
maximizes the F ratio also minimizes Wilks' lambda, a measure of 
group descrimination. This test takes into consideration the 
differences between all centroids and the cohesion (homogeneity) 
within the groups (SPSS, 1975:447). 
Coupled with this criterion is the specification of the 
minimum level of significance for an observed variablle to be 
designated (and remain designated) significant during the stepwise 
procedure.. This is indicated by a minimum partial F ratio, which is: 
the likelihood ratio of equality of the test variable over all 
groups, given the distribution produced by the variables already 
entered.  Expressed another way, this is a test for the 
statistical significance of the amount of centroid separation 
added by this variable above and beyond the separation produced by 
the previously entered variables (SPSS, 1975:453). 
For this investigation the default minimum partial F value = 1.0 is 
used. This is associated with a minimum significance level of 0.50. 
This ensures that any observed variables with discriminatory power is 
included in the set of significant observed variables. 
The set of significant observed variables found using 
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discriminant analysis is compared to the original results. ^The degree 
to which the observed variables used in the construction of good 
breakcurves are found to be significant in deterimining the winner and 
loser in a specified type of engagement strengthens the validity of 
the initial results. 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter describes the basis for the current investi- 
gation. The type, quantity and limitations of the data contained in 
the engagement data matrix are discussed.  In addition/\the analytical 
steps contained in the methodology are described. The nexfc\chapter 
\ documents the results of the analysis. This includes the results of 
the data reduction process, the construction, testing and identifi- 
cation of meaningful breakcurves, their aggregation into breakcurve 
sets and the independent examination of their validity using 
discriminant analysis. 
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Chapter 4 
RESULTS 
In this chapter the results obtained by following the 
procedure contained in chapter 3 are described and discussed. Factor 
analysis is used to reduce the set of 49 observed variables specifying 
each engagement to a total of 21 underlying defined factors.  Of the 
potential defined factor combinations, prescreening results in the 
identification of 125 defined factor combinations for further 
evaluation of their associated engagement subsets. With respect to 
hypothesis testing, it is found that many of the defined factor 
combinations' associated engagement subsets have ^~^ckLC  curves which 
fit the ^ EMP data set reasonably well.  UsTrig the set of all 
engagements as a baseline for comparison, 22 defined factor 
combinations achieved 9"1CALC curve fits_yhich are better on the 
basis of their multiple correlation coefficient squared and associated 
F statistics.  The observed variables contained within these defined 
factor combinations are identified and the implications-'of their 
presence briefly discussed.  Discriminant analysis to distinguish 
between winners and losers in an engagement using the engagement data 
matrix results in some agreement, but some differences as well, in the 
observed variables which are significant in determining the outcome of 
the engagement.  These areas of agreement and differences are 
discussed. 
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V 
4.1 Factor Analysis for Data Reduction 
Factor analysis is performed on the observed data set in order 
to reduce the number of combinations to be evaluated during the 
testing of the breakpoint hypothesis.  As mentioned in section 3-7, in 
order to meet the requirement that the observed variables entered into 
the factor analysis be independent, then for the set of observed 
variables there must be a subset of joint reference category variables 
identified and kept separate-  The factor analysis is, therefore, 
performed in two segments.  The first segment consists of the 
reduction of the subset of 14 joint reference category variables to 6 
defined factors. The second segment consists of the reduction of the 
remaining 35 observed variables to 15 defined factors. With regards 
to which factor rotation method to use, for each of the two factor 
runs the VARIMAX and QUARTIMAX rotational methods are used to rotate 
the factors initially extracted to a terminal solution. Within each 
of the two segments the rotated factor matrix produced by the factor 
analysis is the same.  Given this, the VARIMAX rotational method is 
selected and used since it is the default method for subprogram 
FACTOR. 
The rotated factor matrix produced for each of the two 
observed variable segments are then separately input into the factor 
combination program (program FACTCOM).  A listing of the computer 
source code for FACTCOM, written in the FORTRAN IV computer language, 
is available in the Industrial Engineering department office located 
at Lehigh University.  As stated in section 3.7, program FACTCOM 
reduces the rotated defined factor matrix by identifying the least 
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number of defined factors which, for a specified observed variable, 
account for mo3t of the observed variable's variance.  For this 
investigation, it is required that 75$ of the variance accounted for 
in the original rotated factor matrix be accounted for in the reduced 
rotated factor matrix. 
For each segment, at the conclusion of this reduction process, 
two matrices are generated to be used later in the analysis. These 
include the Defined Factor/Observed Variable matrix and the Defined 
Factor/Engagement matrix. 
The Defined Factor/Observed Variable matrix is a direct result 
of the reduction process of the rotated factor matrix discussed 
above.  The Defined Factor/Observed Variable matrices for each of the 
two observed variable segments are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, 
respectively.  A number one in the cell for a particular observed 
variable/defined factor pair indicates that the observed variable is 
represented by that defined factor. A blank in the cell for a 
particular observed variable/defined factor pair indicates that the 
observed variable is not represented by that defined factor.  The 
Defined Factor/Observed Variable matrices for each of the two observed 
variable segments contain the net reduction of the data in the 
observed variable set that is achieved through factor analysis. 
The observed variable/defined factor relationships identified 
in the Defined Factor/Observed Variable matrices are used to generate 
the Defined-Factor/Engagement matrix for each of these two observed 
variable segments.  As mentioned in section 3.7, engagements are 
identified with specific defined factors according to the following 
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Table 4.1 
Defined Factor/Observed Variable Matrix for the First 
Observed Variable Segment 
Observed 
Variable 
Defined Factor 
ENGN1 
DURDAY1 
WILCAT1 
ENGTYP1 
TERR2 
WEAT2 
SEASN2 
M0R3 
BTSURN 
SETEFFO 
AIRSPR3 
CAIRO 
TPERSTR1 
FRATI01 
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Table 4.2 
Defined Factor/Observed Variable Matrix for the Second 
Observed Variable Segment 
Observed Defined Factor 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
ENGN2 
ENGN3 
DURDAY2 
DURDAY3 
DURDAY4U 
WILCAT2 
ENGTYP2 
ENGTYP3 
ENGTYP4 
TERR1 
TERR3 
TERR4 
TERR5 
WEAT1 
WEAT3 
WEAT4 
WEAT5 
WEAT6 
SEASN1 
SEASN3 
SEASN4' 
M0R1 
MOR2 
ATTSURY 
DEFSURY 
SETEFF1 
AIRSPRO 
AIRSPR1 
AIRSPR2 
CAIR1 
CAIR2 
CAIR3 
TPERSTR3 
TPERSTR2 
FRATI02 
1  1  1 
1  1 
1  1  1 
1  1  1 
1  1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1  1 
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/ 
rule: 
If any of the observed variables that are present in an 
engagement are represented by a given defined factor, then 
that engagement is included in that defined factor's 
associated engagement subset. 
A sampling of the Defined Factor/Engagement matrix generated for the 
second segment of observed variables is given in Table 4.3. The 
contents of this matrix are used by program HMBLD in identifying the 
associated engagement subsets for each of the factor combination's 
evaluated. A complete listing of the Defined Factor/Engagement 
matrices for each of the two observed variable segments is not 
provided since the relationship between an engagement and a defined 
factor can be identified using one of the Defined Factor/Observed 
Variable matrices, the relationships between observed variables and 
combat factors (Table 3-9), and the engagement data matrix (Section 
3.3). 
4.2 Breakpoint Hypothesis Testing 
This portion of the analysis involves the identification and 
evaluation of the validity of the breakpoint hypothesis for all unique 
defined factor combinations, subject to defined factor prescreening 
requirements.  This is performed using program HMBLD.  A listing of 
the computer source code, written in the FORTRAN IV computer language, 
is also located at the Industrial Engineering department office at 
Lehigh University.  Using the Defined Factor/Engagement matrix 
generated in program FACTCOM, program HMBLD identifies, prescreens and 
evaluates the unique defined factors in accordance with the 
methodology presented in section 3.7.  All unique defined factor 
145 
on 
X) 
01 
H 
c 
CO 
B 
hO 
Q) 
CO 
C 
o 
•o 
0) 
*J 
cfl 
t- 
CO 
a 
<u 
C3 
4J 
C 
CD 
a 
0) 
a?. 
w 
-V 
u 
o 
o 
cd 
CD 
X! 
.P 
Cw 
o 
CD 
rH 
& 
nl 
TO 
in 
CM 
o>l 
oo I 
H 
vo| 
ml 
m| 
CVJI 
c 
<D 
B 
CD i «- C\J r— CM m CM CM CM CO m m 
146 
Table 4.3 
Sample of the Factor/Engagement Matrix Generated for Segment 2 
Factor 
Engagement llijLIiliL£-10.111fL.I3JjLJ5. 
1 ■     1 11 
2 1111 1 
3 11111 1 1 
• •••••••••••    •    •    •    • 
• ••••••••••    •    •    •    •    • 
        : • • • • • • • • • 
 • • • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
• •    •    • 
321 1111 1                         1 
322 1                      1 
323 •            1          1                   1                             1                     1 1 
combinations are identified and examined to at least a certain extent. 
d 
The extent to whioh a defined factor combination is examined 
is dependent upon whether or not it passes the initial prescreening. 
As discussed in section 3.7, three types of prescreening are 
identified for potential use in this investigation.  The use of one of 
the prescreening techniques, the specification of a maximum number of 
engagements (as a fraction of the total engagement set) contained in 
any defined factor combination to be defined further, results in the 
number of defined factor combinations to be evaluated indicated in 
Table 1.4. 
Table 1.4 
i 
Defined Factor Combination Prescreening 
Defined Factor 
Potential Combinations Selected 
Observed Variable*     Defined Factor For Further 
Segment Combinations Evaluation 
1 . 63 1 
2 32, 767 123 
*  In addition, the set of all engagements is evaluated to serve as a 
baseline for comparison. 
This degree of prescreening is achieved using a maximum engagement 
cutoff of Q0%  of the total engagement set. 
Given this reduction in the number of defined factor 
combinations to be evaluated to a reasonable number, no further 
reduction of the number of combinations to be evaluated need be made 
from the p^int of view of available computer resources.  Also, 
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J* 
additional reductions in the number of defined factor combinations to 
be evaluated resulting from the remaining two prescreening techniques 
appears to be negligible. Based on the number of engagements 
associated with each of the individual factors listed in Table 4.5, a 
requirement for a reasonable minimum number of engagements would 
result in no additional defined factor combinations being dropped. 
Additional testing for the uniqueness of each defined faotor 
combination's associated engagement subset is not profitable, either,, 
given that the results shown in Appendix C indicate that only a few 
)■ 
defined factor combinations are redundant from the standpoint of their 
associated engagement subsets. 
The results of evaluating the associated engagement subsets of 
the prescreened set of defined factor combinations show the breakpoint 
hypothesis being obeyed reasonably well. When evaluating the entire 
engagement set, the 4J_1CALC equation fitted the ^"1£MP data 3et 
with a multiple correlation coefficient of .8653. and an associated F 
statistic of 292.00 with 98 degrees of freedom. 
The ^CALC equation from which ^~ cALC *3 obtained has a multiple 
correlation coefficient of O.9876 with an associated F statistic of 
3696.40 with 98 degrees of freedom. 
The' all-engagement case is used as a baseline with which to 
compare the results of the associated engagement subsets of the 
remaining 124 defined factor combinations.  Twenty-two o'f the 
combinations have associated engagement subsets »/hich result in 
^"^CALC ecJuation fit3 to ltJ-1EMP data,, sets that have multiple 
correlation coefficient squared greater than 0.8653.  Thy relevant 
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Table 4.5 
Number of Engagements Associated with Bach Defined Factor for the 
Two Observed Variable Segments 
Observed 
Variable 
Segment 
Factors 
1   2   3   1   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   15 
1 
2 
220 321  305 321  258 278 
283 171 257 291 299 215 237 211  150 118  156  112  127  132  149 
data concerning each of these "good" defined factor combinations is 
listed in Table 4.6a. Table 4.6b' presents the same results, but 
explicitly displays the observed variables present in each of the 22 
"good" defined factor combinations. The results for all evaluated 
defined factor combinations are listed in Appendix C. Table 1.7 lists 
the component observed variable for each of the defined factor 
combinations which are better than the case where all engagements are 
evaluated.  The implications of these results are discussed in section 
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Table A.6a 
Breakpoint Hypothesis Test Results— 
Identification of "Good" Defined Factor 
Combination Subsets and Associated Equation Fit Results 
- 
Total Won Won 
4> 
 . _    *CALC 
mult. Func- ■ U/YHJ mult. 
Rank Factors Present No. of by ' by tional corr.„ 
coeff. 
corr.„ 
coeff. Order 1  2  3 4  5. 6  7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Engag. Attk. Def. Form* b 
—  —o *i _F _F 
1 1 1 <i 171 107 64 2 0.1531 0.9486 0.9870 3690.95 0,9241 572.77 2 • 1 1 1 215 134 81 2 0.1686 0.9364 0.9820 2771.53 0.9184 528.26 
3 1 1 I 237 153 84 2 0.1680 0.9343 0.9828 2781.70 0.9182 526.24 
, 4 1 1 211 139 72 2 0.1577 0.9665 0.9861 3463.24 0.9181 525.90 
5 1 I 150 100 50 2 . 0.1555 0.9463 0.9847 3127.43 0.9170 517.74 
6 ■ 1 1 I 118 75 43 2 0.1868 0.9531 0.9743 183?,.87 0.9167 515.49 
7 1 1 1 156 102 54 2 0.1577 0.9721 0.9864 3519.01 0.9164 513.57 
8 - I 112 63 49 2 0.1526 0.9345 0.9830 2811.08 0.9146 501.14 
9 1 1 127 86 41 2 0.1565 0.9822 0.9876 3887.66 0.9099 471.29 
10 1 I 132 83 49 2 0.0471 0.9131 0.9893 '4512.27 0.9097 470.37 
11 \ 1 1 149 93 56 2 0.3669 1.0183 0.9764 1999.23 0.9010 422.57 
12 
i 
1 247 157 90 2 0.2284 1.0474 0.9892 4453.24 0.8987 411.32 
13 1 228 147 81 2 0.1376 0.94,77 0.9867 3598.96 0.8959 398.40 
14 1 i 192 120 72 2 0.0572 0.9251 0.9871 3711.17 0.8942 390.99 
15 1 1 243 155 88 2 0.2347 1.0195 0.9870 3688.09 p.8929 385.54 
16 1 210 131 79 2 0.0757 0.9673 0.9913 5564.88 0.8903 374.65 
17 1 1 222 146 76 1 0.0294 0.9644 0.9984 30060.25 0.8773 327.59 
18 1 1 195 123 72 2 0.1945 6.9355 0.9773 2084.12 0.8717 310.22 
19 1 1 1 234 150 84 2 0.1749 0.9411 0.9862 3487.80' 0.8717 310.12 
20 1 1 238 146 92 2 0.2053 0.9147 0.9679 1452.60 0.8702 305.66 
21 1 1 242 163 79 2 0.2088 0.9148 0.9708 1604.19 0.8673 297.44 
22 1 1 227 145 82 2 0.2066 0.9043 0.9611 1187.77 0.8667 295.79 
23 All Engagements Inc :luded 323 203 120 2 0.1620 0.9510 0.9870 3696.40 0.8653 292.00 
*  1—Linear Form; 2—Power Form; 3—Log Form 
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Table 4.6b 
Breakpoint Hypothesis Test Results— 
Component Observed Variables for Subsets 
of "Good" Defined Factor Combinations 
3 
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6 0.9167 
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9 0.9099 
10 0.9097 
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12 0.8987 
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Table 4.7 
Observed Variables Contained in Those Defined Factor 
Combinations Whose Associated Engagement Subsets Produced 
^"^CALC Pita  Which are Superior to that for the Entire 
Engagement Set " 
Nominal Variable 
Order Name 
1 DURDAY2 
2 DURDAY3 
3 WILCAT2 
4 ENGTYP2 
5 ENGTYP3 
6 ENGTYP4 
7 TERR1 
8 TERR3 
9 TERR4 
10 TERR5 
11 WEAT3 
12 WEAT4 
13 WEAT5 
14 WEAT6 
15 SEASN1 
16 M0R2 
17 AIRSPR2 
18 CAIR2 
19 TPERSTR3 
20 TPERSTR2 
4.3 Discriminant Analysis 
The results of the Helmbold hypothesis testing are partially 
checked using discriminant analysis on the full engagement data set. 
As discussed in section 3-7, discriminant analysis is used to 
determine which observed variables are significant in determining the 
winner and loser in an engagement.  SSPS subprogram DISCRIMINANT is 
used to perform the stepwise selection of observed variables using the 
WILKS lambda criterion.  The default value for minimum selection 
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criteria for variable selection is used to ensure that all observed 
variables having discriminatory power are included.  The significant 
variables identified are contained in Table 4.8.  In section 4.4, this 
set of significant observed variables is compared to the observed 
variables found in order to identify the associated engagement subsets 
which obey the breakp6int hypothesis best. 
s» 
154 
Table 4.8 
Observed.Variables Found to be Significant in Distinguishing 
Between Winners and Losers in Engagements 
Nominal 
Ordering 
Observed 
Variable 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
ENGN2 
ENGN3 
DURDAY1 
ENGTYP4 
WEAT1 
WEAT3 
WEAT6 
SEASN1 
MORI 
ATTSUR1 
DEFSUR1 
AIRSPR1 
AIRSPR2 
CAIR1 
CAIR2 
FRATI01 
4.4 Discussion of Results 
The discussion of the results is comprised of several parts. 
The .first concerns the degree to which the various associated 
engagement subsets, as well as the complete engagement set, obey, or 
do not obey, element three of the breakpoint hypothesis.  Secondly,} 
the implications of those existing subsets of the engagement data base 
which obey the breakpoint hypothesis to a greater extent are 
discussed.  Lastly, as a partial check of the validity of the 
i 
breakpoint hypothesis testing, the set of observed variables found to 
be significant in the discriminant analysis are compared with those 
observed variables contained within the defined factor combinations 
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whose associated engagement subsets obeyed element three of the 
breakpoint hypothesis to a better, extent than the complete engagement 
data set. 
The results presented in section 4.2 show that element three 
of the breakpoint hypothesis is obeyed reasonably well by the complete 
engagement data set and the breakpoint hypothesis obeyed better by 22 
of tihe 124 defined factor combinations that are evaluated.  The 
multiple correlation coefficient squared for those 22 defined factor 
combinations ranged from a high of 0.9241 to a ,low of 0.8667.  All of 
the defined factors which fall in this "good" category come from the 
second observed variable segment. Note that, except for the 
combination ranked 17th, the power functional form is consistently 
selected as best fitting the ^"E^P data 3et#  Tni3 nold3 true ?or  fche 
vast majority of the remainder of the 124 defined factor combinations. 
The existence of a number of defined factor combinations whose 
associated engagement subsets obey element three of the breakpoint 
hypothesis better than the entire engagement data matrix, suggests 
that a series of break curves should be used to account for the 
universe of possible engagement types.  The observed variables 
contained in those defined factor combinations which fit well are 
candidates for specifying the types of engagements grouped within the 
individual break curves. 
Comparison between the observed variables found to be 
significant in distinguishing between winners and losers in an 
engagement, and the observed variables inferred to be significant in 
determining the outcome of an engagement by virtue of their being 
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contained in "good" defined factor combinations, however, results in 
differenced between the two.sets of observed variables.  Only. 6 of the 
16 observed variables fouad to be significant in the discriminant 
analysis are contained in the "good" groups of defined factor 
combinations.  In addition, 14 variables inferred to be significant in 
the results for the breakpoint hypothesis testing are not found to be 
significant by the discriminant analysis for the complete engagement 
9 
data set.  Many of these discrepancies, however, can be attributed to 
drawbacks in the prescreening technique used for defined factor 
combinations as well as reduction of the set of observed variables to 
a smaller set of defined factors which represent more than one 
observed variable each. 
The impact of the prescreening technique on denying or 
hampering the ability of observed variables to enter into fully- 
evaluated factor combinations is significant. Table 4.9 lists the 
observed variables effectively denied being explicitly included in any 
fully evaluated defined factor combination.  Table 4,10 lists the 
observed variables hampered in any fully evaluated defined factor 
1 
combination.  Table 4.11 presents a matching of the two sets of 
observed variables and shows how 13 of the 16 observed variables found 
via the discriminant analysis can be accounted for.  Of the remaining 
three observed variables, two of them (ENGN1 and DURDAY1) are in the 
joint reference category observed variable segment where the number of 
potential combinations they can enter into is limited.  The last 
observed variable, DEFSURY, may be deemed insignificant due to the 
small number of engagements (3%) where this observed variable is 
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Table 4.9 
Observed Variables Effectively Denied Being Explicitly 
Included in Any Fully Evaluated Defined Factor Combination 
First Observed 
Variable Segment 
Second Dbserved 
Variable Segment 
WILCAT1 
TERR2 
WEAT2 
SEASN2 
M0R3 
BTHSURN 
SETEFFOL 
CAIRO X 
TPERSTR1 
FRATI01 
ENGN2 
ENGN3 
WEAT1 
MOR1 
SETEFF1 
AIRSPR1 
CAIR1 
CAIR3 
FRATI02 
Table 4.10 
Observed Variables Hampered in Being Explicitly Included In 
Any Fully Evaluated Defined Factor Combination 
First Observed 
Variable Segment 
Second Observed 
Variable Segment 
ENGTYP1 DURDAY2 
DURDAY3 
WILCAT2 
TERR1 
TERR3 
WEAT5 
SEASN4 
ATTSURY 
AIRSPRO 
AIRSPR2 
TPERSTR2 
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Table 4.11 
Comparison Between Observed Variables Found to be Significant via 
Helmbold Hypothesis Testing and via Discriminant Analysis 
Significant 
Variables via 
Discriminant 
Analysis 
Subset of Good Defined Factor Combinations 
Present 
Denied 
Access Hampered Other 
ENGN1 
ENGN2 
DURDAY1 
ENGTYPU 
WEAT1 
WEAT3 
WEAT6 
SEASN1 
M0R1 
ATTSURY 
DEFSURY 
AIRSPR1 
AIRSPR2 
CAIR1 
CAIR2 
FRATI02 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
I 
indicates yes 
present. 
There are additional observed variables found in the subset of 
good defined factor combinations which are not considered significant 
by the discriminant analysis. These can be partially explained by the 
reduction of the observed variables to a set of defined factors during 
the factor analysis step. Table 1.12 shows that the presence of half 
of the 14 observed variables can be explained in this fashion. The 
presence of the other seven observed variables (coming from five 
combat factors) can not be readily explained and should be the subject 
of further research. 
Table 1.12 
Additional Observed Variables Found in 
Subset of Good Defined Factor Combinations 
Additional Observed Variables 
Found in Subset of Good Defined 
Factor Combinations 
Located in Same Defined 
Factor as Observed Variable 
Deemed Significant via 
Factor Analysis  
DURDAY2 
DURDAY3 
WTLCAL2 
ENGTYP2 
ENGTYP3 
TERR1 
TERR3 
TERR4 
TERR5 
WEAT4 
WEAT5 
M0R2 
TPERSTR3 
TPERSTR2 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
160 
4.5 Summary 
Rasults from testing of the breakpoint hypothesis have been 
presented here. They clearly indicate a number of engagement subsets 
which obey element'three of the breakpoint hypothesis reasonably 
well.  In addition, engagement subsets have been found which obey 
element three of the breakpoint hypothesis better than the full 
engagement set. These indicate that a series of break curves, rather 
than a single break curve, may better account for the break behavior 
of military forces for the universe of possible engagement types. The 
discriminant analysis confirmed the significance of some of the 
observed variables and, for the most part, reconciles with the results 
from the breakpoint hypothesis testing. The differences which remain 
concern the determination of which observed variables are significant 
in determining the outcome of an engagement and should be considered 
when specifying multiple break,curves. Those differences do not 
diminish the degree to which the breakpoint hypothesis has been seen 
to hold. Additional areas of research indicated by these results are 
identified in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter includes a reaffirmation of the degree of 
validity found for the breakpoint hypothesis and, by extension, the 
validity of the use of probabalistic break curves in modelling 
probibalistic break curves.  In addition, areas for future research 
are discussed. 
5.1 Results Summary 
The Helmbold Theorem appears to be obeyed reasonably well by 
the full engagement data base, as well as being better in certain 
additional subsets of the engagement data base. 
The presence of specific subsets of the engagement data base 
which result in better fits by the ^"^ALC curve are an indication 
that a series of break curves might be better able to deal with the 
battle termination behavior of the universe of possible engagement 
types. 
The observed variables found to be significant by discriminant 
analysis and those inferred as being significant' by virtue of their 
bei,ng contained in the subset of good defined factor combinations in 
the Helmbold Theorem testing are in many cases different.  However, 
many of these differences can be accounted for by the fact that the 
preacreening technique used for hypothesis testing precluded or 
hampered many of those observed variables from being in the defined 
factor combinations which survived the prescreening.  In addition, a 
number of the observed variables inferred as being significant are 
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contained in the same defined factors as observed variables which are 
found to be significant by the discriminant analysis.  Therefore, it 
is not possible to distinguish between which of the observed variables 
in the defined factor is significant in identifying the associated 
engagement subset which produced the good fit. 
5.2 Areas for Future Research 
This investigation can be viewed as a preliminary empirical 
validation of the use of probabilistic break curves to model battle 
termination. Additional research need3 to be performed in order to 
refine these results as well as investigate the specification of break 
ourves for particular groupings of engagement types. 
One improvement would be the use of discriminant analysis to 
identify significant observed variables followed by testing of the 
breakpoint hypothesis using combinations of the significant 
variables. The use of discriminant analysis for significant observed 
variable selection would eliminate the need for segmenting the 
observed variable set and provide the ability to examine the observed 
variables directly during the testing of the breakpoint hypothesis. 
Prescreening of the combinations could be performed by more 
restrictive variable selection in the discriminant analysis, which 
would overcome the drawbacks encountered in the current prescreening 
problems. 
Another improvement would be to use additional functional 
forms for fitting the * ^p data.  This could permit greater precision 
in identifying the degree to which particular engagement subsets 
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obeyed element three of the breakpoint hypothesis. 
The validity of specifying multiple breakcurves, as opposed to 
a single breakcurve, to properly model the battle termination process 
of all possible engagement types should also be investigated. Two 
points can be made concerning the specification of such a set of 
breakcurves. 
1) Each observed variable combination within a breakcurve set 
must contain at least one observed variable whose exclusion 
is mandated by each of the other observed variable 
combinations within the breakcurve set. This precludes the 
possibility of an engagement being contained within the 
engagement subsets of two or more observed variable 
combinations. The occurence of this would infer that the 
break behavior of a combat force in a specified engagement 
could be represented by two or more breakcurves. For 
modelling purposes, however, it is necessary to ensure that 
only one unique breakcurve is associated with a combat force 
in a specified situation. 
2) It is essential that a fully specified breakcurve set is 
capable of accounting for all possible types of engagements. 
Lastly, the addition of more engagements to the engagement 
data base used in any future research, as well as the quantification 
of additional combat factors, would add to the validity of any results 
achieved in that research. 
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Appendix A 
.MATHEMATICAL GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
a =  attrition rate coefficient for y forces 
b =  attrition rate coefficient for x forces 
C  = CZ(T) =   total casualties suffered by side z during the combat 
encounter (C  = z ~z) 
C (t)     =  casualties sustained by side z as of time t into the 
combat encounter; Cz(t) = zQ-z(t) 
D (vlw )   =  conditional distribution of L , Riven W 
x  i y x y 
D (u W )   =  conditional distribution of L  given W y  i x y        x 
Fz(u)     =  break curve for side z, given the probability that the 
side's breakpoint threshold, L , will not exceed u; 
Pr [Lz<uj 
f  = f_(T) =  casualty fraction sustained by side z In the combat 
encounter 
f (t)     =  casualty fractton for side z as of time t into the 
combat encounter; (fz(t) = Cz(t)/z ) 
L =  preselected (breakpoint) casualty-fraction level which, 
if met or exceeded, results in side z's losing the 
combat encounter 
P„..       =   the probability of a military force performing a 
specified mission 
P(W )     =  probability that force x wins a specified combat 
encounter 
P(W )      =   probability that force y wins a specified combat 
encounter 
R a proportionality constant relating the force y 
casualty fraction to the force x casualty fraction at 
time t 
T =   duration of the combat encounter 
x =   the force level for force x 
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xRp       =   force x's breakpoint force level 
x =  the initial force ievel for force x 
o * 
y        =  the force level for force y 
y„p       -   force y's breakpoint force level 
y =   the initial force level for force y   ' 
o J 
z =  general symbol denoting a value of either x or y, 
depending on context 
z = z(T)   =  surviving troop strength of side z at the end of the 
combat encounter 
z =   initial troop strength of side z at the start of the 
o . 
combat encounter 
z(t)      =  surviving troop strength of side z as of time t into 
the combat encounter 
Azz.(u> 
<P 
*<u) 
^CALC 
-I 
P(f?<u|wz,) 
a strictly increasing monotonic function relating f (t) 
to f (t) via the formula f (t) = (/) f (t) y x      ~ y 
Minf(|9(u), ll 
the *\>    function associated with the defender cumulative 
casualty-fraction distribution, which is obtained by 
taking the inverse to a fitted curve representing 
the ^ function for the attacker cumulative casualty- 
fraction curve.  This curve, in turn, is obtained by 
fitting an appropriate functional form to the data 
points contained in ^p.m* 
^ L-MP     
=
   
tne
 
set
 of data points which lie on the 41 curve 
associated with the attacker cumulative casualty- 
fraction distribution 
,-l V„       =   the set of data points which lie on the ^ curve 
associated with the defender cumulative casualty- 
fraction distribution 
dual      =   the result of applying the usual transposition to a 
formula, expression, etc. 
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"usual 
transpo- 
sition" =       x-*. y,   y-**.x,    i\i~l jfc.vj;,   \\i ^ 4T1 
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Appendix B 
NONMATHEMATICAL GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Active combat operations - refers to a military force engaged In 
combat activities against an opposing military force. 
Area of operations - the area that a specified military force is 
responsible for in a particular military operation.  This 
area either changes during the course of an operation or 
remains constant for more than one operation. 
Associated engagement subset - the engagements in the engagement data 
matrix which are classified under a specified factor 
combination.  These engagements constitute the subset of 
engagements which is associated with the factor combination. 
ATLAS - an acronym representing the title "A Tactical, Logistical, 
Air Simulation." This is a combat model which represents 
theater-level operations (Taylor, 1980:11). 
Attacker - the military force in an engagement which conducts 
primarily offensive operations. 
Attack on a positional defense - An attack by a military force 
against an opposing military force in a defensive posture. 
The defense is positional, or fixed, in the sense that 
permanent retrograde movement by the defender is not 
envisioned.  The defending military force occupies one of 
three operational states.  These consist of, in the order of 
increasing s'trength, the Hasty Defense, the Prepared Defense 
and the Fortified Defense.  The differences between these 
states are a function of the concentration of the defending 
force, time in the defensive position and the presence of 
attached engineering troops to aid in the preparation of the 
defenses (Dupuy, 1979:210-211). 
Attack on a delaying force - an attack by a military force against an 
opposing military force which attempts to delay it.  The 
delaying military force actively resists the advancing force 
while it moves rearward to a new position. 
Attack on a withdrawing force - an attack by a military force against 
an opposing military force which attempts to withdraw.  The 
withdrawing force attempts to avoid combat during the retro- 
grade movement.  It defends as a coherent military force If 
attacked, but attempts to disengage as rapidly as possible. 
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Auxllllary model - a model which is a simplification of a large-scale 
operational model.  It is used to investigate the system 
dynamics of the more complex model by considering alternative 
assumptions and data estimates (Taylor, 1980:15-17). 
Battle - a combat encounter between two opposing military forces. 
Each force has opposing aims or objectives (assigned or 
implicit) and each seeks to impose its will on the opponent 
by achieving Its objective, while preventing the enemy from 
achieving his.  A battle terminates when one side or the 
other clearly achieves its objective or when one side (or 
both) clearly fails to achieve its objective.  It is 
considered possible for modern battles between large forces 
to last many days (Dupuy, 1979:187). 
Battle termination process - the militarily-significant events and 
activities in a battle which result in its conclusion. 
Break curve - a curve which indicates the probability that a military 
force will discontinue the engagement as a function of the 
personnel casualties it sustains (Helmbold, 197 1:2). 
Break curve set - an aggregation of break curves which is capable of 
accounting for the universe of possible engagement types. 
Breakpoint - the casualty fraction at which a specified military 
force discontinues the engagement.  Alternatively, the 
casualty fraction at which a specified military force 
'breaks,1 or moves to a lower operational state (Helmbold, 
1971:2). 
Campaign - usually an aggregation of several battles.  A campaign 
usually lasts longer than a battle and encompasses a larger 
geographic area.  It concludes when either a strategic 
objective is achieved or when a lull or stalement in combat 
operations occurs (Dupuy, 1979:187), 
Casualty effectiveness - a quantitative comparison of the casualties 
incurred by the opposing military forces in an engagement 
(Dupuy, 1979:49). 
i 
Close air support - aircraft (fixed-wing or helicopter) used against 
ground targets in direct support of friendly ground forces. 
• This -represents only close air support sorties actually flown 
in support of engaged ground troops (Dupuy,-1979:72). 
Coherent military force - a force capable of fighting in an organized 
fashion, as opposed to a military force for which the command 
and control structure has broken down. 
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Combat ineffective - a condition which exists in a military force 
when it is unable to carry out its mission (Clark,_1954:9). 
Common factor -* an unmeasured (or hypothetical) underlying variable 
which is the source, of variation in at least two observed 
variables, under consideration (Kim and Mueller, 1978:76). 
Conflict termination - the end of a specified military operation. 
Current investigation - refers to the thesis work performed by the 
author. 
Data elements - the distinct types of data for each engagement 
contained in the engagement data matrix. 
De fender - the military force in an engagement which conducts 
primarily defensive operations. 
Defensive position - refers to the geographic area which a defending 
force occupies (either temporarily or permanently) while in a 
defensive posture. 
Defensive posture - the manner in'which a defending (and coherent) 
military force is organized to resist an attack.  Possible 
defenses includes a positional defense of specified strength, 
a delay or a withdrawal. 
Defined factor combination - a set of one or more defined factors. 
Each combination provides the basis for identifying a break 
curve to be tested. 
Defined factors - a set of variables, or principle components, which 
is obtained via the mathematical transformation of an 
original variable set.  The transformed variables are 
orthogonal to each other.  No assumptions are made about the 
general structure of the original variable set. 
Deterministic break curve - a break curve which contains one 
breakpoint to be used for any condition for which the curve 
is defined.  This constitutes a special case of the 
probabilistic break curve. 
Discriminant analysis - a data analysis technique which calculates 
the effects of a collection of interval-level independent 
variables on a nominal dependent variable (classification). 
The linear combinations of independent variables that best 
distinguish between cases in the categories of the dependent 
variable are then found (SPSS, 1975:435). 
Divisional engagement - the period of combat during which a division 
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fights to carry out a specific mission, the termination being 
marked by the beginning of a period of relative inactivity 
following definite success or failure in achieving the 
mission (Clark, 1954:8). 
Engagement - a combat encounter between forces smaller than an 
army.  A battle between two armies usually contains several 
engagements involving subordinate units.  The duration of an 
engagement is usually shorter than a battle.  A modern 
divisional engagement rarely lasts more than two or three 
\ . days (Dupuy, 1979:187). 
Engagement data matrix - the data base which contains the set of 
engagement data used in the current investigation. 
Engagement Identification - the specification of an engagement on the 
basis of geographic location, start date, duration, 
termination and the unity of mission within each of the two 
respective military forces. 
Engagement magnitude - the size of the engagement with respect to the 
number of personnel engaged.  For the current investigation, 
an engagement's magnitude is represented by the total number 
of personnel engaged and the ratio of attacker to defender 
personnel, or force ratio. 
Engagement type - the classification of engagements on the basis of 
the postures of the opposing military forces (Dupuy, 
1979:230). 
Environmental factors ~ those physical conditions which affect the 
effectiveness of weapons.  These include terrain, weather and 
seasonal factors (Dupuy, 1979:34). 
Factor analysis - a variety of statistical techniques for the 
location and definition of dimensional space among a 
relatively large group of variables.  Its primary uses 
Include the location of a smaller number of valid dimensions, 
clusters, or factors contained in a larger set of independent 
,    items or variables and the determination of the degree to 
v
which a given variable or several variables are part of a 
common underlying phenomenon (SPSS, 1975:469). 
Factor combination - any possible combination of one or more of the 
defined factors obtained from the factor analysis in the 
current investigation. 
Fixed defensive posture - a defensive posture where permanent  v 
retrograde movement by the defender is not envisioned. • This 
includes a mobile defense. 
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Force-on-force attrition modelling - the representation of combat 
between two military forces with respect to temporal force 
levels and engagement outcome (Taylor, 1980:1). 
Helmbold's Theorem - a theorem stating the expected mathematical 
behavior between related attacker and defender break curves 
first developed by Helnlbold (Helmbold, 1971:7-9). Refer to 
section 2.3 for details. 
Holding - the occupation of a position or area by a military force 
for the purpose of defending it but in the absence of any 
significant enemy attack.  Contact is maintained with an 
opposing military force, however. 
Initial strength - the number of personnel in a military force at the 
start of an engagement. 
Investigator - the author of the thesis. 
Mass surrender - the capitulation of large numbers of personnel 
relative to the initial strength of the military force. 
Meeting engagement - an engagement which consists of both military 
forces moving to contact followed by predominantly offensive 
actions by each side against the other. 
Mission accomplishment - an assessment of the extent to which each 
side in an engagement accompllshs its assigned or perceived 
mission (Dupuy, 1979:48). 
Morale - a sense of common purpos.e or a degree of dedication to a 
common task regarded as characteristic of or dominant in a 
particular group or organization (Webster's, 197 1:1469). 
Nominal level of measurement - a measurement scheme where no 
assumption has been made about the values assigned to the 
^1.   data.  Each value represents a distinct category and no 
assumptions are made concerning the ordering-or distances 
between categories (SPSS, 1975:4). 
Observed variable - a variable which partially specifies an 
engagement and whose values are at the ratio level of 
measurement. 
Observed variable subset - the observed variable associated with a 
specified common factor combination. 
Operational factor (combat) - a factor which influences the 
employment of weapons and military forces.  The set' of 
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operational factors Includes air superiority, tactical air, 
force posture and mobility factors (Dupuy, 1979:34). 
Open literature - literature whose distribution Is not significantly 
restricted. 
Operational state - one of five states which categorizes the 
activities of a military force during active combat 
operations.  These consist of the attack, defend/hold, delay, 
withdraw and routed states. 
Orthogonal rotation - in factor analysis, the operation through which 
a simple structure is sought under the restriction that the 
factors must be orthogonal (uncorrelated).  Factors obtained 
through this rotation are by definition uncorrelated (Kim and 
Mueller, 1978:78). 
PostuLate of factorial causation - the assumption that the observed 
variables are linear combinations of underlying factors, and 
that the covariation between observed variables is solely due 
to their common sharing of one or more of the common factors 
(Kim and Mueller, 1978:78). 
Probabilistic break curve - a break curve contains a set of 
breakpoints, each having a nonzero probability of occurrence. 
Quartlmax - a method of rotation to a terminal solution in factor 
analysis, the emphasis being on the simplification of the 
rows of the factor pattern matrix.  In other words, the 
emphasis is on reducing the complexity of the observed 
«>    variables.  For further details, please consult Statistlcal 
Package for the Social Sciences, 2nd edition (SPSS, 1975:484- 
485). 
Ratio level of measurement - a measurement where the distances 
between the categories is defined in terms of fixed and equal 
units and where the zero point is inherently defined by the 
measurement scheme (SPSS, 1975:5). 
Reinforcements - the addition of previously uncommitted military 
units to an ongoing military operation.  To be classified as 
reinforcements, it is required only that the military units 
be uncommitted with respect to the particular operation. 
Replacements - the replacement of losses incurred by military units 
during a military operation. 
Rotation to a terminal solution - in factor analysis, the 
simplification of the structure once the initial set of 
common factors have been obtained in the factor-extraction 
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phase (Kim and Mueller, 1978:49). 
Rout - an operational state which represents military units which, at 
least temporarily, have lost all ability to function as a 
coherent military force.  Within this condition, however, it 
is possible for small, relatively insignificant, subsets of 
the military force to remain combat effective. 
/"" 
Season - a data element indicating the climatic season within which 
the ,engagement took place.  The season affects weapon 
effectiveness and reflects the significance of changes in the 
hours of daylight and darkness in the Temperate Zone (Dupuy, 
1979:35). 
Setpiece effect - a data element which represents the advantage that 
an attacking force has as a result of Intensive preparations 
against a specified defensive position.  These preparations 
may Include a rehearsal of the rtssault against dummy posi- 
tions.  This effect Is applicable only to an attacking force 
which is otherwise inferior to the defending force (Dupuy, 
1979:203). 
Spatial effectiveness - a quantitative assessment of the extent to 
which each side is able to gain ox  hold ground (Dupuy, 
1979:48-49). 
Surprise- a data element which- indicates the level of surprise 
achieved by the attacking or defending force (Dupuy, 
1979:63). 
Termination point - the point in time at which an engagement ended. 
This is indicated by one.or more of the following conditions 
occurring:  a change in the state of at least one of the two 
military forces involved in the engagement, a temporary pause 
in operations, and the addition of reinforcements or 
replacements to one or both military forces in an engagement. 
Terrain - a data element which indicates the type of terrain upon 
which the engagement is fought.  Terrain has an effect on the 
weapon effectiveness, mobility.and the posture of a military 
force (Dupuy, 1979:34-35,228). 
Unity of mission - the degree of interdependence among military units 
in carrying out their respective missions.  This is one of 
the criteria used in engagement identification. 
Victor - the military force which wins the engagement.  This is 
determined on the basis of three criteria.  Each military 
force was evaluated and compared on the basis of mission 
accomplishment, spatial effectiveness and casualty 
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effectiveness (Dupuy, 1979:47-49). 
Vulnerability - the vulnerability of a force to hostile firepower. 
The considerations which affect a force's vulnerability 
include its personnel strength, combat deployment exposure 
(in terms of terrain and posture), the relative firepower of 
the opposing forces, the presence or absence of air 
superiority, and increased exposure in amphibious and river 
crossing situations (Dupuy, 1979:36-37). 
Weapon effectiveness (lethality) - the inherent capability of a given 
weapon to kill personnel or to make material ineffective for 
a given period of time.  Capability includes weapon range, 
rate of fire, accuracy, radius of effects, and battlefield 
mobility factors (Dupuy, 1979:19). 
Weather - a data element which indicates the specific climatic 
conditions at the time of the engagement.  Weather has an 
effect on the weapon effectiveness, mobility and the posture 
of a military force (Dupuy, 1979:35,229). 
Wlllard's Category 1 engagement - a category which contains open 
engagements in the sense that both sides could, with about 
equal facility, disengage and conduct an orderly withdrawal 
(Willard, 1962:2; Helmbold, 1971:25). 
Wlllard's Category II engagement - a category which contains closed 
engagements in the sense that one of the forces in the 
engagement is encircled or otherwise in a position from which 
an orderly withdrawal can not readily be made, and whose 
options for maneuver are correspondingly markedly more 
restricted than those of his opponent (Willard, 1962:2; 
Helmbold, 1971:25). 
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Appendix C 
BREAKPOINT HYPOTHESIS TEST RESULTS 
Table C.l    Identification of All Evaluated Defined Factor 
Combination Subsets and Associated Equation Fit 
Results (Second Observed Variable Segment)- 
Table C.2    Component Observed Variables for Subsets of All 
Evaluated Defined Factor Combinations (Second 
Observed Variable Segment) 
Table C.3    Identification of'All Evaluated Defined Factor 
Combination .Subsets and Associated Equation Fit 
Results (Fir^t Observed Variable Segment) 
Table C.A    Component Observed Variables for Subsets of All 
Evaluated Defined Factor Combinations (First 
Observed Variable Segment) 
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Table C.l 
Breakpoint Hypothesis Test Results— 
Identification of All Evaluated Defined Factor 
Combination Subsets and Associated Equation Fit Results (Second Observed Variable Segment) 
Rank  _ 
Order 1 
Factors Present 
Total Won 
No. of  by 
1   1   h.   1    ^ I    8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Engag. Attk. 
Won Func- 
by  tional 
Def. Form* 
ML CALC 
mult, 
corr., 
ili   coef f \ 
± 
mult. 
corr., 
coeff. 
-1 
€Ate 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
i 
1 
I 
171 
215 
23 
li 
150 
118 
156 
112 
127 
132 
149 
2.47 
228 
192 
243 
210 
222 
195 
234 
238 
242 
227 
229 
245 
232 
229 
235 
203 
205 
229 
234 
199 
169 
200 
136 
193 
198 
237 
107 
134 
153 
139 
100 
75 
102 
63 
86 
83 
93 
157 
147 
120 
155 
131 
146 
123 
150 
146 
163 
145 
144 
160 
147 
149 
153 
128 
134 
150 
151 
131 
106 
132 
85 
125 
124 
158 
64 
81 
84 
72 
50 
43 
54 
49 
41 
49 
56 
90 
81 
72 
88 
79 
76 
72 
84 
92 
79 
82 
85 
85. 
85 
80 
82 
75 
71 
79 
83 
68 
63 
68 
51 
68 
74 
79 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0.1531 
0.1686 
0.1680 
0.1577 
0.1555 
0.1868 
0.1577 
0.1526 
0.1565 
0.0471 
0.3669 
0.2284 
0.1376 
0.0572 
0.2347 
0.0757 
0.0294 
0.1945 
0.1749 
.0.2053 
0.2088 , 
0.2066 
0.1859 
0.1854 
0.1613 
0.1854 
0.1845 
0.1823 
0.1811 
0.1643 
0.1584 
0.1644 
0.1541 
0.1541 
0.1528 
0.1632 
0.1811 
0.1694 
0.9486 
0.9364 
0.9343 
0.9665 
0.9463 
0.9531 
0.9721 
0.9345 
0.9822 
0.9131 
1.0183 
1.0474 
0.9477 
0.9251 
1.0195 
0.9673 
0.9644 
0.9355 
0.9411 
0.9147 
0.9148 
0.9043 
0.9737 
0.9705 
1.0007 
0.9705 
0.9696 
0.9509 
0.9464 
0.9671 
0;9454 
0.9517 
0.9423 
0.9423 
0.9860 
0.9802 
0.9420 
0.9356 
0.9870 
0.9828 
0.9828 
0.9861 
0.9847 
0.9743 
0.9864 
0.9830 
0.9876 
0.9893 
0.9764 
0.9892 
0.9867 
0.9871 
0.9870 
0.9913 
0.9984 
0.9773 
0.9862 
0.9679 
0.9708 
0.9611 
0.9783 
0.9786 
0.9895 
0.9786 
0.9784 
0.9756 
0.9761 
0.9854 
0.9850 
0.9850 
0.9861 
0.9861 
0.9894 
0.9864 
0.9780 
0.9816 
3690.95 
2771.53 
2781.70 
3463.24 
3127.43 
1832.87 
3519.01 
2811.08 
3887.66 
4512.27 
1999.23 
4453.24 
3598.96 
3711.17 
3688.09 
5564.88 
30Q60.25 
2084.12 
3487.80 
1452.60 
1604.19 
1187.77 
2181.26 
2218.98 
4602.36 
2218.98 
2197.08 
1931.01 
1976.63 
3272.11 
3187.39 
3184.59 
3459.66 
3459.66 
4554.29 
3524.74 
2157.96 
2591.08 
0.9241 
0.9184 
0.9182 
0.9181 
0.9170 
0.9167 
0.9164 
0.9146 
0.9099 
0.9097 
0.9010 
0.8987 
0.8959 
0.8942 
0.8929 
0.8903 
0.8773 
0.8717 
0.8717 
0.8702 
0.8673 
0.8667 
0.8647 
0.8643 
0.8634 
0.8631 
0.8627 
0.8624 
0.8616 
0.8614 
0.8612 
0.8606 
0.8604 
0.8604 
0.8602 
0.8601 
0.8598 
0.8596 
572.77 
528.26 
526.24 
525.90 
517.74 
515.49 
513.57 
501.14 
.471.29 
470.37 
422.57 
411.. 32 
398.40 
390.99 
385.54 
374.65 
327.59 
310.22 
310.12 
305.66 
297.44 
295.79 
290.49 
289.26 
287.01 
286.19 
285.31 
284.53 
282.49 
281.77 
281.34 
279.72 
279.25 
279.25 
278.88 
278,55 
277.95 
277.39 
*   1—Linear Form; 2.— Power Form; 3--Log Form 
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Table C.l (cont.) 
Breakpoint Hypothesis Test Results—- 
Identification of All Evaluate.d Defined Factor 
Combination Subsets and Associated Equation Fit Results (Second Observed Variable Segment) 
Rank  _ 
Order 1 
Factors Present 
Total Won 
No. of- by 
Won F.unc- 
by  tional 
2L   1 A 1   i 1   I 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Engag. Attk. Def. Form*   b 
j£ CALC; 
.Mult. 
Corr.? 
Coeff: 
-I p., 
1 
€Ate Mult, 
Corr-2 
Coeffl    F 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
. 1 
1 
1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
208 
174 
192 
178 
188 
205 
222 
204 
253 
255 
243 
248 
250 
243 
245 
214 
239 
199 
236 
255 
245 
246 
246 
215 
251 
239 
238 
254 
233 
236 
237 
244 
255 
233 
252 
244 
134 
106 
124 
112 
119 
136 
146 
130 
160 
161 
156 
160 
163 
157 
156 
133 
157 
125 
151 
162 
156 
155 
161 
135 
160 
157 
152 
166 
146 
149 
148 
- 158 
167 
152 
159 
156 
74 
68 
68 
66 
69 
69 
76 
74 
93 
94 
87 
88 
87 
86 
89 
81 
82 
74 
85 
93 
89 
91 
85 
80 
91 
82 
86 
88 
87 
87 
89 
36 
88 
81 
93 
88 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
? 
2 
2 
2 
*2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0, 
1787 
1591 
1679 
1679 
1617 
1605 
1653 
1797 
1645 
1535 
1571 
2169 
1461 
1523 
1497 
1900 
1900 
1557 
1974 
1549 
1613 
1630 
1637 
1496 
1736 
1500 
1545 
1893 
1749 
1907 
1694 
1869 
1677 
1875 
1579 
1682 
0, 
0, 
0. 
0. 
0.9402 
0.9582 
0.9311 
0.9311 
0.9442 
0.9406 
0.9875 
0.9391 
,9882 
.9563 
.9546 
.8808 
0.9532 
0.9520 
0.9640 
0.9195 
0.9195 
0.9682 
0.9381 
0.9650 
0.9578 
0.9761 
.9707 
.9452 
.9280 
.9613 
.9625 
0.9164 
0.9383 
0.9223 
.9952 
.9115 
.9944 
.9163 
.9518 
.9240 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0, 
0. 
0, 
0, 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0, 
0.9762 
0.9862 
0.9817 
0.9817 
0.9849 
0.9849 
0.9860 
0.9781 
0.9857 
0.9869 
0.9862 
0.9496 
0.9886 
0.9869 
0.9896 
0.9666 
0.9666 
0.9872 
0.9767 
0.9875 
0.98.59 
0.9861 
0.9857 
0.9867 
0.9737 
0.9890 
0.9875 
0.9664 
0.9774 
0.9665 
0.9858 
0.9666- 
0.9857 
0.9667 
0.9850 
0.9853 
1983.11 
3483.14 
259 7.23 
2597.23 
3163.01 
3172.00 
3421.31 
2166.30 
3354.69 
3661.77 
3470.47 
898.58 
4227.70 
3666.19 
4634.92 
1393.59 
1393.59 
3749.83 
2026.98 
3852.16 
3393.14 
3448.31 
3359.66 
3604.72 
1789.02 
4372.15 
3847.52 
1385.08 
2092.04 
1390.89 
3372.52 
1393.25 
3341.-44 
1396.77 
3197.02 
3263.37 
0.8596 
0.8596 
0.8587 
0.8587 
0.8587 
0.8580 
0.8580 
0.8579 
0.8578 
0.8578 
0.8577 
0.8574 
0.8572 
0.8570 
0.8567 
0.8565 
0,8564 
0.8563 
0.8558 
0.8558 
0.8558 
0.8557 
0.8552 
0.8550 
0.85A6.. 
0.8545 
0.8542 
0.8541 
0.8539 
0.8536 
0.8530 
0.8528 
0.8525 
0.8521 
0.8505 
0.8505 
277.32 
277.31 
275.20 
275.20 
275.12 
273.40 
273.34 
273.25 
273.03 
272.89 
272.83 
271.96 
271.58 
270.97 
270.36 
269.74 
269.68 
269.43 
268.29 
268.22 
268.17 
268.03 
266.71 
266.41' 
265.36 
265.15 
264.60 
264.17 
263.71 
263.24 
261.04 
261.38 
260.59 
259.77 
256.26 
256.15 
*  1—Linear Form; 2—Power Form; 3.—Log Form 
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Tabled (cont.) 
Breakpoint Hypothesis Test Results— 
Identification of All Evaluated Defined Factor 
Combination Subsets and Associated Equation Fit Results (Second Observed Variable Segment) 
V 
Total Won Won 
'      r1 
M .„ CALC Mult. Func- 
* unLC i-iult. 
Rank Factors Present No. of " by by tiona 1 Corr.„ 
Coefr. 
Corr.„ 
Coefr. Order 12 3 4 5 6  7 8 9 10 11 12 11 14 15 Engag. Attk. Def. Form* b b^ . F F    , 
—  —o —1 
75 •-■1 1 239 154 85 . 2 0.1849 0.9098 0.9665 1390.90 0.8486 252.19 
76 1 1 1 243 158 85 2 0.1737 0.9721 •0.9842 3026.44 0.8484 251.74 
77 1 1 1 1 250 159 91 2 0.1731 0.9599 0.9837 2923.68 0.8474 249.65 
78 1 1 1 253 166 87 2 0.1139 0.9951 0.9926 6584.41 0.8469 248.66 
79 1 1 230 149 81 2 0.1647 0.9738 0.9859 3410.52 0.8466 248.06 
' 80 1 1 1 254 166 88 2 0.1653 0.9572 0.9851 3218.22 0.8461 246.99 
"81 1 , 1 1 1 210 135 75 2 0.1575 0.9434 0.9853 3269.28 0."8460 246.80 
82 1 1 1 1 211 133 78 2 0.1646 0.9550 0.9851 3222.74 0.8459 246.47 
83 1 1 222 145 77 2 0.1602 0.9710 0.9863 3505.08 0.8456 245.99 
84 • 1 1 182 114 68 2 0.1135 0.9867 0.9920 6052.95 0.8453 245.35 
85 1 1 1 220 144 76 2 0.1562 0.9371 0.9854 3277.43 0.8449 244.50 
86 1 1 1 1 208 137 71 2 0.1695 0.9512 0.9839 2961.30 0.8448 244.29 
87 1 1 i 242 159 83 2 0.1695 0.9512 0.9839 2961.30 0.8447 244.04 
88 1 1 1 1 1 206 131 75 2 0.1554 0.9361 0.9855 3308.51 0.8446 243.78 
89 1 1 252 165 87 2 0.1629 0.9505 0.9849 3169.35 0.8444 243.39 
90 1 • 1 I 1 237 152 85 2 0.1587 0.9719 0.9877 3899.02 0.8443 243.21 
91 1 1 1 1 204 126 78 2 0.1547 0.9329 0.9854 3282.10 0.8440 242.59 
92 1 1 1 1 247 159 88 2 0.1587 0.9719 0.9877 3899.02 0.8437 242.02 
93 1 1 1 '219 136 83 2 0.1587 0.9719 0.9877 3899.02 0.8437 241.99 
94 1 l" 1 225 148 77 2 0.1576 0.9696 0.9877 3900.06 0.8437 241.99 
95 1 1 1 1 240 158 82 2 0.1571 0.9682 0.9877 3919.87 0.-8434 241.43 
96 1 1 1 229 149. ■ -..,80 2 0.1612 0.9438 0.9850 3204.18 0.8433 241.25 
97 1 1 1 248 163 85 2 0.1576 0.9696 0.9877 3900.06 0.8430 240.77 
98 1 1 1 1 1 255 161 94 2 0.1566 0.9655 0.9878 3952.50 0.8429 240.42 
99 I 1 1 252 162 90 2 0.1571 0.9682 0.9877 3919.87 0.8428 240.21 
100 I , 1 247 159 88 2 0.1554 0.9561 0.9863 3505.86 0.8422 239.04 
101 1 1 1 1 251 162 89 2 0.1561 0.9549 0.9868 3635.25 0.8418 238.27 
102 1 1 -1 247 157 90 2 0.1565 0.9561 0.9867 3608.44 0.8414 237.54 
103 1 1 248 156 92 2 0.1565 0.9561 0.9867 3608.44 0.8412 237.24 
104 1 1 249 162 87 2. 0.1188 1.0047 0.9927 6659.00 0.8408 236.37 
105 1 1 1 1 219 137 82 2 0.1406 0.9352 0.9873 3793.12 0.8401 235.06 
106 1 1 1 253 161 92 2 0.1406 0.9352 0.9873 3793.12 0.8400 234.89 
107 1 1 242 15d- 84 2 0.1004 0.9613 0.9922 6170.77 0.8383 231.66 
108 1 1 1 240 153 87 2 0.1380 0.9270 0.9868 3635.05 0.8382 231.59 
' 109^ 1 248 156 92 2 0.1166 0.9928 0.9921 6151.94 0.8377 230.49 
110 1 1 248 162 86 2 0.1564 0.9947 0.9903 4972.64 0.8256 209.82 
1—Linear Form; 2—Pov/er Form; 3—Log Form 
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Table C.l (cont.) 
 Breakpoint Hypothesis Test Results—, 
Identification of All Evaluated Defined~Factor 
Combination Subsets and Associated Equation Fit Results (Second Observed Variable Segment) 
Rank  _ 
Order 1 
Total Won 
 No. of by 
1   1   A 1   A _7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Engag. Attk. 
Factors Present 
Won 
-by 
Def. 
Func- 
tional 
Form*   b 
€Afc€- 
*1 
Mult. 
Corr., 
Coeffl 
Mult. 
Corr., 
Coeffl 
± -1 
in 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
254 
241 
247 
239 
233 
221 
228 
231 
249 
240 
250 
251 
242 
162 
150 
160 
153 
149 
137 
149 
150 
163 
152 
157 
163 
153 
92 
91 
87 
86 
84 
84 
79 
81 
86 
88 
93 
88 
89 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0.0672 
0.0654 
0.0173 
0.0190 
0.0162 
0,0176 
0.0341 
0.0895 
0.0622 
0.0621 
0.0123 
0.0465 
0.0418 
0.9001 
0.9245 
0.9458 
0.9541 
0.9435 
0.9392 
0.9411 
0.8904 
0.9174 
0.9761 
0.9837 
0.9493 
0.9532 
0.9805 
0.9833 
0.9949 
0.9957 
0.9948 
0.9944 
0.9939 
0.9713 
0.9854 
0.9897 
0.9996 
.0.9963 
0.9962 
2438.34 
2856.18 
9548.32 
11255.57 
9418.23 
8606.36 
7899.82 
1631.32 
3272.37 
4667.96 
100000 + 
13039.99 
12964.84 
0.8214 
0.8190 
0.8163 
0.8156 
0.8141 
0.8130 
0.8091 
0.8086 
0.8030 
0.7928 
0.7846 
0.7582 
0.7286 
203.18 
199.61 
195.72 
194.78 
192.58 
191.13 
185.80" 
185.05 
177.85 
165.76 
156.91 
132.51 
11(L:87 
1—Linear Form; 2—Power Form; 3—Log Form 
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Table C.2 
Breakpoint Hypothesis Test Results— 
Component Observed Variables for Subsets 
of All Evaluated Defined Factor Combinations (Second Observed Variable Segment) 
3 ro    CN 
Cv)cn<fCN(SrOrr .. >«      JH      rH     O      i-H      0>J OdpcJfNJ 
>*      >H     >*     H     CU     &,     Cu r-(n<r pdtifcPdDdOJ H     H     O 
Multiple eMcn<i'<sj<;<:><SH>4iHcnsrinrHn«3-,ir»vo2;ss?i5 asu.p^DjPu'-icNncn 
Rank    Correlation    o    o    2    2    2   VJ    oao2222<5<^«i:<d<^<5<:<dorfKSHfeH«22MMH-- 
Order Coefficient    WuaoQ3:uawuHHHHs5SsS:wwwsa<:Qw<i;<:<;ocju H     H     tn 
1 .      0.9241 111 111 11                «             1 
2 0.9184 111 1.11 111                             1                                    11 
3 0.9182 111 11 1.1                             1                                    11 
4 0.9181 111 1 1                                      11 
5 0.9170 * 1 11111 
6 0.9167 1 111111 11 
7 0.9164' 1111 1 11                                     1                                      11 
8 0.9146 1 1 
9 0.9099 11 11 11 
1Q 0.9097 111                         11 11 
11 0.9010 11 1           1   '   '   1 1                               1 
12 0.8987 "    "i \ 1 r"~                                1     1 
13 0.8959 1 '•■ 1                                                                          11 
14 0.8942 11 11 1, 
15 0.8929 11 1                                                             11 
16 0.8903 1111 
17 0.8773 111 1                  1 1       '                                    1 
18 0.8717 1111 l, 11                                                             1            .         .     . 
19 0.8717 11 111.1 1                  11                        1                                      1 
20 0.8702 1111 1111 1 
21 0.8673 11111 1 1 
22 0.8667 11111 •- 11 
23 0.8647 11 111 1    1     1    |                         11                               11 
24 0.8643 ,11 111 111/                          111                        11- 
25 0.8634 "fill , '*           £"          1     1 
26 0.8631 11 11 11                 '            111                      '11 
27- 0.8627 11                         11 ll'i                  11                               11 
28 0.8624 111111 111 11- 
29 0.8616 1111111 111 11 
30 0.8614 11 111 11-                    11 
31 0.8612 111111 11 1                                      11 
32 0.8606, 11 11-11 11111                                                                11 
33 0.8604                -11.1 111 11 111                        1 
34 0.8604 111 11 1                               111                        1 
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Table C.2 (cont.) 
Breakpoint Hypothesis Test Results— 
Component Observed Variables for Subsets ^ 
of All Evaluated Defined Factor Combinations (Second Observed Variable Segment) 
Rank 
Order 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Coef ficientr- 
CN 
S3 
a 
ss 
S3 
O 
S3 
W 
CM 
a 
ro. 
3 
Q 
1 
o 
a 
CN 
5! 
u 
M 
CM 
PL. 
a 
S3 
u 
co 
PM 
a 
W 
a 
S3 
3 
w 
H 
c*l 
w 
H 
3 
w 
H H 
H H 
r-K 
S3 
CO 
CO SE
AS
N3
 
SE
AS
N4
 
 
' 
oS g 
CM 
OS g 
E2 
to 
H 
H 
< 
c3 
m 
O 
Cn 
Ut 
W 
H 
W 
CO 
O 
OS 
< 
3 
PL. 
M 
<: 
CN 
OS 
PL, 
CO 
OS 
M 
< 
OS 
< 
CN 
OS 
M 
2 
CO 
OS 
d 
OS 
H 
CN 
OS 
H 
W 
PM 
H 
CN 
O 
M 
H 
35 0.8602 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
36 0.8601 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 
37 6.8598 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 
38 0.8596 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 
39 0.8596 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 
40 0.8596 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
41 - 0.8587 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
42 0.8587 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 
43 0.8587 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 • 1 I 
44 0.8580 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1' l 
45 0.8580 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 
46 0.8579 j 1 1 1   ■ 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 
47 0.8578 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I '' 
48 0.85781 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
49 0.8577' I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
50 0.8574 1 1 1 1 
51 0.8572 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
52 0.8570 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
53 0.8567 1 1 I 1 1 1 J 
1 
1 1 1 1 
54 0.8565 I -1 1 1 1   ' '  1 
-H& 1 1 I 55 0.8564 I 1 1 1 1 1 ^ u 1 
56 0.8563 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
57 0.8558 1 1 1 1 1 1 
58 0.8558 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
59 0.8558 1- 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 I 
' 60 0.8557 I 1 1 1>' ' 1 1 1 1 1 I 
61 0.8552 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
62 '  0.8550 I .1 1' '   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
63 0.8546 I 1 1 1. 1 1 1 I 
64 0.8545 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 
65 0.8542 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 
66 0.8541 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 
67 0.8539 «** i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 
68 0.8536 I 1 1 1 1 J 1 1 
69 0.85 3Q 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 I 
70 -   0.8528 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 
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Table C.2 (cont.) 
Breakpoint Hypothesis Test Results— 
Component Observed Variables for Subsets 
of All Evaluated Defined Factor Combinations (Second Observed Variable Segment) 
Rank 
Order 
Multiple        CM 
Correlation, o 
Coefficient   w 
ro 
25 
O 
25 
CM 
3 
Q 
3 
a 
§ 
Q 
CN 
H 
< 
CM 
PU 
o 
25 
W 
CO 
PU 
CJ 
25 
W 
o 
w 13 TE
RR
5 
WE
AT
l en H 
S 
H H 
<X5 
H 
w 
co SE
AS
N3
 
SE
AS
N4
 
o 
53 
"2 
o 
Pi 
CO 
H 
H 
< 
CO 
■fn 
W 
O 
W 
H U 
CO 
o 
erf 
PM 
2 
PU 
M 
< 
CM 
Pd 
PH 
S3 
M 
<: 
Oi 
M 
< 
CM 
M 
< 
en 
Oi 
M 
<: 
u 
CO 
ptj 
H 
ft 
CM 
H 
CM 
o 
M 
H 
71 0.8525 i 1 I 1 1 1 l 1 
72 0.8521 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
73 0.8505 l 1 '■ 1 l 1 1 1 1 l 
74 0.8505 ' 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 l 
75 0.8486 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 
76 0.8484 1 l 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
77 0.8474 I 1 l 1 1 1 .1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 
78 0.8469 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 
79 0.8466 l 1 1 1 1 l 1 
80 0.8461 l 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 
81 0.8460 1 1 I 1 l 
.1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 l 1 
82 0.8459 l 1 l i 1 1 1 1 1 1 -• 1 1 
83 0.8456 l 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 
84 ' 0.8453 1 i 1 1    .. 1 1 1 
85 0.8449 1 1 l 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
86 0.8448 I 1 l I 1 •1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
87 0.8447 I 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 
88 Q.8446 1 1 I 1 l I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
89 0.8444 I 1 l 1 1 1 1 l 1 
»  
90 0.8443 1 l 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
91 0.8440 1 1 I 1 l i 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 
92 0.8437 • 1 I 1 l I 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 l 
93 0.8437 1 I 1 l 1 1 1 1 •1 1 1 
94 0.8437 1 I 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 
'95 0.8434 1 I 1 l i 1. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
'96 0.8433 I 1 l I 1 1 1 1 l 1 
97 0.8430 1 I 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 l 
98 0.8429 1 I 1 l I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l f 
99 0.8428 1 I 1 l I 1 1 1 1 1< l 
100 0.8422 I 1 1 i 1 1. 1 l 
101 0.8418 I 1 l l 1 1 1 "l 1 1 1 1 l 
102 0.8414 I 1 l i 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 
103 0.8412 I 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 
104 0.8408 1 I « 1 1 1 l 
105 0.8401 1 1 I 1 l l 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 
106 0.84*00 1 1 I 1 l 1 1 1 
». 
1 1 1 ' l 
—a^^ 
187 
•t™: 
I-1  M  M- t-*  t-1 t—■   (—■ I—" I—*- f—"   I—*  I—• 
0000000«)VDifl\D>0^iOVO,OvO  COM  OOMOOOOOOOOfflOOMMvlslMvjNj-JM 
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 
O300000O00a)ro0OCOCOCOCOCOCOCOCO0OCO0O00C»00CO00CO0000t»00CDCO000O00.0()00 
OOOHJMM^M^OJLOLOU)U)LOi>f>t-X>-C-4>t><_nU1U1C3NCTN<^(^-~JOOOOOOrsOKJ 
OM00tOi>00h000V0OU)X>~O^J-^JO0JX><^^J00^0L0aN^0Ol-'O>vOi>£--0>l-nLn)--JUl 
oo 
(-•  (-•  M' (-• •"-•   l-»   M   M 
O W 
i-t to 
a. 3 
TO 7T 
M 
o o 
o o S 
ro  i-i  c 
Hi ^ H 
i-ft (B rt 
H-  (-'  P- 
o  cu *d 
H- rt t— 
fD    p-  TO 
a O 
~NP 
ENGN2 
ENGN3 
DURDAY2 
DURDWY3 
DURDAY4U 
WILCAT2 
ENGTYP2 
ENGTYP3 
ENGTYP4 
TERR1 
TERR3 
TERRA 
TERR5 
WEAT1 
WE AT 3 
WEAT4 
WEAK 
WEAT6 
SEASN1 
SEASN3 
SEASN4 
MORI 
M0R2 
ATTSURY 
DEFSURY 
SETEFF1... 
AIRSPRO 
AIRSPR1 
AIRSPR2 
CAIR1 
CAIR2 
CAIR3 
TPERSTR3 
TPERSTR2 
FRATI02 
o 
i-h 
> 
< 
t-> 
c 
w 
rt 
<T> 
Q. 
O 
n> n 
i-h o 
2 ^ TO   O 
>-t  en 
,ro   EC 
O >-l  ^ 
° < -o 
3 (ii   o C O. rt 
3* 
< ro d)   en 
rr I-I H- 
o (u 
S   °* H 
^   Hit (0   oi 
n  o   ro 
2  i  oi 5     c 
"•  t/l   H 
C  ■-» o a* 
S* w 
(D 
01 
09 
H 
fD 
01 
T3 
O 
H- 
3 
3 
01 I 
3 
a. 
< 
I-I 
H- 
&1 
a* 
F^ 
(0 
c/3 
ro 
cro 
B 
(D 
3 
H 
(11 
cr 
n 
o 
o 
3 
•Table C.2 (cont.) 
Breakpoint Hypothesis Test Results— 
fr Component Observed Variables for Subsets 
of All Evaluated Defined Factor Combinations (Second Observed Variable Segment) 
Multiple ^ M 
Rank Correlation g g 
Order Coefficient2 g g 
CM  en 
5 5 
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107. 0.8383 
108 0.8382 
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110 0.8256 
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112 0.8190 
113 0.8163 
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Table C.3 
Breakpoint Hypothesis Test Results— 
Identification of All Evaluated Defined Factor Combination 
Subsets and Associated Equation Fit Results (First Observed Variable Segment) 
Rank 
Order 
Total Won  Won Func- 
Factors Present    No. of by   by • tional * 
i 2. 1   h.   1   iL   Engag. Attk. Def. Form*   b 
± CALG 
Mult. 
Corr._ 
bx  Coeff. 
€Ate 
Mult. 
Corr._ 
CoeffT  ' F 
220  133 87 0.1299 0.9076 0.9890 4362.03 0.8377 230.66 
* 1—Linear Form; 2—Power Form; 3—Log Form 
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Table C.A 
Breakpoint Hypothesis Test Results— ■- 
Component Observed Variables for Subsets of All Evaluated 
Defined Factot Combinations (First Observed Variable Segment) 
Multiple >H H fa- 
Rank   Correlation- z; q 5 P 
Order  Coefficient z 5. H z 
    : — w a ts w 
O ro K: 
rg § lu a; H CN CNI z: lu pj o C/3 
ftj H to rv 3 W in erf Crf 
Pi ■s JS- orf V3 H Pi M W w o H W M ■d P- H in S-* « C/l <: H 
1      0.8377      11    1 
* 
190 
■J 
o 
f-n- •~> 
M> O 
a 3 
T a 
n. o 
3 
-i o 
CD 3 
n rr 
<-• 
o O Cd 
-i T -t 
7) Q 
n O SJ 
o -1 X 
a <; 3 
-cr o O 
»-'• C~ M- 
n 3 
:J ^ rr 
rr M 
h-*- •-I ;~ 
O M- "^ 
3 PJ 3 
7) T O 
■—i rr 
^—* T> cr 
T] 71 ra 
>-•• 71 
-I '-*! r-*. 
71 O 71 
rr •~f 
H 
O ./i o 
a" c 7! 
71 cr r-r 
ro 7S 
1 o •,rJ 
^ r-r !Xi 
re 71 17) 
a. ■V 
O »—* 
•-^ —r, <-r 
£; 71 
>-i ^* 1 
M. i—■ 1 
£> ,—. 
s 
—< m 
o 
'/I .—. 
J*3 
£ 
3 r-r 
1) O 
3 Cl. 
o 
VITA 
The investigator was also an undergraduate of Lehigh University.- He 
received his Bachelor of Science in Industrial Engineering in 1976, also 
completing the AFROTC program there. He was born in New York City, 
New York on May 8, 1954, the son of Robert and Margaret (nee Hayes) 
Greene, and presently resides in Virginia. Mr. Greene has worked for the 
Santa.Fe Corporation and the Adler Corporation as a military operations 
research analyst. His assignments at the Adler Corporation included the 
development of several tactical and campaign-level naval engagement 
models /and the evaluation of naval weapon, sensor and other ship 
systems. At the Santa Fe Corporation his project work included the 
development of several campai/jn-level stimulation models to evaluate 
alternative future U.S. naval nuclear force structures, a discrete time- 
event simulation for the analysis of drydock utilization, and a 
comprehensive resource allocation model for analyzing ship and aircraft 
resource requirements. Currently he is employed as a System Engineer at 
the MITRE Corporation in their Command, Control and Communications 
Division. » 
In addition Mr. Greene is an Active Reserve Captain, USAF, serving as an 
Imagery Analysis Officer attached to the Air Force Intelligence Service. 
191 
